Publication date: January 19, 2026
Notarial deed as an official document within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
Pursuant to Article 2 section 2 of the Act of 14 February 1991 – The Notarial Law, notarial acts (including notarial deeds) performed by a notary in accordance with the law have the nature of an official document. From this clear statement, it can be inferred that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding official documents apply to notarial deeds. This is also confirmed by the case law of the Polish Supreme Court (including in its judgment of 9 August 2019, II CSK 341/18). Under procedural provisions, the distinction between official documents is significant, primarily in the area of evidence.
A notarial deed is required for many types of contracts (primarily those involving the disposal of real estate). Due to the principle of contractual freedom, the parties may decide to conclude a contract in the form of a notarial deed even when it is not required by law. What benefits can this provide?
In the context of regulations concerning evidence in civil proceedings, we can distinguish between official documents and private documents. This distinction is important due to the presumptions inherent in each type. A standard contract (concluded in writing or documentary form) is a private document because it was not drawn up by a public authority or other authorized entity. Therefore, pursuant to Article 245 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such a contract only implies that the person who signed it made the declaration contained in the document.
In turn, with respect to official documents, Article 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure introduces two important presumptions:
• Presumption of authenticity (truthfulness) – this means that a given official document comes from the person who issued it – in the case of a notarial deed, we presume that it was drawn up by the notary whose name appears in the deed;
• Presumption of truthfulness – such a document constitutes proof of what has been officially certified in it.
While the first presumption raises no major doubts, the second has given rise to numerous doubts in the doctrine and case law. It is pointed out[1] that notarial deeds as documents may be declarative (descriptive, narrative, reporting, attesting, containing declarations of knowledge) or constitutive (containing declarations of intent). It is possible that a notarial deed as an official document is declarative in one part and constitutive in another (e.g., a document that includes declarations of intent creating a legal act may also include declarations of knowledge). The division of documents into declarative and constitutive within the scope of official documents has such significance that the presumption of truth of a declaration included in a document, arising from Article 244 § 1 […] of the Code of Civil Procedure, applies only to declarative documents (to the extent to which the official document is descriptive). The criterion of truthfulness or inaccuracy applies to statements of knowledge, not will. The presumption (to the extent that a public document is descriptive) applies solely to the content of the statements of knowledge made by the document’s issuer (the notary), and therefore does not extend to the statements of knowledge made by persons appearing before the document’s issuer, which the notary records.
It follows from the above statement that Article 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs the formal evidentiary value of an official document and requires that only its content be treated as proven (as stated by the Supreme Court in its ruling of 4 December 2018, file reference IV CSK 219/18). This means that the presumption of truth in the case of a notarial deed refers to the notary’s determination of specific circumstances, including the fact that the persons participating in the deed made declarations of intent or were aware of specific content.
A notarial deed therefore constitutes evidence that the persons indicated in the deed appeared at the notary’s office at the specified time and that they made a declaration of intent, which was accurately and without any distortions recorded in the deed’s content (as stated by the Regional Court in Łódź in its ruling of 15 September 2009, file reference I ACa 427/09).
However, the presumption does not cover the truthfulness of declarations made by persons other than the notary – the deed merely states the fact that a specific declaration was made by those participating in the act, and the presumption does not determine whether these declarations are truthful. The entire compilation of a notarial deed (i.e., the place of execution of the deed, the date, the participation of the persons mentioned, or the statement of their identity) is subject to the presumption of truthfulness. The situation is different in the case of declarations made by the parties participating in the notarial deed, as this presumption applies solely to the fact of their making, not to the truthfulness of their content, i.e., their compliance with reality, regardless of whether they are declarations of will or knowledge. This is also confirmed by the Supreme Court’s judgment of August 9, 2019, reference number II CSK 341/18.
The above presumptions make it difficult to challenge the conclusion of a contract and the content of the parties’ declarations of intent, which is an undeniable advantage of official documents over private ones. However, this does not mean that these presumptions are irrebuttable – on the contrary, Article 252 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly states that a party denying the authenticity of an official document or claiming that the statements contained therein by the authority from which it originated are untrue may challenge these circumstances, but must provide proof. This provision places the burden of proof on the party denying the authenticity of an official document.
Article 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure also applies to official documents, which introduces significant evidentiary restrictions. According to this provision, evidence from witnesses or from the hearing of the parties, whether against or beyond the framework of the document encompassing a legal act, may be admitted between the participants of that act only in cases where it does not circumvent the provisions on form required under pain of nullity and void, and where the court deems it necessary due to the specific circumstances of the case.
If a legal act was performed in a form specified under pain of nullity (and under Art. 73 § 2 of the Civil Code, the form of a notarial deed is such a form), then the evidence listed therein cannot be taken:
It should be emphasized that the evidence ban under Article 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be extended – it applies only and exclusively to the circumstances listed therein, therefore it is not prohibited to prove by means of these means, e.g. to adopt a different interpretation of individual provisions, or to raise objections relating to the authenticity and veracity of a document.
At this point, it is worth highlighting a doctrinal dispute in civil law concerning whether, if the parties agree to conclude a transaction in the form of a notarial deed when it is not required by law, this form is required under pain of nullity. If this question were answered negatively, the above provision might not apply. This is a broader issue that will not be discussed in this article, but it is important for the arguments that should be adopted in the event of a potential dispute.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure discussed above do not mean that official documents or the acts themselves contained in this form cannot be challenged. It is first and foremost worth noting that a party has full authority to raise objections regarding defects in declarations of intent (Articles 82-88 of the Civil Procedure Code). The presumption of truth under Article 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not invalidate an act made under such circumstances. As already mentioned, this presumption only means that the party to the act made a declaration of specific content, which does not mean that it was not made, for example, under the influence of error. A party may prove these circumstances by any means, even those listed in Article 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because raising an objection regarding the existence of a defect in a declaration of intent does not constitute an action against or overriding the substance of the document.
Sources:
[1]A. Turczyn [in:] Civil Procedure Code. Updated commentary. Art. 1–505(39). Volume I , ed. OM Piaskowska, LEX/el. 2025, art. 244.