Publication date: November 17, 2026
Legal status as of 12 November 2026
News media increasingly operate in real time: a television broadcast, an online stream and a social media post are produced in parallel, and every editorial decision leaves a trace in IT systems. For law enforcement, this creates new sources of evidence; for newsrooms, new risks. Taking as an example a prosecutor’s order requiring a licensed broadcaster to produce a broadcast recording and logs from its playout and graphics systems, we discuss the limits of these powers, the protection of journalistic privilege, the legal status of digital material and the rules of liability for live reporting.
News delivery has largely moved into the digital environment. Television broadcasts simultaneously via terrestrial, satellite, cable and internet distribution, and clips from live coverage reach social media within minutes. Streaming by online newsrooms and by journalists themselves is also growing in importance. During live coverage, viewers receive at the same time the camera image, the reporter’s words, the presenter’s commentary and on-screen news banners added in the studio. Each of these elements is created at a different point in the production chain, and each leaves a different trace in IT systems.
Polish press law is conceptually prepared for this shift. Article 7(2)(1) of the Press Law defines the press as including all existing means of mass communication and those emerging as a result of technical progress, including broadcasting stations, which disseminate periodical publications in print, video, audio or by any other technique.[1] Press material is any text or image of an informative, journalistic, documentary or other nature that has been published or submitted for publication (Article 7(2)(4)). A news banner displayed for a few seconds, without an author’s name and generated by graphics software, is therefore press material to the same extent as a newspaper article.
The differences lie in public-law obligations. A broadcaster operating under a licence from the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) is subject to the Broadcasting Act,[2] including the obligation to record and retain its output (Article 20). An online-only newsroom or the author of a social media stream is, as a rule, not subject to that obligation, although it may fall under the Press Law and, in the case of on-demand audiovisual media services or video-sharing platforms, under separate provisions of the Broadcasting Act. This distinction determines which recordings must exist at all when a prosecutor demands that they be produced.
A prosecutor’s order has recently been publicly reported, issued in proceedings concerning, among other offences, the offence under Article 223a § 1 of the Penal Code, in connection with live reporting for which the newsroom produced on-screen banners in real time. The legal basis cited was Article 217 §§ 1, 2 and 3, Article 236a and Article 180 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read together with Article 20(1) of the Broadcasting Act. The demand was addressed to the company operating the television station and to its editor-in-chief personally, or to another authorised person. It covered:
1. a file containing the recording of the programme as broadcast (the so-called statutory recording, rejestr ustawowy) from a specified day, channel and time range, covering the report from the scene of a police intervention, stored on a commonly used data carrier (DVD, USB flash drive or external hard drive) in a format allowing playback without loss of quality;
2. logs from the playout system and from the system used to edit on-screen graphics, identifying account names, the personal data of the account users and their roles in the system, relating to the same programme, day and hours, stored on the same type of carrier.
At the same time, the prosecutor released an authorised employee from the duty of professional secrecy (tajemnica służbowa) with respect to the information requested (Article 180 § 1 CCP) and set a three-day deadline for compliance, citing the running of procedural time limits.
At first glance, this is a routine evidential measure. In fact, the order combines three categories of material with different legal status: a recording of published output, technical data about the broadcast, and information revealing the editorial process and the identity of individuals. Each requires separate assessment.
Such a demand cannot be assessed solely under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Polish Constitution guarantees freedom of the press and other means of social communication (Article 14) and freedom to express opinions and to acquire and disseminate information (Article 54), and any restriction of those freedoms must satisfy the proportionality test in Article 31(3). Equivalent guarantees follow from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Court of Human Rights consistently treats the protection of journalistic sources as one of the basic conditions of press freedom, since without it sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public.[3]
Since 8 August 2025, Article 4 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[4] has applied, for the first time expressly protecting journalistic sources and confidential communications in EU law. It covers, among other things, demands for disclosure of such information and searches and seizures, including those directed at employees of a media service provider or persons who, by reason of a regular relationship with it, may hold such information (Article 4(3)(a)-(b)). A derogation is permissible only under the conditions in Article 4(4): it must be provided for in national or EU law, justified by an overriding reason of public interest, proportionate and, in principle, subject to prior authorisation by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority. Subsequent authorisation without undue delay is allowed only in duly justified exceptional and urgent cases.
The EMFA does not prohibit obtaining recordings that have already been broadcast publicly. An apparently technical demand for logs must, however, be assessed by reference to what it may actually reveal. The activity history of an account in a graphics system may show not only when a caption was displayed, but also who proposed it, who changed its wording and who was consulted on its content. That is already the territory of confidential editorial communication.
Newsrooms often ask whether a broadcaster may refuse to hand over a recording because it “owns” it. In criminal proceedings, the decisive factor is not ownership but control over the evidence. Article 217 § 1 CCP imposes the obligation to produce on anyone holding an item that may constitute evidence, and Article 236a CCP extends the rules on production and search, mutatis mutandis, to the holder and user of a device or IT system with respect to the data stored in it.[5] The obligation therefore falls on whoever actually controls the file or system, regardless of who holds the economic rights in it.
Exclusive rights do not prevent the material from being used in proceedings, but they structure the relationships between those involved in production. A single recording typically involves:
• copyright of journalists and production staff in works created in the course of employment, which passes to the employer within the limits of the purpose of the employment contract (Article 12 of the Copyright Act);[6]
• the broadcaster’s related rights in its broadcasts (Article 97 of that Act);
• third-party rights in agency footage, witness recordings and content taken from social media and used in the report;
• personal data of employees recorded in the logs and of persons visible in the footage.
Article 33² of the Copyright Act permits the use of works for the purposes of public security and of judicial and administrative proceedings. Producing a broadcast recording to a prosecutor therefore does not require the consent of the authors or of the holders of rights in third-party material. Under the GDPR,[7] disclosure of employee data in compliance with an order is based on the controller’s legal obligation (Article 6(1)(c)), and subsequent processing by the prosecution service is governed by the rules implementing Directive 2016/680.[8] The journalistic exemption (Article 85 GDPR and Article 2 of the Polish Personal Data Protection Act)[9] relieves the newsroom of some information obligations but does not release it from the duty to produce evidence.
Economic rights do, however, matter for further use of the material. A copy handed to the authorities serves the proceedings only and does not authorise its dissemination. Newsrooms should also bear in mind that the term “publisher” (wydawca) has a legal meaning in the Press Law (the entity carrying out the publishing process and bearing financial liability, Articles 8 and 38), distinct from the newsroom position of “programme editor” (also called wydawca in Polish). In practice, this overlap in terminology leads to errors in identifying the addressees of orders and the persons responsible.
Article 20(1) of the Broadcasting Act requires a broadcaster to record programmes, advertisements and other broadcasts and to retain the recordings for 28 days from transmission or, where a broadcast has become the subject of proceedings before a state authority, until those proceedings end. The details are set out in the KRRiT Regulation of 28 September 2017:[10] the recording must be a digital file containing the material in full and unaltered, of a quality ensuring intelligible sound and legible images, and must be appropriately labelled and protected.
Three practical conclusions follow.
First, Article 20(1) is the basis for archiving, not for the demand. The prosecutor’s power derives from the CCP; the reference to the Broadcasting Act merely indicates that the material should exist.
Second, the statutory recording documents the final output that reached viewers, including sound and overlaid graphics. The reporter’s camera feed alone, without the banner added in the studio, may not reproduce the content under investigation.
Third, a demand for a file “without loss of quality” must be read by reference to the quality of the recording the broadcaster actually holds. The Regulation does not require retention of uncompressed source material, and lost detail cannot be recovered. Proper compliance means supplying the existing file without further conversion. Nor can the obligation in Article 20 be extended to logs of all newsroom systems: neither the Act nor the Regulation provides for 28-day retention of banner editing histories or of the mapping of accounts to employees. Whether such data exist depends on the configuration of the systems and the broadcaster’s own policy.
The order, and subsequently the production record, should describe the material in a way that allows a court to establish later exactly what the evidence is, where it comes from and whether it has been altered. Terms used in newsrooms do not always have statutory equivalents, so it is worth translating them explicitly.
| Technical term | Legal classification | How to describe it in the order or record |
| Broadcast signal, playout | Programme within the meaning of Art. 4(2) of the Broadcasting Act; subject of the recording under Art. 20(1) | Channel, date, time range to the second, time zone |
| Statutory recording (broadcast file) | IT data (Art. 236a CCP) recording press material | File name, format and codec, size, duration, checksum (e.g. SHA-256) |
| On-screen banner, news ticker | Press material (Art. 7(2)(4) Press Law), part of the programme | Wording, display time by the recording’s timecode |
| Playout system log | IT data on system events | System name and version, scope of events, period, time source |
| Graphics editing history | IT data; potentially confidential editorial communication | Type of events (creation, change, approval, transmission), period |
| User account and role | Personal data; potentially information protected by Art. 180 §§ 2-3 CCP | Account identifier, organisational assignment, confidentiality claim |
| Carrier (DVD, USB, hard drive) | Means of storing the copy, not the evidence itself | Type and labelling of the carrier, method of sealing |
What is key to evidential value is preserving the original format and metadata, calculating a checksum at export, describing the time source and any differences between system clocks, identifying the person performing the export and the tool used, and documenting the subsequent chain of custody of the carrier. These are recommendations of good forensic practice rather than requirements laid down expressly in the KRRiT Regulation, but in a dispute over authenticity they determine whether the material is usable.
The limitations of each source must also be borne in mind. The broadcast recording shows the exact wording and display time of a caption, but not who wrote and approved it. The playout log documents the start and end of transmission, not the editorial decision. The editing history shows successive versions of the text but does not establish whether the account user was their sole author. A username in a log requires interpretation: the account may have been shared, an operation may have been automated, and an entry may mean writing the text as well as merely displaying it.
Legal language knows no general concept of obtaining materials “by force”. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for three distinct measures with separate conditions.
Demand for production. Under Article 217 § 1 CCP, items that may constitute evidence must be handed over at the request of a court or prosecutor and, in urgent cases, also of the police or another authorised body. The person holding the item is requested to hand it over voluntarily (§ 2), and a record of the measure is drawn up (Article 217 § 3 read with Article 228).
Compulsory seizure. If the item is not handed over voluntarily, it may be taken by compulsion (Article 217 § 5 CCP). This provision, rather than § 3, is the basis for compulsion.
Search. Where the evidence must first be located, Articles 219-220 CCP apply. A search requires reasonable grounds to believe that the item or data sought are in a particular place and, as a rule, an order of a court or prosecutor. Acting without one is permitted only in urgent cases, subject to subsequent approval. The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights has stressed the importance of these safeguards in the seizure of a journalist’s computer.[11]
All these measures are subject to Article 227 CCP, which requires them to be carried out in accordance with their purpose, within the limits necessary, with restraint and with respect for the dignity of the persons concerned. For a television newsroom, this has practical significance: if the evidential objective can be achieved by exporting specified files and a limited range of logs, seizing servers or workstations requires particularly compelling justification.
The most serious problem with the order concerns the procedure for releasing staff from confidentiality. Article 180 § 1 CCP allows a prosecutor to release a person from the duty of confidentiality connected with their profession or function, including professional secrecy. Using that term in an order does not, however, determine the actual nature of the information requested.
Journalistic privilege is subject to the special regime of Article 180 § 2 CCP. Release from it is possible only where it is necessary for the interests of justice and the fact in question cannot be established by other evidence. In the investigative phase, the decision lies with a court on the prosecutor’s application, not with the prosecutor alone. The same limitations apply to documents containing privileged information (Article 226 CCP). The Commissioner for Human Rights has emphasised that a demand for production of a document cannot be used to circumvent judicial review.[12]
The scope of this privilege is broad. Article 15(3) of the Press Law extends it to other employees of newsrooms, publishers and other press organisations. The National Public Prosecutor’s Office has referred in this context to, among others, IT staff and archivists.[13] Addressing the demand to a system administrator rather than to a journalist therefore does not change the nature of the information the authority is seeking.
Article 180 § 3 CCP goes further, protecting data enabling the identification of the author of press material, a letter to the editor or other material of that kind, and of persons providing information, where they have requested that such data not be disclosed. The only exception to this prohibition concerns the offences listed in Article 240 § 1 of the Penal Code (Article 180 § 4). Article 223a § 1 of the Penal Code is not on that list. If the order also refers to “other” offences, their legal classification and connection with the protected information must be specified.
This does not mean that every caption writer or technical employee is an anonymous source. It must be established whether the data actually identify a protected author or informant, or reveal confidential communications. Article 180 § 5 CCP also preserves a journalist’s liability for an offence committed through publication. The conclusion for the order described is nonetheless clear: a prosecutor’s release from professional secrecy can extend only to information genuinely subject to it. It does not replace the court order required for journalistic privilege and does not lift the protection of the identity of authors and sources.
When documents designated by the newsroom as privileged are seized, Article 225 § 1 CCP also applies: once it is declared that they contain information subject to privilege, the authority passes them unread to the court or prosecutor in a sealed package. The exceptions in § 2, including those concerning documents held by a suspect, do not automatically remove the evidential restrictions in Article 226.
The importance of these safeguards is underlined by Strasbourg case law. In Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that interference with source protection requires prior review by an independent body capable of weighing whether the public interest outweighs the protection of the source before the investigating authority gains access to the material.[14] Review after the data have been examined does not provide genuine protection.
Establishing what was broadcast is only the first step. The second is attributing responsibility to specific individuals, which depends on their actual involvement in publication rather than on who appeared on screen or is registered as the account holder.
At broadcaster level, Article 13(1) of the Broadcasting Act makes the broadcaster responsible for the content of its programme service while preserving the liability of others for individual broadcasts. Article 25(1) and (4) of the Press Law sets out the duties and responsibility of the editor-in-chief. Neither provision allows an offence to be attributed automatically to the person managing the newsroom.
| Role | Matters to establish |
| Reporter | Own words, information passed to the newsroom, involvement in drafting the banner, knowledge of its content |
| Banner author or editor | Choice of wording, change of meaning, source of information, decision to publish |
| Programme editor, duty editor | Scope of approval, instructions given, opportunity to respond to an error |
| Graphics system operator | Whether they acted technically or had editorial influence |
| Editor-in-chief | Organisation of work, supervision, involvement in publication, specific duties |
Criminal liability requires proof of the elements of the offence and the culpability of the particular individual (Article 1 § 3, Articles 8-9 and Article 18 of the Penal Code).[15] However, Article 49a read with Article 37a of the Press Law must be taken into account: an editor may be liable for negligently allowing the publication of material fulfilling the elements of an offence. Since an editor is any journalist who decides or co-decides on publication (Article 7(2)(6)), this provision is not limited to the editor-in-chief and may concern the person approving banners during a live broadcast.
Civil liability has separate foundations. The author, the editor or another person who caused the publication is liable for an infringement caused by publishing press material, jointly and severally with the publisher as regards financial liability (Article 38(1) of the Press Law). A person affected by a broadcast may seek protection of personality rights under Articles 23-24 and 448 of the Civil Code.[16] The Supreme Court has accepted, in a civil case, a rebuttable factual presumption that the editor-in-chief influenced publication;[17] it must not, however, be carried over into criminal liability.
Standard of care. Article 12(1) of the Press Law requires particular diligence and reliability in gathering and using press material, including in drafting banners. In live coverage, it is essential to distinguish between the reporter’s own observation, a witness account and conjecture. If the reporter says “according to one witness” but the banner presents the information as established fact, the meaning of the message changes, and responsibility may shift to the person who removed the qualification. The pace of a live broadcast does not suspend professional standards, but it affects what could realistically be expected. The availability of reliable sources, signalling of uncertainty, response to conflicting information and prompt correction all matter. According to the resolution of a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2005, demonstrating action in defence of a socially justified interest and the exercise of particular diligence excludes the unlawfulness of an infringement of personality rights.[18] Correction under Article 31a of the Press Law is a separate remedy.
Article 223a § 1 of the Penal Code, in force since 1 January 2023,[19] penalises publicly inciting the disclosure of information about the private life of an officer of a public security authority or of the Prison Service, where disclosure may endanger that officer or a person close to them. It should not be confused with Article 223 § 1 (active assault) or with Article 223b, which concerns the disclosure of such information itself.
In relation to a television report, it must be established whether the particular message contained incitement to disclose information, whether that information concerned the officer’s private life, whether its disclosure could create a danger, and who created or knowingly disseminated the message. Merely showing an intervention, describing official conduct or criticising officers does not fulfil these elements. This is particularly significant for press freedom: documenting the actions of public officials in a public place is a classic exercise of the media’s watchdog function.
Context also matters. Reporting that someone made a particular appeal has a different meaning from an appeal made by the newsroom itself. In Jersild v. Denmark, the ECtHR held that punishing a journalist for disseminating statements made by interviewees in a news report would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to public debate and requires particularly strong reasons.[20] This is not immunity, but a requirement to assess the purpose and the report as a whole.
Persons whose rights have been infringed by an order concerning production of items may file an interlocutory appeal (Article 236 § 1 CCP). In the investigative phase, it is heard by the district court in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are conducted. The deadline is seven days from announcement or service of the order (Article 460 CCP), and filing the appeal does not suspend enforcement unless the authority decides otherwise (Article 462 CCP).
The three-day deadline does not derive from statute; it was set by the authority. A reference to the running of procedural time limits does not lift the protection of privilege, does not replace judicial review and does not establish that the scope of the demand is proportionate. If exporting the data within that time is technically impossible, the broadcaster should promptly and specifically demonstrate this, stating the size of the archive, the export time or the need to separate protected data.
In practice, we recommend that broadcasters divide their response into three parts:
1. the broadcast recording – production of the existing file with a checksum and a description of its origin, which usually raises no concerns;
2. technical playout logs – production to the extent necessary to establish the time and content of the broadcast, with a description of the system and time source;
3. editing history, accounts and personal data – a claim of journalistic privilege to the extent that the data reveal confidential editorial communication or the identity of an author, together with a request to apply the procedure under Article 225 and Article 180 § 2 CCP.
It is also worth acting in advance: adopting a log retention policy consistent with the GDPR and editorial needs, using individual rather than shared accounts, synchronising system clocks, recording versions and approvals of banners, and putting in place an internal procedure for handling law enforcement requests with the involvement of a lawyer and the data protection officer.
Digital news production means that every editorial decision leaves a trace that may become evidence. Polish law gives prosecutors effective tools to obtain broadcast recordings and data from newsroom IT systems. The same provisions, supplemented by the Constitution, the Convention and the European Media Freedom Act, nonetheless set clear limits: data revealing the editorial process and the identity of authors and sources require judicial review, not merely a prosecutor’s decision.
The key conclusion has two parts. An obligation to produce evidence does not mean a right to unlimited use of all the data disclosed. Conversely, establishing who performed an operation in a system does not yet determine who is responsible for the content of the broadcast. Cases involving live coverage require both analyses: a procedural assessment of whether the material was lawfully obtained and an individual assessment of each person’s involvement in publication.
[1] Act of 26 January 1984 – Press Law (Prawo prasowe), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2018, item 1914, as amended.
[2] Act of 29 December 1992 on Radio and Television Broadcasting (ustawa o radiofonii i telewizji), consolidated text as amended (the “Broadcasting Act”), in particular Articles 4, 13, 20 and 33.
[3] ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 14 September 2010, application no. 38224/03; see also ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 March 1996, application no. 17488/90.
[4] Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act), OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, Articles 4 and 29.
[5] Act of 6 June 1997 – Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2026, item 490, as amended (“CCP”).
[6] Act of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights (ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2025, item 24, as amended, in particular Articles 12, 33² and 97.
[7] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1, as amended (“GDPR”).
[8] Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89; Act of 14 December 2018 on the protection of personal data processed in connection with the prevention and combating of crime.
[9] Act of 10 May 2018 on Personal Data Protection (ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2019, item 1781, Article 2.
[10] Regulation of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) of 28 September 2017 on the methods of recording and storing programmes, advertisements and other broadcasts by broadcasters, Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) item 1862, §§ 1-2.
[11] Commissioner for Human Rights (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), intervention concerning the seizure of a journalist’s laptop, 6 October 2021.
[12] Commissioner for Human Rights, submission II.510.1143.2018 on professional secrecy in documents and Article 226 CCP.
[13] National Public Prosecutor’s Office (Prokuratura Krajowa), “Prokuratorzy w mediach o odpowiedzialności za złamanie tajemnicy dziennikarskiej” [Prosecutors in the media on liability for breach of journalistic privilege], 21 September 2016.
[14] Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, op. cit. (note 3).
[15] Act of 6 June 1997 – Penal Code (Kodeks karny), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2026, item 1342.
[16] Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code (Kodeks cywilny), Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) 2026, item 795.
[17] Supreme Court judgment of 2 December 2010, I CSK 11/10.
[18] Resolution of a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court of 18 February 2005, III CZP 53/04, OSNC 2005, No. 7-8, item 114.
[19] Act of 5 August 2022 amending the Executive Penal Code and certain other acts, Journal of Laws (Dz. U.) item 1855, Article 7(4) and Article 37.
[20] ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, judgment of 23 September 1994, application no. 15890/89, § 35.
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