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	<title>Artificial intelligence - KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</title>
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	<description>KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL &#124; CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</description>
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		<title>From Idea to Patent: Protecting Drone Technology in Poland, the EU and the United States</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-patents-poland-europe-us/</link>
					<comments>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-patents-poland-europe-us/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:06:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IT, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI patents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomous drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomous navigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[battery management systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer vision]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[computer-implemented inventions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone docking systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone patents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone patents in Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European patents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[freedom to operate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FTO analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intellectual Property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inventive step]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[KG Legal Kiełtyka Gładkowski]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[obstacle avoidance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[patent classification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[patent infringement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Patent Protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[patent searches]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[patentability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Polish patent law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sensor fusion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[software patents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology commercialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAV]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aerial vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aircraft Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US patents]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=9050</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: November 18, 2026 Drones sit where mechanics, electronics, sensors and artificial intelligence meet, and the law that protects them sits at the same crossroads. Since around 20 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace in September 2025, Europe has put drones and counter-drone systems at the top of its defence agenda, Poland has signed [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-patents-poland-europe-us/">From Idea to Patent: Protecting Drone Technology in Poland, the EU and the United States</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: November 18, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<p><strong>Drones sit where mechanics, electronics, sensors and artificial intelligence meet, and the law that protects them sits at the same crossroads. Since around 20 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace in September 2025, Europe has put drones and counter-drone systems at the top of its defence agenda, Poland has signed up for EUR 43.7 billion in EU defence loans, and the United States has closed its market to new foreign-made drones. In this environment the intellectual property behind a folding frame, a sensor array or an obstacle-avoidance algorithm can decide who wins contracts. This article explains what in a drone can be patented, how Polish, European and US law treat software and AI inventions, why patent classification, ISO standards and freedom-to-operate searches matter, and how EU and Polish drone regulation has changed over the past year.</strong></p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">What a patent is and what it requires</h1>



<p>Polish statutes do not define the term &#8220;patent&#8221;, but legal scholarship fills the gap. The definitions vary in detail, yet they agree on the core: a patent is a time-limited exclusive right to exploit an invention commercially, granted by a decision of a competent state authority for its territory, in exchange for disclosure of the technical details of the invention. The system rests on a bargain between disclosing a technical solution to the public and granting its owner a temporary monopoly. In civil-law terms, a patent is an absolute right that allows its holder to use an intangible asset &#8211; the invention &#8211; to the exclusion of others.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>



<span id="more-9050"></span>



<p>The procedure and the substantive conditions are set out in the Polish Industrial Property Law,<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> in particular its Articles 24 to 30. An invention must be new, involve an inventive step and be susceptible of industrial application. On novelty, the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) has held that an invention cannot simply combine several earlier ideas, and that what counts is a concrete technical implementation rather than an idea: the specific technical means, how they are combined, what they serve and how they work together.<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a> An inventive step exists where, for a person skilled in the art, the solution does not follow in a simple and obvious way from the state of the art.<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> Industrial applicability requires the inventor to give at least one reasonable example of practical use that would allow a specialist in the field to reproduce and apply the solution.<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a></p>



<p>These conditions are tested daily in fast-moving sectors such as unmanned aircraft. On the boundary between mechanics, electronics and software, a patent monopoly translates directly into market advantage, and every new mechanism or navigation system must pass a careful test of novelty and inventive step.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Can a drone be patented, and which parts?</h1>



<p>Polish law grants patents for inventions that are new, inventive and industrially applicable. Articles 28 and 29 of the Industrial Property Law set the limits. Article 28 contains an open list of things that are not inventions, including discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; aesthetic creations; schemes, rules and methods for mental acts, playing games or doing business; products or methods whose use cannot be demonstrated or would not produce the expected result in light of accepted scientific principles; computer programs; and presentations of information. Article 29 contains a closed list of inventions that cannot be patented: those contrary to public order or morality, plant varieties and animal breeds and essentially biological breeding methods, and methods of surgical or therapeutic treatment and diagnosis of humans and animals. Together these rules separate inventions from non-inventions and balance the patent monopoly against the public interest, freedom of research and the protection of human life and morality.</p>



<p>Within those limits, almost every layer of a drone can be patented. Examples from published patent documents include:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Infrastructure for docking and recharging &#8211; a network of multi-use docking stations, for instance mounted on street lights or cell towers, where drones recharge, exchange parcels and receive routing instructions (Amazon Technologies Inc., US9387928B1);<a id="_ftnref6" href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></li>



<li>Propulsion &#8211; propellers carried on spherical motors that tilt the thrust independently of the airframe, so the drone can change direction while keeping its camera level (SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd., WO2017219255A1);<a id="_ftnref7" href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></li>



<li>Energy management &#8211; systems in which a drone lands on a station that stores, charges and swaps its battery (SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd., US10363826B2);<a id="_ftnref8" href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></li>



<li>Reliability of on-board electronics &#8211; designs that reduce electrical interference with the drone&#8217;s sensors and limit user assembly errors (SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd., US9284049B1);<a id="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></li>



<li>Communications &#8211; networks of drones acting as airborne relays that provide broadband access where satellite and cellular coverage is insufficient (Ubiqomm LLC, US9859972B2);<a id="_ftnref10" href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></li>



<li>Data transmission &#8211; a method by which a drone chooses between a direct Wi-Fi link and a cellular path to its controller based on measured link quality (Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software Co., Ltd., US11610491B2);<a id="_ftnref11" href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></li>



<li>Flight safety &#8211; a parachute deployment system that detects failures from the accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer and barometer and deploys the parachute automatically or on command from the operator (Flirtey Holdings Inc., US10112721B2);<a id="_ftnref12" href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></li>



<li>Autonomy &#8211; an on-board system that detects and tracks objects on a collision course and automatically generates evasive manoeuvres (L-3 Unmanned Systems Inc., US8700306B2).<a id="_ftnref13" href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></li>
</ul>



<p>For mechanical and electronic components the patent protects the physical solution. For control, stabilisation and autonomy systems it protects a method or mode of operation, provided that it has a technical character.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Code, copyright and computer-implemented inventions</h1>



<p>The code that runs a drone is protected by copyright under Article 74 of the Polish Copyright Act,<a href="#_ftn14" id="_ftnref14">[14]</a> but every physical element of the airframe and every new way in which its embedded systems work may be a valuable subject of a patent. The European Patent Convention (EPC) excludes programs for computers from patentability only &#8220;as such&#8221; (Article 52(2)(c) and (3) EPC),<a href="#_ftn15" id="_ftnref15">[15]</a> an approach that mirrors Polish law. The Guidelines for Examination at the European Patent Office (EPO) use the concept of &#8220;computer-implemented inventions&#8221;, meaning solutions in which software, an algorithm or a digital process produces a concrete technical effect. To be patentable, a computer program must produce a &#8220;further technical effect&#8221; that goes beyond the normal physical interactions between software and hardware.<a href="#_ftn16" id="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Compared with the three statutory criteria in Polish law, the EPO practice therefore adds a practical filter: the technical effect.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">The drone&#8217;s &#8220;eyes&#8221;: sensors, computer vision and AI</h1>



<p>The optical and sensor system &#8211; often called the drone&#8217;s &#8220;eyes&#8221; &#8211; is key to safety and precision. Modern systems rely on sensor fusion, which combines data from several sensors to build a more accurate picture of the surroundings. Depending on the mission and type of aircraft they use RGB cameras that record the visible spectrum for inspection and photogrammetry;<a href="#_ftn17" id="_ftnref17">[17]</a> LiDAR scanners that build precise 3D point clouds with laser pulses, work in complete darkness and measure terrain under tree cover;<a href="#_ftn18" id="_ftnref18">[18]</a> thermal and multispectral cameras used in rescue, inspection and precision agriculture; and stereo vision<a href="#_ftn19" id="_ftnref19">[19]</a> and optical flow sensors<a href="#_ftn20" id="_ftnref20">[20]</a> that track image shifts, allowing flight without GPS and autonomous obstacle avoidance.</p>



<p>Receiving signals is only half of the process. Computer vision combined with artificial intelligence lets drones track moving objects, detect obstacles in real time and map their surroundings while determining their own position. Combining visible light, infrared and laser technology, a modern drone can perceive space far more precisely than the human eye.</p>



<p>The drone&#8217;s eyes can be patented if they meet the statutory requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. What is patented is a specific technical solution, not the general idea of giving a drone eyes: a particular sensor arrangement, a configuration of cameras and other sensors, a data fusion method, or technical signal processing for navigation, flight stabilisation and obstacle detection. Since 2025 there is also an international standard on detection and avoidance (DAA) systems, ISO 15964:2025, which sets safety and quality requirements for the radars and optical sensors used for this purpose.<a href="#_ftn21" id="_ftnref21">[21]</a> Standards of this kind do not decide patentability, but they increasingly shape what a commercially viable &#8220;eye&#8221; must be able to do.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Patent classification</h1>



<p>To define the technical scope of an invention, to search global databases when assessing novelty and inventive step, and to monitor technical progress and competitors, patent offices use the International Patent Classification (IPC).<a href="#_ftn22" id="_ftnref22">[22]</a> It is a hierarchical system for classifying inventions and utility models, dividing all fields of technology into eight sections, A to H,<a href="#_ftn23" id="_ftnref23">[23]</a> and it is an essential tool for engineers and patent attorneys. The authentic versions are in English and French and are prepared by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The IPC is revised once a year, normally with effect from 1 January, and the Polish Patent Office publishes the current Polish-language version. For drone developers it matters that the IPC now has a dedicated subclass for unmanned aerial vehicles, B64U, which makes targeted searches considerably easier than when drone inventions were scattered across general aviation classes.</p>



<p>WIPO also administers three other classifications: the Nice Classification of goods and services for trade marks,<a href="#_ftn24" id="_ftnref24">[24]</a> the Vienna Classification of figurative elements of marks,<a href="#_ftn25" id="_ftnref25">[25]</a> and the Locarno Classification for industrial designs.<a href="#_ftn26" id="_ftnref26">[26]</a> For a drone business all of them are relevant. The Locarno system is used to register a distinctive aerodynamic body as an industrial design, the Nice system to register the brand and define the goods and services it covers, and the Vienna system to classify figurative elements such as a manufacturer&#8217;s logo.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Do drones have to meet ISO standards?</h1>



<p>Alongside intellectual property, technical standardisation plays a central role in the drone industry. ISO standards are sets of requirements, guidelines and good practices for products, services, processes and management systems, developed by experts of the International Organization for Standardization through international consensus.<a href="#_ftn27" id="_ftnref27">[27]</a> For drones they are prepared by technical committee ISO/TC 20/SC 16 &#8220;Uncrewed aircraft systems&#8221;, set up in 2014, which covers unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and advanced air mobility.<a href="#_ftn28" id="_ftnref28">[28]</a></p>



<p>The core is the ISO 21384 series. Part 1, on general requirements and testing, is still being developed.<a href="#_ftn29" id="_ftnref29">[29]</a> ISO 21384-2:2021 sets quality and safety requirements for the design and manufacture of the aircraft, remote pilot stations, data links, payloads and support equipment.<a href="#_ftn30" id="_ftnref30">[30]</a> ISO 21384-3 governs operational procedures for safe commercial flights; its third edition was published in August 2026.<a href="#_ftn31" id="_ftnref31">[31]</a> ISO 21384-4:2025 provides the vocabulary.<a href="#_ftn32" id="_ftnref32">[32]</a> Market growth has also required rules for integrating drones into airspace and ground infrastructure: ISO 23629-8 standardises remote identification of drones in flight,<a href="#_ftn33" id="_ftnref33">[33]</a> ISO 5015-2 sets requirements for the operation and servicing of vertiports (landing sites for vertical take-off aircraft), including noise reduction, contamination removal and interfaces with drone operators and traffic management providers,<a href="#_ftn34" id="_ftnref34">[34]</a> and ISO 23665 sets uniform training standards for commercial drone pilots.<a href="#_ftn35" id="_ftnref35">[35]</a></p>



<p>ISO standards are not law. They are voluntary, and companies are not legally required to follow them. In practice, however, many businesses adopt them as benchmarks of quality, safety and efficiency, and public and defence buyers increasingly expect compliance in tenders.<a href="#_ftn36" id="_ftnref36">[36]</a></p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Freedom to operate</h1>



<p>A key part of any patent strategy is checking that a product, technology or invention does not infringe the exclusive rights of third parties. A freedom-to-operate (FTO) search verifies whether the technical features of a solution are covered by patents in force in a given territory, and allows the legal risk to be assessed before commercialisation. It should be carried out during development and again before sales start, because the legal status of patents changes, and always for a specific territory, because patent protection differs between countries.<a href="#_ftn37" id="_ftnref37">[37]</a></p>



<p>WIPO describes the process in &#8220;Tool 5: Freedom to Operate&#8221;, part of its Toolkit on New Product Development and Inventions in the Public Domain. FTO means the ability to make, sell or use a product or service in a given market without the risk of infringing third-party patents. Failing to check can lead to infringement claims, financial losses and product withdrawal. The process has three stages: describe, search and analyse. The final FTO assessment requires a formal opinion of a patent attorney in each relevant country, because patent rights are territorial. The search should be done as early as possible so that the design can be changed, a licence obtained or, in the last resort, the idea abandoned.<a href="#_ftn38" id="_ftnref38">[38]</a></p>



<p>For drone companies FTO has become more pressing, not less. The sector&#8217;s leading manufacturers hold large portfolios in exactly the areas &#8211; optics, stabilisation, batteries and autonomy &#8211; where new entrants, including Poland&#8217;s fast-growing defence suppliers, are now building products. An FTO search is the basis for an informed business decision and a safeguard against costly litigation.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Polish, European and US patents compared</h1>



<p>The main differences between Polish, European and US patents concern territorial scope, the granting authority, and cost and procedure:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td>&nbsp;</td><td><strong>Polish patent</strong></td><td><strong>European patent</strong></td><td><strong>US patent</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Territorial scope</strong></td><td>Poland</td><td>Selected EPC states, through a single procedure before the EPO followed by national validation</td><td>United States only</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Granting authority</strong></td><td>Patent Office of the Republic of Poland (UPRP)</td><td>European Patent Office (EPO)</td><td>United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Average cost of obtaining the patent</strong><a href="#_ftn39" id="_ftnref39">[39]</a></td><td>PLN 10,000-40,000</td><td>PLN 35,000-70,000</td><td>approx. PLN 100,000</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p><em>Source: own compilation.</em></p>



<p>Since 1 June 2023 there is also a fourth option: the European patent with unitary effect (the Unitary Patent). It is granted by the EPO and, on request after grant, has uniform effect in the EU Member States that have ratified the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court &#8211; currently 18 states.<a href="#_ftn40" id="_ftnref40">[40]</a> Poland is not among them. A drone developer that wants protection in Poland must therefore still validate a European patent in Poland or apply to the Polish Patent Office, and disputes concerning Polish territory remain with Polish courts rather than the Unified Patent Court.</p>



<p>On software, practice differs markedly between systems. The Polish and European positions are described above. The US system is broader: patentable subject matter covers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, and for years software and computer-implemented business method patents were granted widely. The turning point was the Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (2014).<a href="#_ftn41" id="_ftnref41">[41]</a> Under the two-step Alice test, a claim directed to an abstract idea is patentable only if it contains an &#8220;inventive concept&#8221; amounting to significantly more than the idea itself, and implementing the idea on a generic computer is not enough. In that sense Alice brought US practice closer to the European focus on technical contribution.</p>



<p>Recent developments have moved the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) back towards a more applicant-friendly approach. In August 2025 the USPTO reminded examiners that AI-based claim limitations which cannot practically be performed in the human mind do not fall within the &#8220;mental process&#8221; exception.<a href="#_ftn42" id="_ftnref42">[42]</a> In Ex parte Desjardins, decided by the Appeals Review Panel in September 2025 and designated precedential on 4 November 2025, the USPTO held that improvements to how a machine-learning model itself operates can be a patent-eligible practical application; in December 2025 the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure was updated accordingly.<a href="#_ftn43" id="_ftnref43">[43]</a> In short, while in Poland and before the EPO the emphasis remains firmly on the technical, often hardware-related, dimension of the invention, in the US it is easier to protect the structure, methodology and working logic of software, including AI models.</p>



<p>The same is true for drones. Control systems, collision-detection algorithms and terrain-mapping software now drive competitive advantage. US practice allows companies to patent the methodology of control applications themselves, while in Europe drone developers must show a direct technical effect of the code on the operation of the device.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">The EU and Polish regulatory framework</h1>



<p>Patent law protects drone technology; aviation law decides how it may be used. The foundation of drone law in the EU, including Poland, consists of two Commission regulations (not directives, as they are sometimes described). Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft<a href="#_ftn44" id="_ftnref44">[44]</a> introduced uniform operating rules, including a risk-based classification of operations (Articles 3-6), registration of operators in national systems (Article 14), a minimum age for remote pilots (Article 9) and UAS geographical zones (Article 15). Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 on unmanned aircraft systems and third-country operators<a href="#_ftn45" id="_ftnref45">[45]</a> sets the product side: drone classes C0 to C6, technical and safety requirements for manufacturers (Article 4), conformity assessment obligations for economic operators (Article 15) and rules for third-country operators (Article 41). Both have been amended several times to keep pace with technology and implementation deadlines.<a href="#_ftn46" id="_ftnref46">[46]</a></p>



<p>The past year has brought significant change. In September 2025 the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) adopted the updated SORA 2.5 risk assessment methodology for the &#8220;specific&#8221; category, simplifying many professional operations.<a href="#_ftn47" id="_ftnref47">[47]</a> After a wave of drone incursions near airports and military sites, the Commission adopted an Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security on 11 February 2026, and in September 2026 EASA issued Opinion No 06/2026 proposing amendments to both regulations to strengthen security, including lowering the registration and direct remote identification threshold from 250 grams to 100 grams.<a href="#_ftn48" id="_ftnref48">[48]</a> The Opinion is a recommendation to the Commission, not yet binding law, but it shows the direction of travel. In Poland, since 13 November 2025 operators of drones with a take-off mass between 0.25 kg and 20 kg must hold third-party liability insurance (Article 209(1a) of the Aviation Law).<a href="#_ftn49" id="_ftnref49">[49]</a></p>



<p>Developers of AI-enabled drones must also keep the EU Artificial Intelligence Act in mind. It does not apply to AI systems used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes, but civil and dual-use applications fall within its scope, and its rules interact with EU aviation safety legislation.</p>



<p>The rapid growth of drone technology is reflected in rising numbers of patent filings at the EPO, which in turn requires examiners and practitioners to follow both the technology and the regulatory changes closely.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Technologies used by the leading manufacturers</h1>



<p>The largest manufacturers combine artificial intelligence, vision systems, precise geolocation and modern construction materials. The volume of training data available for AI means that the technology no longer limits large companies&#8217; willingness to invest. Solutions differ depending on whether a drone is intended for consumers, commercial users or the military. Most modern drones are already largely autonomous: they analyse terrain in real time to avoid obstacles, predict flight trajectories, recognise people, vehicles and animals to follow them without a pilot, and plan routes around infrastructure. Engineering aims at full autonomy, long range, high-quality imaging and light, durable and increasingly biodegradable materials.</p>



<p>China&#8217;s DJI (SZ DJI Technology) leads the civil and commercial market and holds thousands of patents, mainly in optics, stabilisation and advanced sensors. Its notable solutions include gimbal protection during a fall (the drone detects free fall and turns the camera gimbal into a protective position before impact), optical detection of hazardous landing surfaces such as water, and navigation in environments with weak GNSS signals by fusing data from multiple optical and infrared sensors to hold position and map obstacles in 3D without GPS.<a href="#_ftn50" id="_ftnref50">[50]</a> DJI&#8217;s position has, however, been shaken by regulation rather than technology: on 22 December 2025 the US Federal Communications Commission added all foreign-produced UAS and their critical components, as well as DJI and Autel communications and video surveillance equipment, to its Covered List, which bars new models from FCC authorisation.<a href="#_ftn51" id="_ftnref51">[51]</a></p>



<p>The US company Skydio builds its products on AI, computer vision and autonomy. Its drones offer 360-degree vision-based navigation without GPS (building a 3D map in real time and recalculating the flight path around obstacles), dynamic object tracking in difficult terrain, and autonomous docking and battery charging with cloud-based control.<a href="#_ftn52" id="_ftnref52">[52]</a> Having left the consumer market in 2023, Skydio now focuses on enterprise and defence customers, and in July 2026 its entire current lineup was placed on the Pentagon&#8217;s Blue UAS Cleared List.<a href="#_ftn53" id="_ftnref53">[53]</a></p>



<p>In Europe the leading manufacturer is France&#8217;s Parrot, which serves professional, government and military users. Its technology focuses on antenna design (multi-directional antennas in the arms and under the body, with dynamic switching of channels and configurations based on telemetry and attitude to prevent loss of link), folding multirotor structures that let a drone fit into a pocket or tactical backpack, and fusion of altitude sensors.<a href="#_ftn54" id="_ftnref54">[54]</a> Its ANAFI UKR micro-drone, designed around lessons from the war in Ukraine, combines embedded AI and optical navigation for flight in GNSS-denied environments; the first orders through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency were placed in March 2026.<a href="#_ftn55" id="_ftnref55">[55]</a></p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Can artificial intelligence be patented?</h1>



<p>With AI now present in almost every area of life, the question is whether AI itself can be patented. Artificial intelligence can be described as a system that performs tasks requiring learning and taking new circumstances into account while solving a problem, and that can &#8211; depending on its configuration &#8211; act with varying degrees of autonomy and interact with its environment.<a href="#_ftn56" id="_ftnref56">[56]</a> Seen as an algorithm or source code, AI is not patentable but may be protected by copyright, exactly as with drone software. Models and methods as such cannot be patented, because patent offices treat them as mathematical methods or computer programs as such. AI integrated with a specific device that solves a technical problem and produces a technical effect in the real world can, however, be patented under Polish, European and US law. The algorithm alone is not enough; the technical character of the solution is decisive. The US is currently the most receptive of the three, as Desjardins shows, but even there the claim must be tied to an improvement in how the technology works.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Conclusion</h1>



<p>Drone patenting sits at the meeting point of industrial property law, international law and practical technology deployment. Source code is excluded from patent protection and protected by copyright, but new technical solutions, electronic systems, and methods of operating control and autonomy systems can be patented, provided that they meet the strict statutory conditions of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.</p>



<p>Patents are available both for physical elements, such as docking stations, tilting propellers and battery-swap systems, and for advanced sensor systems &#8211; the drone&#8217;s &#8220;eyes&#8221;. Integrating sensors, thermal cameras and AI allows companies to patent specific methods of data processing and autonomous navigation, which is a key tool for building competitive advantage. Market leaders such as DJI, Skydio and Parrot turn their solutions into patent portfolios and monetise their technology, which makes strategic patent management a foundation of the unmanned aviation industry, linking innovation with safety requirements and regulation.</p>



<p>Drones are used today in agriculture, archaeology, real estate, logistics, mountain and medical rescue (for example rapid transport of blood) and in responding to natural disasters such as floods. The war in Ukraine has, however, turned much of the industry&#8217;s development towards military use, and 2025-2026 accelerated that shift in Poland and across the EU. Poland signed a EUR 43.7 billion loan agreement under the EU SAFE programme on 8 May 2026, with drone and counter-drone capability among its priorities,<a href="#_ftn57" id="_ftnref57">[57]</a> while the European Drone Defence Initiative aims for initial capability by the end of 2026 and full functionality by the end of 2027.<a href="#_ftn58" id="_ftnref58">[58]</a> Civil drones continue to develop as well, driven by AI and machine learning enabling autonomous operation, advanced sensors for precise data collection, 5G connectivity for instant data transmission, new-generation batteries extending flight time and range, and digital traffic management systems that will allow safe and regular use in urban airspace.<a href="#_ftn59" id="_ftnref59">[59]</a> For companies operating in this space, the lesson is simple: secure the technology early, check the patent landscape before entering each market, and build regulatory compliance into the product from the start.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a>J. Ożegalska-Trybalska, Ograniczenia ochrony patentowej a naruszenie patentu (Wolters Kluwer 2019).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a>Ustawa z dnia 30 czerwca 2000 r. &#8211; Prawo własności przemysłowej (Industrial Property Law), consolidated text Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 1170, as amended.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a>Judgment of the NSA of 16 April 2024, II GSK 908/20, LEX no. 3719439.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a>Judgment of the NSA of 19 June 2024, II GSK 581/21, LEX no. 3759854.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a>Judgment of the NSA of 26 September 2023, II GSK 677/20, LEX no. 3642931.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US9387928B1/en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/WO2017219255A1</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US10363826B2</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref9" id="_ftn9">[9]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US9284049B1/en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref10" id="_ftn10">[10]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US9859972B2/en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref11" id="_ftn11">[11]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US11610491B2</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref12" id="_ftn12">[12]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US10112721B2/en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref13" id="_ftn13">[13]</a>https://patents.google.com/patent/US8700306B2/en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref14" id="_ftn14">[14]</a>Ustawa z dnia 4 lutego 1994 r. o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych (Copyright and Related Rights Act), consolidated text Dz. U. z 2025 r. poz. 24, as amended.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref15" id="_ftn15">[15]</a>Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Article 52(2)(c) and (3).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref16" id="_ftn16">[16]</a>EPO, Guidelines for Examination in the EPO (2026 edition), Part G, Chapter II, section 3.6, https://link.epo.org/web/legal/guidelines-epc/en-epc-guidelines-2026-hyperlinked.pdf.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref17" id="_ftn17">[17]</a>https://enterprise.dilectro.pl/drony-z-kamera-rgb-swiatla-widzialnego/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref18" id="_ftn18">[18]</a>https://enterprise.dilectro.pl/drony-z-lidarem/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref19" id="_ftn19">[19]</a>https://www.vantagespace.com/pl/glossary/sensor-technologies-iot-for-occupancy/stereo-vision-cameras</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref20" id="_ftn20">[20]</a>https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/pl/expo/czujniki-przepywu-optycznego/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref21" id="_ftn21">[21]</a>ISO 15964:2025, Detection and avoidance systems for uncrewed aircraft systems, https://www.iso.org/standard/84450.html.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref22" id="_ftn22">[22]</a>Urząd Patentowy RP, Klasyfikacja patentowa, https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/przedmioty-ochrony/wynalazki-i-wzory-uzytkowe/wynalazki-i-wzory-uzytkowe-procedura-krajowa/klasyfikacja-patentowa.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref23" id="_ftn23">[23]</a>A &#8211; human necessities; B &#8211; performing operations, transporting; C &#8211; chemistry, metallurgy; D &#8211; textiles, paper; E &#8211; fixed constructions; F &#8211; mechanical engineering, lighting, heating, weapons, blasting; G &#8211; physics; H &#8211; electricity.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref24" id="_ftn24">[24]</a>https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/slownik-terminow?litera=K&amp;nazwa=Klasyfikacja-nicejska</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref25" id="_ftn25">[25]</a>https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/slownik-terminow?litera=K&amp;nazwa=Klasyfikacja-wiede%C5%84ska</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref26" id="_ftn26">[26]</a>https://uprp.gov.pl/pl/slownik-terminow?litera=K&amp;nazwa=Klasyfikacja-lokarne%C5%84ska</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref27" id="_ftn27">[27]</a>https://www.pcbc.gov.pl/pl/blog/certyfikacja/normy-iso-czym-sa-aktualne-rodzaje-przyklady</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref28" id="_ftn28">[28]</a>https://www.iso.org/committee/5336224.html</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref29" id="_ftn29">[29]</a>https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:21384:-1:dis:ed-1:v1:en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref30" id="_ftn30">[30]</a>ISO 21384-2:2021, Unmanned aircraft systems &#8211; Part 2: UAS components.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref31" id="_ftn31">[31]</a>ISO 21384-3:2026, Uncrewed aircraft systems &#8211; Part 3: Operational procedures (third edition, 2026-08).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref32" id="_ftn32">[32]</a>ISO 21384-4:2025, Uncrewed aircraft systems &#8211; Part 4: Vocabulary, https://www.iso.org/standard/85053.html.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref33" id="_ftn33">[33]</a>https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:23629:-8:ed-1:v1:en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref34" id="_ftn34">[34]</a>https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:5015:-2:ed-1:v1:en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref35" id="_ftn35">[35]</a>https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:23665:ed-2:v1:en</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref36" id="_ftn36">[36]</a>https://certcom.pl/czy-norma-iso-jest-obowiazkowa/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref37" id="_ftn37">[37]</a>https://aomb.pl/co-to-jest-badanie-czystosci-patentowej/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref38" id="_ftn38">[38]</a>WIPO, Toolkit on New Product Development and Inventions in the Public Domain, Tool 5: Freedom to Operate, https://www.wipo.int/documents/d/tisc/docs-en-tisc-toolkit-freedom-to-operate-description.pdf.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref39" id="_ftn39">[39]</a>Indicative figures: Gdański Uniwersytet Medyczny, Centrum Transferu Technologii, Jak prawidłowo zaplanować koszty ochrony patentowej wynalazku (2 August 2024), https://ctt.gumed.edu.pl/2024/08/02/jak-prawidlowo-zaplanowac-koszty-ochrony-patentowej-wynalazku/. Actual costs depend on the complexity of the case, translations and the number of validation states.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref40" id="_ftn40">[40]</a>Irish Patents Office, Unitary Patent, https://ipoi.gov.ie/en/types-of-ip/patents/understanding-patents/protection-abroad/unitary-patent/.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref41" id="_ftn41">[41]</a>Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int&#8217;l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/208/.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref42" id="_ftn42">[42]</a>Maynard Nexsen, USPTO &#8211; Recent Trends &#8211; Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. §101 (11 November 2025), https://www.maynardnexsen.com/publication-uspto-recent-trends-subject-matter-eligibility-under-35-u-s-c-101.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref43" id="_ftn43">[43]</a>Baker Botts, Director Squires Designates Ex Parte Desjardins Decision as Precedential (November 2025), https://ourtake.bakerbotts.com/post/102ltdl/director-squires-designates-ex-parte-desjardins-decision-as-precedential; Oblon, USPTO Issues New Guidance and Updates the MPEP Following Ex Parte Desjardins (17 December 2025), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/patent/1720232/uspto-issues-new-guidance-and-updates-the-mpep-following-ex-parte-desjardins.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref44" id="_ftn44">[44]</a>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft, OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 45.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref45" id="_ftn45">[45]</a>Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems, OJ L 152, 11.6.2019, p. 1.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref46" id="_ftn46">[46]</a>Including Regulations (EU) 2020/639, 2020/746, 2022/525 and 2024/1110 (amending Regulation 2019/947) and (EU) 2020/1058 and 2024/1108 (amending Regulation 2019/945).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref47" id="_ftn47">[47]</a>EASA, ED Decision 2025/018/R (29 September 2025), https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/agency-decisions/ed-decision-2025018r.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref48" id="_ftn48">[48]</a>EASA, Opinion No 06/2026, Regular update of Regulations (EU) 2019/947 and (EU) 2019/945 &#8211; Security, https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/opinions/opinion-no-062026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref49" id="_ftn49">[49]</a>Urząd Lotnictwa Cywilnego (Civil Aviation Authority), Przepisy dronowe w UE i Polsce (21 April 2026), https://ulc.gov.pl/_download/2026/seminariumGA/2_3_Przepisy_dronowe_w_UE_i_Polsce.pdf.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref50" id="_ftn50">[50]</a>https://blog.cyfrowe.pl/zgubiles-sie-w-ofercie-dji-sprawdz-ktory-dron-naprawde-pasuje-do-twoich-potrzeb/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref51" id="_ftn51">[51]</a>Akin Gump, FCC Adds All Foreign-Made UAS and UAS Critical Components to Covered List (31 December 2025), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/terrorism-homeland-security-defence/1725852/fcc-adds-all-foreign-made-uas-and-uas-critical-components-to-covered-list.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref52" id="_ftn52">[52]</a>https://www.skydio.com/products</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref53" id="_ftn53">[53]</a>DroneXL, Skydio X10 guide (updated August 2026), https://dronexl.co/guides/skydio-x10/.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref54" id="_ftn54">[54]</a>https://dronopedia.pl/sprzet-i-akcesoria/drony-parrot/</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref55" id="_ftn55">[55]</a>EDR Magazine, First NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) call-off orders placed for Parrot ANAFI UKR micro-UAV systems (17 March 2026), https://www.edrmagazine.eu/first-nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-call-off-orders-placed-for-parrot-anafi-ukr-micro-uav-systems.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref56" id="_ftn56">[56]</a>T. Zalewski, Definicja sztucznej inteligencji, in: M. Świerczyński (ed.), Prawo sztucznej inteligencji (Warszawa 2020), Chapter I.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref57" id="_ftn57">[57]</a>Notes from Poland, Poland signs agreement with EU for EUR 44 billion in SAFE defence loans (8 May 2026), https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/05/08/poland-signs-agreement-with-eu-for-e44-billion-in-safe-defence-loans/.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref58" id="_ftn58">[58]</a>Defense Magazine, Building European Readiness 2030: EUR 1.07 Billion EDF Investment Targets Drones, Eastern Flank, Air and Space Shields (2026), https://www.defensemagazine.com/article/building-european-readiness-2030-eur107-billion-edf-investment-targets-drones-eastern-flank-air-and-space-shields.</p>



<p><a id="_ftn59" href="#_ftnref59">[59]</a>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAtPxp07WFA</p>



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<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-patents-poland-europe-us/">From Idea to Patent: Protecting Drone Technology in Poland, the EU and the United States</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:43:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=9035</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: November 17, 2026 Kraków, 17 November 2026 Today KG Legal is taking part in a business meeting with a delegation from the Free State of Thuringia, led by Minister-President Mario Voigt, hosted at the National Synchrotron Radiation Centre SOLARIS in Kraków. The meeting is organised by the Polish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/investment-law-and-processes-in-poland/thuringia-meets-malopolska-kg-legal-kieltyka-gladkowski-at-the-business-meeting-with-minister-president-mario-voigt-at-solaris/">Thuringia Meets Małopolska: KG Legal KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI at the Business Meeting with Minister-President Mario Voigt at SOLARIS</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: November 17, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<p><em>Kraków, 17 November 2026</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="538" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Blog-header-1200×630@1x-1024x538.png" alt="" class="wp-image-9036" srcset="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Blog-header-1200×630@1x-1024x538.png 1024w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Blog-header-1200×630@1x-300x158.png 300w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Blog-header-1200×630@1x-768x403.png 768w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Blog-header-1200×630@1x.png 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<p>Today KG Legal is taking part in a business meeting with a delegation from the Free State of Thuringia, led by Minister-President Mario Voigt, hosted at the National Synchrotron Radiation Centre SOLARIS in Kraków. The meeting is organised by the Polish-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (AHK Polska) together with the Marshal&#8217;s Office of the Małopolska Region and the Business in Małopolska centre, with LEG Thüringen, the Thuringian economic development agency, as a partner.</p>



<span id="more-9035"></span>



<p>The aim is simple and ambitious at the same time: to build direct business relationships between companies, research institutes and institutions from Thuringia and Małopolska, and to open new avenues for cooperation in industry, technology and R&amp;D.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A venue that sets the tone</h2>



<p>It is hard to imagine a better setting for a meeting about science-driven business than SOLARIS, Poland&#8217;s synchrotron facility in Kraków. The programme combines an official opening with representatives of both regions and SOLARIS, presentations on the economic and technological potential of Małopolska and Thuringia, a presentation of the Polish AI factory Gaia AI Factory, and a guided tour of the synchrotron. The afternoon closes with short company profiles from the German participants and a networking session dedicated to one-to-one conversations.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Who came from Thuringia</h2>



<p>The Thuringian delegation reflects the region&#8217;s strengths in high technology and advanced manufacturing. It includes medtech companies such as 3di GmbH (patient-specific implants and 3D surgical models) and HEMA Orthopädische Systeme GmbH (orthopaedic solutions and medical technology), leading research organisations such as Fraunhofer IOF in Jena (photonics and optical systems), the DLR Institute for Data Science in Jena (AI and data analysis), IMMS GmbH (microelectronics, mechatronics, sensor systems and AI) and iba e.V. (bioprocess and analytical technologies), as well as industrial companies GSM GmbH and GSN Maschinen-Anlagen-Service GmbH, the certification body TÜV Thüringen e.V. and LEG Thüringen.</p>



<p>The focus sectors &#8211; microelectronics, mechatronics, industrial automation, biotechnology, life sciences and medtech &#8211; overlap closely with Małopolska&#8217;s own innovation profile, including its life sciences cluster, universities and research infrastructure.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Where law meets technology</h2>



<p>For KG Legal, these are familiar sectors. Life sciences, healthcare, medtech, AI and data protection are at the core of our practice, and we regularly advise foreign companies, including German businesses, entering or expanding in Poland. Cross-border technology cooperation tends to raise a recurring set of legal questions, and it pays to address them early:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Medical devices and life sciences products</strong> &#8211; placing products on the Polish market, Polish-language labelling and instructions for use, obligations towards the Polish regulator (URPL), distribution models and public procurement for hospitals.</li>



<li><strong>R&amp;D partnerships with universities and research institutes</strong> &#8211; ownership and licensing of intellectual property, publication rights, commercialisation of research results and spin-out structures, as well as EU and national grant funding.</li>



<li><strong>AI and data</strong> &#8211; compliance with the EU AI Act, GDPR and the specific rules on health data, including in joint research projects.</li>



<li><strong>Market entry and operations</strong> &#8211; company set-up, contracts with Polish partners and distributors, employment, and effective dispute resolution across borders.</li>
</ul>



<p>Poland and Germany share a single market and a long history of economic ties, but successful cooperation still depends on getting the details right on both sides of the border.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Looking ahead</h2>



<p>We thank AHK Polska, the Marshal&#8217;s Office of the Małopolska Region, Business in Małopolska, LEG Thüringen and NCPS SOLARIS for bringing the two regions together. Meetings like this one show how much potential lies in Polish-German cooperation in science and technology, and we look forward to following up on today&#8217;s conversations.</p>



<p>If your organisation is considering projects in Poland, or cooperation with partners in Małopolska, our team in Kraków and Warsaw will be glad to help. You can reach us at office@kg-legal.pl.</p>
<p> </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Services</h2>



<p><strong>KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI</strong> is a Polish business law firm headquartered in Warsaw and Krakow, with a New York office under the iSTART1 brand. Building on a practice dating back to 1981, we advise clients in the following areas.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">Explore our services</h1>



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<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/investment-law-and-processes-in-poland/thuringia-meets-malopolska-kg-legal-kieltyka-gladkowski-at-the-business-meeting-with-minister-president-mario-voigt-at-solaris/">Thuringia Meets Małopolska: KG Legal KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI at the Business Meeting with Minister-President Mario Voigt at SOLARIS</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: the Risks Behind the Promise</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/artificial-intelligence-in-healthcare-the-risks-behind-the-promise/</link>
					<comments>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/artificial-intelligence-in-healthcare-the-risks-behind-the-promise/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 10:55:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PHARMACEUTICAL, HEALTHCARE & LIFE SCIENCES LAW]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8974</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: November 04, 2026 Errors, bias, opacity, data security and the accountability gap &#8211; what patients, clinicians and regulators need to watch Artificial intelligence is already reading scans, ranking medical literature, predicting kidney failure and managing hospital beds. Its potential to make medicine faster, more precise and more personalised seems almost limitless. Yet the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/artificial-intelligence-in-healthcare-the-risks-behind-the-promise/">Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: the Risks Behind the Promise</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: November 04, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<p><em>Errors, bias, opacity, data security and the accountability gap &#8211; what patients, clinicians and regulators need to watch</em></p>



<p><strong>Artificial intelligence is already reading scans, ranking medical literature, predicting kidney failure and managing hospital beds. Its potential to make medicine faster, more precise and more personalised seems almost limitless. Yet the same technology brings a distinct set of risks: algorithms that fail silently, tools used without adequate training, models that reproduce existing inequalities, decisions that no one can explain, patient data that is exposed or re-used, and a legal framework that still struggles to say who is responsible when something goes wrong. This article maps those risks and outlines what is needed to manage them.</strong></p>



<span id="more-8974"></span>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Where AI is already used in medicine</strong></h1>



<p>Interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare has grown rapidly in recent years. Medical science is constantly expanding its horizons and generating ever larger and more diverse volumes of information. AI plays a key role in this evolution, becoming increasingly integrated into medical practice and offering healthcare systems in Europe a way to respond to the pressures they face.</p>



<p>Today, AI is used in medicine mainly for the quantification of medical images, the automated analysis of genetic data, disease prediction, medical robotics, telemedicine and virtual assistants. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly accelerated the development and deployment of AI applications in medical and clinical settings, as AI technologies became a central element of the response to the global health crisis.</p>



<p>AI is now applied across radiology, ophthalmology, dermatology and pathology. In cardiology, it is transforming clinical practice through the automated processing of cardiac data: machine learning models improve the diagnosis of heart disease by analysing complex imaging such as echocardiograms and electrocardiograms, help assess cardiac risk and predict treatment outcomes, contributing to better patient care and a lower burden of cardiovascular disease. Although AI is less widespread in nephrology, progress is being made in the diagnosis of kidney disease. Machine learning models can analyse ultrasound images of the kidneys and histopathological findings to identify pathological changes and assess disease severity, and AI can predict acute kidney injury from clinical and laboratory data, enabling faster diagnosis and treatment of patients in potentially life-threatening conditions. In biomedical research, AI is used primarily to analyse scientific publications: platforms such as PubMed use machine learning algorithms to rank search results, and newer tools such as the Best Match algorithm improve access to clinical knowledge.</p>



<p>In surgery, decisions sometimes have to be made quickly and without complete certainty about the diagnosis or the patient&#8217;s likely response to treatment. A lack of data or insufficient evidence can push clinicians towards mental shortcuts and intuition, which may lead to errors and bias. Traditional decision-support tools often fail to account for these limitations. AI-based models show promising efficacy in predicting risk for individual patients, which may prove particularly valuable in cardiovascular medicine.</p>



<p>AI is not confined to clinical medicine; it is also used in healthcare administration. One argument for deploying AI in administrative work is that errors there are usually less critical than errors in the clinical setting. AI-based applications can play a key role in organising patient flow, for example by managing bed availability, which is an important factor in surgery cancellations. Another administrative area is clinical coding &#8211; the process of extracting information from clinical records and classifying it under systems such as the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) or diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Coding accuracy is crucial for cost recovery, management and analytics. Although computer-assisted coding has existed for some time, AI can significantly increase the accuracy and transparency of the process.</p>



<p>Despite these benefits, concerns about the possible negative effects of AI in medicine have grown in recent years. This fast-developing field raises considerable concern among healthcare professionals, patients and the public regarding clinical safety, equal access, privacy and security, appropriate use, liability and regulation. These risks can lead not only to harm to patients and citizens but also to a loss of public trust in AI algorithms and in doctors themselves.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>When the algorithm gets it wrong: AI errors</strong></h2>



<p>One of the main challenges is the unavoidable possibility of algorithmic error, which can have serious consequences for patients. Errors may have different causes and manifest themselves at different stages of the diagnostic and therapeutic process. A misdiagnosis may result in unnecessary treatment or in a serious illness being overlooked. In emergency departments, inappropriate interventions may follow from imprecise diagnoses or incorrect triage prioritisation.</p>



<p>An important aspect is the way data is collected and used in the machine learning process. Noise in input data, whether caused by technological imperfections or human factors, can significantly reduce the predictive accuracy of AI algorithms. Ultrasound imaging, for example, although widely used in clinical practice, is prone to operator-dependent scanning errors that can lead to incorrect results.</p>



<p>Dataset shift &#8211; a change in the statistical distribution of the data on which an algorithm was trained &#8211; is another major problem. It may result from differences between populations, from differing data acquisition protocols across medical facilities or from the use of different diagnostic technologies. A model trained on data from one type of scanner, for instance, may lose accuracy when applied to data from another.</p>



<p>AI algorithms may also have difficulty adapting to unexpected changes in the clinical environment. What a radiologist would immediately recognise as an artefact on an X-ray may be interpreted by an AI system as a pathological change, leading to false-positive results and unnecessary further investigation or intervention.</p>



<p>To minimise these risks, standardised methods for the assessment and approval of AI solutions by the competent regulatory authorities are essential. In keeping with the principles of ethics and safety, AI algorithms should be designed as tools that support doctors rather than replace them. It is also important that AI solutions remain dynamic, with the ability to keep learning from new data and clinical situations &#8211; under appropriate controls.</p>



<p>Implementing such solutions will, however, require significant investment in infrastructure and technology, as well as appropriate integration policies in healthcare facilities. Collaboration between all actors &#8211; scientists, physicians, regulators and technology manufacturers &#8211; will be crucial for the successful introduction of AI into healthcare.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The human factor: improper use of medical AI tools</strong></h2>



<p>The role of the human factor in the use of AI in medicine cannot be underestimated. Even the most advanced algorithms are prone to error, and their effectiveness depends on proper use by end users, including doctors, other medical staff and patients. Without adequate understanding and skill, there is a risk that AI tools will be used incorrectly, leading to wrong diagnoses, treatment plans and clinical decisions that endanger patients&#8217; health.</p>



<p>Clinicians and medical staff must not only have access to AI technology but also be properly trained to use it. Current medical curricula often contain too little on artificial intelligence, leaving doctors to acquire new knowledge and skills quickly in order to use these tools effectively in practice. In addition, the absence of clinical experts from the design and development of AI technology can result in tools that are difficult to use and poorly matched to real clinical needs.</p>



<p>Patients, too, must be aware of and able to use medical AI appropriately. As more and more AI applications and tools become available to the general public, there is a risk that patients will rely on them without understanding their limitations and the uncertainty surrounding their accuracy. It is therefore important to inform patients about both the possibilities and the limits of AI in healthcare and to encourage a healthy, critical evaluation of the information these tools provide.</p>



<p>The development of medical AI applications also creates an urgent need for regulation and supervision. For years, many AI-based applications reached the market without sufficient evaluation of their clinical effectiveness and safety. The EU has now begun to close this gap: AI-enabled medical devices are subject to the Medical Devices Regulation (MDR), the AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) classifies most of them as high-risk systems with phased-in obligations, and the European Health Data Space regulation sets rules for the secondary use of health data. Clear regulatory guidelines and assessment and approval procedures that reflect specific clinical and ethical requirements remain essential, however, and enhanced regulatory and supervisory efforts can help ensure that AI technologies are tailored to end-user needs and meet the highest standards of safety and effectiveness.</p>



<p>Ultimately, minimising the risk of error and misuse of medical AI requires the broad involvement of all stakeholders &#8211; physicians, medical staff, patients, regulators and technology manufacturers. Working together to develop, implement and evaluate AI in healthcare can benefit both patients and the healthcare system as a whole by improving diagnostic accuracy, treatment effectiveness and access to care.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Bias: when AI reinforces health inequalities</strong></h2>



<p>Inequality in healthcare is a complex, multi-factor problem. Many people experience discrimination based on gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status or geographical location. These inequalities may be systemic, resulting from socio-economic neglect, lack of access to healthcare or direct discrimination by medical staff.</p>



<p>One of the main sources of these inequalities is human bias, which can lead to patients being treated differently on the basis of characteristics such as race or gender. Research conducted in the United States has shown that Black patients often receive inferior medical care compared with white patients. Similarly, women frequently experience delayed diagnoses for certain conditions, such as endometriosis, and their pain is more likely than men&#8217;s to be attributed to psychological causes.</p>



<p>The introduction of AI into healthcare seems promising, but without proper regulation it may exacerbate these inequalities. Medical algorithms can be biased because they are trained on data that is incomplete, unrepresentative or itself the product of biased decisions. If diagnostic algorithms are trained mainly on data from white patients, for example, they may be less effective at diagnosing disease in patients of other ethnic backgrounds. There is also a risk of perpetuating existing inequalities where AI models are trained on data that reflects them.</p>



<p>Addressing these issues requires close supervision and evaluation of medical algorithms and assurance that training data is representative and balanced across population characteristics such as race, gender, age and socio-economic status. It is also necessary to involve a broad range of experts &#8211; sociologists, biomedical ethicists, public health professionals and patients &#8211; to ensure that AI models are fair and effective for all social groups.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The black box problem: lack of transparency</strong></h2>



<p>Amid growing interest in medical AI, an algorithm developed by Google for breast cancer screening sparked debate about the role these technologies can play in improving diagnosis and care. The algorithm delivered promising results, improving both the speed and reliability of screening and in some cases outperforming radiologists. Its ability to generalise to populations outside the regions on which it was trained attracted further interest.</p>



<p>The enthusiasm was accompanied by concern. The absence of details about the algorithm itself and of key technical descriptions led some to question the transparency and safety of the tool. This concern was echoed in the media and the AI community, where critics argued that a lack of full transparency could compromise both the usefulness and the safety of the algorithm.</p>



<p>Transparency in healthcare AI operates on two levels: traceability and explainability. Traceability refers to the documentation of the AI development process, including the model, the training data and post-deployment monitoring of the tool. In practice, existing tools are often delivered without full traceability, which undermines users&#8217; trust.</p>



<p>Explainability concerns the transparency of the decisions AI makes. In the case of algorithms based on deep neural networks, often referred to as &#8220;black boxes&#8221;, the absence of this transparency makes it difficult for clinicians and other stakeholders to understand the basis on which a decision was reached.</p>



<p>Various mitigation measures have been proposed to improve transparency and trust. An &#8220;AI passport&#8221; documenting key information about a model, together with tools for tracking the use of algorithms after deployment, could significantly improve traceability. Involving clinical end users from the earliest stages of algorithm development can also help develop effective strategies for explaining AI decisions.</p>



<p>Finally, regulators have an important role to play. By treating traceability and explainability as prerequisites for certification, they can set standards that encourage greater transparency in the development and application of AI algorithms in medicine.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Privacy and data security</strong></h2>



<p>The growing use of AI in healthcare, particularly during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, has highlighted the risks to privacy, confidentiality and the protection of patient data. Lack of informed consent may lead to breaches such as the disclosure of protected data or the re-use of patient data for other purposes.</p>



<p>Opaque AI algorithms and complex consent forms limit patient autonomy and hinder shared decision-making with the physician. A well-known example is the 2016 case in which patient records held by a London NHS trust were transferred to DeepMind without the patients&#8217; informed consent.</p>



<p>AI in healthcare also carries the risk of data breaches, which can lead to identity theft and other cyberattacks. In 2020, for instance, a data breach at Cense AI exposed sensitive data relating to more than 2.5 million patients.</p>



<p>The re-use of data is a further risk, potentially leading to unauthorised use of patient data for purposes unrelated to healthcare. There is a need to raise awareness and skills regarding privacy and security risks and to extend the regulatory and legal framework. Support for decentralised approaches to AI and continued research into the security of cloud-based systems are also crucial.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Who is responsible? The accountability gap</strong></h2>



<p>The concept of &#8220;algorithmic accountability&#8221; is gaining importance wherever AI is used, and especially in healthcare. It refers to the principle that people &#8211; not AI systems &#8211; are responsible for errors or improper actions of algorithms. The introduction of AI tools in medicine brings new challenges in this respect, and a sound solution to the question of responsibility is crucial for public acceptance of and trust in these technologies.</p>



<p>There is still considerable uncertainty as to who is responsible for AI-related medical errors, which calls for the adaptation of regulations and the legal framework to the specific characteristics of these technologies. One such challenge for policymakers and legislators is the &#8220;many hands&#8221; problem &#8211; the difficulty of allocating responsibility among the various entities involved in the development, implementation and use of AI. At EU level, the revised Product Liability Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/2853), which expressly covers software and AI systems, is a first step towards addressing this, while the proposed AI Liability Directive was withdrawn, leaving fault-based liability largely to national law.</p>



<p>A further difficulty lies in identifying the precise cause of an error involving medical AI. The cause may lie in the algorithm, in the data used to train it or in a misunderstanding of how the AI operates in clinical practice. The absence of uniform ethical and legal standards across the AI industry makes these problems harder to resolve.</p>



<p>Responsibility in medical AI is also closely linked to the clarity and transparency of algorithms: the less understandable an algorithm is, the harder it becomes to determine who is responsible. Proposals to address this include establishing processes that define the respective roles of AI developers and users, and setting up dedicated regulatory bodies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Barriers to implementation</strong></h2>



<p>Over the past five years, numerous medical AI algorithms have been proposed for a wide range of healthcare applications. Yet even where these technologies are clinically proven, safe and ethical, their implementation faces many practical obstacles. Healthcare professionals are often slow to adopt new technologies in daily practice. The implementation phase is critical, and beyond the creation of the algorithm itself, other factors must be taken into account, such as the limitations and quality of medical data and changes in the doctor-patient relationship.</p>



<p>The quality of medical data is essential for the effective use of medical AI, but such data is often unstructured and noisy. It must therefore be verified, quality-controlled and labelled, which requires considerable time and money. In addition, the introduction of AI may change the relationship between patients and healthcare professionals, creating new challenges in communicating disease risk information and updating clinical guidelines.</p>



<p>Bringing AI into clinical practice also requires interoperability and integration with existing health systems. Manufacturers and healthcare organisations will need to establish standard operating procedures and work together to ensure that new AI tools interoperate with existing technologies such as genetic sequencing and electronic patient records.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>



<p>The use of AI in medicine brings numerous benefits, but it also involves significant challenges and risks. Beyond technical aspects such as data quality and interoperability, changes in the relationship between patients and healthcare professionals and the need to update clinical guidelines must also be considered. Implementing AI in clinical practice requires collaboration between technology manufacturers and healthcare professionals to ensure the safe and effective integration of new tools into existing healthcare systems. Ultimately, a clear-eyed awareness of these risks is the precondition for harnessing the potential of AI to improve healthcare.</p>
<p> </p>




<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/artificial-intelligence-in-healthcare-the-risks-behind-the-promise/">Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: the Risks Behind the Promise</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>A Purchased Innovation Is Not R&#038;D. When Do AI Projects Qualify for the Polish R&#038;D Tax Relief?</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/a-purchased-innovation-is-not-rd-when-do-ai-projects-qualify-for-the-polish-rd-tax-relief/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 15:48:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IT, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Implementation]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8971</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: November 02, 2026 A growing number of businesses are investing in artificial intelligence and expect to recover the cost of those projects through the research and development (R&#38;D) tax relief. The Polish tax authorities and the Supreme Administrative Court, however, draw a clear line: integrating an off-the-shelf AI model or implementing a commercially [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/a-purchased-innovation-is-not-rd-when-do-ai-projects-qualify-for-the-polish-rd-tax-relief/">A Purchased Innovation Is Not R&amp;D. When Do AI Projects Qualify for the Polish R&amp;D Tax Relief?</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color"><strong>Publication date: November 02, 2026</strong></mark></p>



<p><strong><em>A growing number of businesses are investing in artificial intelligence and expect to recover the cost of those projects through the research and development (R&amp;D) tax relief. The Polish tax authorities and the Supreme Administrative Court, however, draw a clear line: integrating an off-the-shelf AI model or implementing a commercially available system – however advanced or “self-learning” – is not R&amp;D activity. The relief is available only to those who create new technology themselves and bear genuine research risk. We explain how the tax authorities’ “two-step test” works, what the Frascati Manual and the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court say, which costs in IT projects qualify and which are traps – and how to document the work so that the deduction survives a tax audit.</em></strong></p>



<span id="more-8971"></span>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Artificial intelligence in the enterprise and the R&amp;D tax relief</h2>



<p>In the era of digitalisation, artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming an integral part of how modern businesses operate. Deploying advanced algorithms, automating processes and building intelligent analytical systems all involve substantial investment. It is natural for businesses to look for ways to optimise that expenditure by claiming the research and development (R&amp;D) tax relief. The practice of the tax authorities and the case law of the administrative courts show, however, that the line between an innovative implementation and qualifying R&amp;D activity is a fine one, and crossing it requires meeting strict statutory criteria.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Legal basis of research and development activity</h2>



<p>The R&amp;D relief, governed by Article 18d of the Corporate Income Tax Act<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> (the “CIT Act”) and, correspondingly, Article 26e of the Personal Income Tax Act<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> (the “PIT Act”), allows specific categories of expenditure, known as eligible costs, to be deducted from the tax base. Although the mechanism is almost identical in both statutes – with minor adjustments such as the right of an “enterprise in succession” to continue deductions under the PIT Act – the key to claiming the relief lies in a proper understanding of the statutory definition of R&amp;D activity itself.</p>



<p>Under Article 4a(26) of the CIT Act, research and development activity means creative activity comprising scientific research or development work, undertaken in a systematic manner in order to increase the stock of knowledge and to use that stock of knowledge to devise new applications. For an AI project to be covered by the relief, it must therefore cumulatively be creative in nature, be conducted methodically according to an established schedule, and generate new knowledge or lead to a new application of knowledge. The requirement to “increase the stock of knowledge” does not mean that the knowledge must be new on a global scale. According to the explanatory notes issued by the Minister of Finance, it is sufficient to develop a new solution or a new application of knowledge from the perspective of the enterprise, provided that the work is genuinely creative and involves real technological uncertainty<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The tax authorities’ two-step test and the OECD standards</h2>



<p>When verifying entitlement to the deduction, the tax authorities apply a rigorous mechanism that may be described as a “two-step test”. First, they assess the nature of the work itself, examining whether it substantively meets the statutory definition of R&amp;D. Only after this stage has been passed does the second step open up: financial qualification, i.e. verification of whether the expenditure incurred falls within the closed catalogue of eligible costs.</p>



<p>When interpreting these provisions, the Polish tax authorities and courts refer to the guidelines contained in the OECD’s Frascati Manual<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a>, which is widely used as an interpretative standard for assessing R&amp;D activity. The Manual sets out five criteria that R&amp;D activity must satisfy cumulatively. The work must be novel, i.e. aimed at findings that go beyond the existing knowledge in the relevant industry. It must be creative, based on original concepts rather than mechanical replication. The third, critically important element is uncertainty – at the outset of the project, the final outcome, the time required and the costs must be difficult to predict because of technological risk. The activity as a whole must be systematic (planned and budgeted), and its results – including negative ones – must be reproducible or transferable thanks to appropriate codification and documentation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Implementation versus creation of technology</h2>



<p>For a business’s tax security, it is fundamental to separate the implementation of ready-made solutions from genuine R&amp;D work. Implementing commercially available tools such as ERP systems, SaaS platforms, RFID technology or pre-built AI models consists solely in adapting them to the individual needs of the enterprise. Such activities are not creative in nature and do not generate new resources of objective technical knowledge, and the risk involved is operational rather than research-related.</p>



<p>One can speak of R&amp;D activity in the field of artificial intelligence only where the business acts as the creator of the technology rather than its user. Qualifying work will therefore include designing and training proprietary network architectures from scratch, modifying the core of algorithms to achieve properties previously unknown on the market, or building prototypes in an experimental environment to verify unique hypotheses. It should be stressed, however, that the use of off-the-shelf AI models does not automatically rule out the R&amp;D relief. Where a business makes significant modifications to the architecture of such a model, develops its own training methods or devises new optimisation mechanisms, such work may well satisfy the criteria of R&amp;D activity. The Director of the National Tax Information Office has already addressed AI-based projects directly in individual tax rulings, assessing them against the same criteria that apply to “conventional” IT projects<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a>.</p>



<p>An example of an implementation that does not qualify a business for the R&amp;D relief is purchasing API access to a ready-made large language model and integrating it with the company’s own customer database in order to build a simple website chatbot. The work is then limited to parameterisation, adjusting the user interface (UX/UI) and preparing prompts – there is no technological uncertainty, only the operational risk of whether the implementation will be completed on time and within budget.</p>



<p>An example of creation, by contrast, is a situation in which a business uses an open-source AI model but its engineers substantially alter the model’s architecture, design a unique data-weighting algorithm to minimise so-called hallucinations in a highly specialised medical field, and run a series of experiments without knowing at the outset whether the model will achieve the precision required by the market. Here the risk is research-related: the project may fail, and yet its result – knowledge of which approaches do not work – still constitutes new technical knowledge.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The position of the Supreme Administrative Court</h2>



<p>The line of case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, NSA) on the classification of IT implementations is unequivocal. Particularly instructive are the twin judgments of 25 August 2021, II FSK 138/19<a href="#_ftn6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a> and II FSK 139/19<a href="#_ftn7" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a>, in which the NSA examined the implementation of modern document workflow, warehouse management and sales systems. The Court firmly held that adapting existing, commercially available software to the needs of the taxpayer’s business does not constitute R&amp;D activity, as it is not a creative process that expands the stock of knowledge.</p>



<p>The same issue was addressed in the earlier judgment of 9 October 2019, II FSK 3589/17<a href="#_ftn8" id="_ftnref8">[8]</a>, concerning the implementation of a highly advanced, “learning” APS-class production planning system. The taxpayer argued that the system made decisions autonomously and learned the specifics of the enterprise. The Court nevertheless held that purchasing even the most innovative, self-learning technology from a third party and configuring it over many months is still merely an implementation. The conclusion from the case law is clear: a purchased innovation does not turn the purchaser into an entity conducting R&amp;D activity. The administrative courts consistently distinguish between acquiring and configuring ready-made solutions and independently creating new functionalities that actually lead to the creation of new technical knowledge. This is of particular importance in the context of AI, where the “intelligence” of the tool itself is often mistakenly equated with the innovativeness of the work performed by the taxpayer.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Eligible costs and pitfalls in IT projects</h2>



<p>A positive substantive assessment of the project does not end the challenges. The next area of risk is the categorisation of expenditure. In practice, the most significant item for businesses claiming the relief is personnel costs. These cover the remuneration of employees under employment contracts and of persons performing R&amp;D work under contracts of mandate or contracts for specific work, together with employer-funded social security contributions. Such expenditure is deducted in proportion to the time actually spent on R&amp;D activity. It is worth remembering that these costs are deductible at 200%, which makes them the most valuable category of eligible costs<a href="#_ftn9" id="_ftnref9">[9]</a>. Another important category is depreciation write-offs on fixed assets and intangible assets used in R&amp;D activity.</p>



<p>It should also be borne in mind that the purchase of software cannot be treated as the acquisition of materials and raw materials within the meaning of the statute, since it concerns rights in intangible property. As regards the cost of cloud services (renting computing power), SaaS subscriptions and API access to AI models, the possibility of including them in the R&amp;D relief is, as a rule, limited. In each case, this requires an analysis of the nature of the expenditure and the way it is recognised in the accounting books. Software may constitute an eligible cost essentially where the business acquires the economic copyright or a licence to it, recognises it in its records as an intangible asset and includes the depreciation write-offs in the relief. This is particularly relevant in AI projects, where the cost of computing power for model training is often one of the largest budget items – and, at the same time, one of the most difficult to claim under the relief.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How to document an AI project in case of a tax audit</h2>



<p>Projects that make use of artificial intelligence open the way to the R&amp;D relief provided that the business genuinely co-creates new technology, generates new knowledge through research experiments and bears real technological risk in doing so. The burden of demonstrating these circumstances lies with the taxpayer, so the documentation should be produced as the project progresses, not merely in response to a request from the tax authority.</p>



<p>To protect their interests, businesses should adopt several project management principles. First, the conceptual, uncertainty-laden research phase must be clearly separated from subsequent implementation and maintenance work – ideally at the level of the project structure and budget. Second, precise records of staff working time must be kept so that only the man-hours devoted to creative work are included in eligible costs. Third, the whole process must be supported by codification of the research process in line with the standard described in the Frascati Manual: from formulating the research hypothesis and describing the state of knowledge at the outset, through analysing the technological uncertainty and documenting the experiments performed (including unsuccessful ones), to a final report recording the newly acquired knowledge. In AI projects, versioned code repositories, model training logs and benchmark test protocols have particular evidential value, as they make it possible to demonstrate that the outcome was not known in advance.</p>



<p>Where there is doubt as to the classification of a specific project, it is worth considering applying for an individual tax ruling. A precise description of the facts, emphasising the element of uncertainty and the team’s creative contribution, is then crucial – it is precisely on this ground that most disputes over the R&amp;D relief in IT projects are decided.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a>Act of 15 February 1992 on Corporate Income Tax (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2026, item 554).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a>Act of 26 July 1991 on Personal Income Tax (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2026, item 592).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a>Tax explanatory notes of the Minister of Finance of 15 July 2019 on the preferential taxation of income generated by intellectual property rights (IP Box), paras 32–45 (definition of research and development activity common to the R&amp;D relief and the IP Box regime).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a>OECD (2015), Frascati Manual 2015: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development, The Measurement of Scientific, Technological and Innovation Activities, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264239012-en; Polish edition: OECD/GUS (2018), Warsaw.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a>See, inter alia, individual tax rulings of the Director of the National Tax Information Office of 4 March 2024, 0111-KDIB1-3.4010.742.2023.2.JKU; of 25 April 2025, 0114-KDIP3-1.4011.236.2025.2.EC; and of 13 March 2026, 0111-KDIB1-3.4010.7.2026.3.AN.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a>Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25 August 2021, II FSK 138/19, LEX no. 3265262.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a>Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 25 August 2021, II FSK 139/19, LEX no. 3252790.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a>Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 9 October 2019, II FSK 3589/17, LEX no. 2740353.</p>



<p><a id="_ftn9" href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a>Article 18d(7)(3) of the CIT Act and Article 26e(7)(3) of the PIT Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/a-purchased-innovation-is-not-rd-when-do-ai-projects-qualify-for-the-polish-rd-tax-relief/">A Purchased Innovation Is Not R&amp;D. When Do AI Projects Qualify for the Polish R&amp;D Tax Relief?</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 12:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PHARMACEUTICAL, HEALTHCARE & LIFE SCIENCES LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: October 12, 2026 I. Introduction The longevity economy is commonly estimated at several hundred billion dollars worldwide and continues to grow rapidly.[1] Venture capital flows into biotechnology companies that promise to slow, halt, or reverse aging. Clinics from Zurich to Seoul to Miami sell “longevity programmes.” Supplement brands attach the word “longevity” to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective-2/">Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: October 12, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">I. Introduction</h2>



<p>The longevity economy is commonly estimated at several hundred billion dollars worldwide and continues to grow rapidly.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Venture capital flows into biotechnology companies that promise to slow, halt, or reverse aging. Clinics from Zurich to Seoul to Miami sell “longevity programmes.” Supplement brands attach the word “longevity” to products ranging from NAD precursors to collagen powders. And yet the word “longevity” does not exist as a legal category in European Union law. There is no definition, no register, no certification scheme, and no authority empowered to decide what may or may not describe itself as a longevity product, a longevity clinic, or a longevity company.</p>



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<p>The gap between an enormous market and a non-existent legal definition is precisely where legal risk accumulates. Where there is no definition, there is classification risk, claims risk, and enforcement risk. There is also a phenomenon that this article, borrowing from the vocabulary of environmental marketing, calls “longevity washing.”</p>



<p>This article examines the longevity industry through the lens of EU regulatory law. The EU framework governs a market of some 450 million consumers and, because it is horizontal, sector-specific, and increasingly enforcement-oriented, it offers a useful point of comparison for practitioners in the United States, Asia, and Latin America. Part II explains why “longevity” is not a legal category and introduces the borderline-product problem that follows from that fact. Part III develops the concept of longevity washing and its consumer-facing, unfair-commercial-practice, and investor-facing dimensions. Part IV addresses the regulation of artificial intelligence in longevity research and diagnostics, including the revised timeline of the AI Act, the position of the European Medicines Agency on AI in the medicinal-product lifecycle, and the data-protection architecture formed by the GDPR and the European Health Data Space. Part V maps the sectoral “hot spots” across pharmaceuticals, medical devices, cosmetics, and food supplements. Part VI draws conclusions for practitioners.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">II. “Longevity” in the Eyes of the Law: The Borderline-Product Problem</h1>



<p>In EU regulatory law, aging is not a disease. The European Medicines Agency has never approved a medicinal product with “aging” as a therapeutic indication, and under Directive 2001/83/EC a medicinal product is defined by reference to the treatment or prevention of disease or the restoration, correction, or modification of physiological functions.<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> The position in the United States is comparable. The long-running debate around the Targeting Aging with Metformin (TAME) trial illustrates the point: its designers had to negotiate a trial protocol with the Food and Drug Administration that targets aging indirectly, through a composite of age-related diseases, precisely because “aging” itself is not an approvable indication.<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a></p>



<p>The consequence is profound. A company cannot lawfully market a product “to treat aging.” The entire longevity industry therefore operates in the space of indirect claims: “supports healthy aging,” “promotes cellular health,” “extends healthspan.” Each of those phrases pushes the product toward one of several very different regulatory regimes.</p>



<p>This is the borderline-product problem, and it is the single most important legal concept in the sector. The same molecule – an NAD precursor, for example – may be: a medicinal product, if it is presented as treating or preventing disease or exerts a significant pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic effect; a food supplement under Directive 2002/46/EC;<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> a novel food requiring pre-market authorisation under Regulation (EU) 2015/2283;<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a> a cosmetic under Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, if applied to the skin with a claim limited to appearance;<a href="#_ftn6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a> or a medical device. The last category is broader than it may appear: since the Medical Device Regulation (MDR) came into application, products listed in its Annex XVI – dermal fillers, certain energy-based aesthetic equipment – are regulated as devices even where they have no medical purpose at all.<a href="#_ftn7" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a></p>



<p>Classification does not follow the label a company chooses. It follows presentation, composition, and route of administration. The Court of Justice of the European Union has held for four decades that a product is a medicinal product “by presentation” where it is described or recommended as having properties for treating or preventing disease, irrespective of whether it actually has those properties; and that classification “by function” turns on a case-by-case scientific assessment of the product’s actual pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic action, not on the manufacturer’s intention.<a href="#_ftn8" id="_ftnref8">[8]</a> Marketing language alone can therefore reclassify a product and, with it, the entire compliance burden: marketing authorisation, good manufacturing practice, pharmacovigilance, and advertising restrictions.</p>



<p>When a client says “we are a longevity company,” the first question counsel should ask is: <em>which regime are you actually in?</em> “Longevity” is a marketing word. The law knows only medicines, devices, foods, and cosmetics.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">III. Longevity Washing: When the Claim Outruns the Science</h1>



<p>Greenwashing – claiming environmental virtue one does not have – is a familiar concept. Longevity washing is its younger sibling: labelling a product, a clinic, a research programme, or an entire company as “longevity-focused” when the science, the indication, or the business model does not support that description. The practice matters legally for three reasons.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. Consumer-Facing Claims</em></h2>



<p>Under the Health Claims Regulation, any health claim made on a food – and food supplements are foods – must be specifically authorised and listed in the EU register.<a href="#_ftn9" id="_ftnref9">[9]</a> Claims such as “slows aging,” “supports cellular repair,” or “extends lifespan” are not authorised health claims. National authorities in the EU and the United Kingdom have treated phrases such as “cellular repair” and even “healthy aging” as impermissible where they imply a physiological mechanism or a reduction of disease risk. A substantial part of the longevity supplement market is thus operating with claims that would not survive enforcement scrutiny.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. Unfair Commercial Practices and the Greenwashing Template</em></h2>



<p>The second layer is the general prohibition of misleading commercial practices under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD).<a href="#_ftn10" id="_ftnref10">[10]</a> Here the EU has recently built an entire enforcement architecture against greenwashing that repays close study by anyone advising on health claims. The Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition Directive amends the UCPD to prohibit generic environmental claims – “eco-friendly,” “climate-neutral” – unless the trader can demonstrate recognised excellent environmental performance, and it adds a series of specific greenwashing practices to the UCPD’s blacklist. Its provisions apply across the Union from 27 September 2026.<a href="#_ftn11" id="_ftnref11">[11]</a></p>



<p>The Directive should be read as a template. If “climate-neutral” now requires substantiation, it is a very short doctrinal step for regulators and courts to demand the same of “clinically proven to slow biological aging.” The methodology of anti-greenwashing enforcement – generic claim, absence of substantiation, misleading omission – maps directly onto longevity claims. The UCPD’s general clauses on misleading actions and omissions already provide the legal basis; what the green-claims reform supplies is a worked example of how those clauses can be operationalised against vague virtue-signalling.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Investor-Facing Washing</em></h2>



<p>The third dimension is of particular relevance to transactional lawyers. Start-ups increasingly brand themselves as “longevity biotech” because that is where the capital is, even when the underlying asset is a conventional dermatology product or a wellness application. For investors, this creates due-diligence risk: is the “longevity platform” in fact a regulated medicinal pipeline, with all the timeline and cost that implies, or a supplement business one enforcement letter away from relabelling? Misclassification discovered after investment is a valuation event. For the company, aggressive longevity framing in fundraising materials can generate liability under securities and misrepresentation rules in multiple jurisdictions. In due diligence on a longevity start-up, the regulatory classification memorandum is not an annex to the deal; it <em>is</em> the deal.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">IV. Artificial Intelligence in Longevity Research and Diagnostics</h1>



<p>The longevity field is arguably the most AI-dependent sector in the life sciences, for a simple reason: aging is not one target but thousands of interacting biological processes. A geroprotective drug cannot be designed the way an antibiotic is designed. The entire aging phenotype must be modelled, and that means machine learning on large multi-omic datasets. AI is not an add-on in longevity; it is the core methodology. That raises three distinct regulatory questions under EU law.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. The AI Act</em></h2>



<p>Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the AI Act, is the most comprehensive horizontal AI regulation in force anywhere and applies to almost every AI system used in the longevity value chain.<a href="#_ftn12" id="_ftnref12">[12]</a> It adopts a risk-based structure – prohibited practices, high-risk systems, transparency obligations, and minimal-risk systems – and the critical category for this sector is high-risk. An AI system that is itself a medical device, or a safety component of one, under the MDR or the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation, and that is subject to third-party conformity assessment under those instruments, is high-risk under Article 6(1) and Annex I of the AI Act.<a href="#_ftn13" id="_ftnref13">[13]</a> This captures, for example, an AI tool that estimates a patient’s “biological age” from a blood panel and uses that estimate to guide a clinical intervention; an AI-driven diagnostic that predicts age-related disease risk; and the software layer of many longevity-clinic platforms once it makes a diagnostic or prognostic claim.</p>



<p>High-risk status is not a prohibition; it is a compliance regime. It requires a risk-management system, data governance with representative and bias-tested training data, technical documentation, logging, human oversight, transparency to deployers, accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity, a conformity assessment, and post-market monitoring.<a href="#_ftn14" id="_ftnref14">[14]</a> For most longevity start-ups this is a wholly new compliance layer on top of MDR conformity assessment, and the two must be coordinated.</p>



<p>The timeline has recently changed, and practitioners should update their advice accordingly. The original AI Act applied the high-risk obligations from 2 August 2026 for stand-alone systems listed in Annex III and from 2 August 2027 for AI embedded in products covered by Annex I, including medical devices. The Digital Omnibus on AI, adopted as Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 and in force since 27 July 2026, defers those dates to 2 December 2027 and 2 August 2028 respectively.<a href="#_ftn15" id="_ftnref15">[15]</a> The deferral does not lighten the substantive regime; the prohibitions in Article 5, the obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models, and the transparency obligations of Article 50 (which apply from 2 August 2026) are unaffected. For longevity companies whose AI is a medical device, the practical effect is a compliance window of roughly two years, during which harmonised standards and notified-body capacity are expected to mature. The window is an opportunity to design AI Act compliance into the MDR technical file from the outset rather than to defer the exercise.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. AI in Drug Discovery and the European Medicines Agency</em></h2>



<p>The position for drug discovery is more nuanced. An AI model used purely internally to identify candidate molecules – the classic “AI for drug discovery” use case that dominates longevity-biotech pitch decks – is generally not, in itself, a high-risk AI system under the AI Act, because it does not make or materially influence decisions about individual patients. The regulatory question shifts instead to the European Medicines Agency. The EMA’s Reflection Paper on the use of AI in the medicinal product lifecycle sets out the Agency’s expectations from discovery through pharmacovigilance.<a href="#_ftn16" id="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Its core message is that the burden of proof rests on the sponsor to demonstrate that the AI model is fit for its regulatory purpose. That entails documented data provenance, model validation, a degree of explainability appropriate to the stage of development, and lifecycle management of the model itself.</p>



<p>If a longevity company tells its investors that “our AI discovered this molecule,” the regulator will eventually ask to see the model, the training data, and the validation. Vague AI claims in fundraising materials do not survive regulatory scrutiny and, increasingly, do not survive investor due diligence either.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Data: The GDPR and the European Health Data Space</em></h2>



<p>The third question concerns data, and it is here that longevity becomes uniquely difficult. Aging research is inherently longitudinal and multi-omic: genomic, epigenetic, and proteomic data, wearable data, and medical records, ideally across decades. Under the General Data Protection Regulation this is special-category data – health, genetic, and biometric data – and the available lawful bases are narrow.<a href="#_ftn17" id="_ftnref17">[17]</a> The scientific-research provisions of Article 9(2)(j) and Article 89 assist, but they are implemented differently in each Member State, which produces real fragmentation for pan-European longevity cohorts.</p>



<p>The European Health Data Space Regulation adds a second layer.<a id="_ftnref18" href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> It creates, for the first time, a mandatory EU-wide framework for the secondary use of electronic health data, administered by health-data-access bodies in each Member State. For longevity research the EHDS is potentially transformative, because it opens access to population-scale health data for research purposes. It also imposes strict conditions: purpose limitation, processing only within secure processing environments, a prohibition on re-identification, and specific prohibitions on using the data for advertising or marketing, for decisions detrimental to individuals such as insurance or employment decisions, or for developing products harmful to health.<a id="_ftnref19" href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> The secondary-use chapter applies from March 2029 for most data categories, but the lead time is short in the context of longitudinal cohorts. Longevity companies that intend to monetise health data – and many do – should be mapping their data flows against the EHDS regime now.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">V. Sector-by-Sector Regulatory Hot Spots</h1>



<p>Four sectoral silos together make up the longevity industry, and the same start-up frequently straddles two or three of them without realising it. In each silo, specific “hot spots” – advertising, manufacturing standards, registration, and market withdrawal – recur in practice.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. Pharmaceuticals</em></h2>



<p>True longevity drugs – rapamycin analogues, senolytics, geroprotectors – sit squarely within Directive 2001/83/EC and its implementing rules, and will continue to do so under the new pharmaceutical package once it applies. Three practical hot spots stand out. First, off-label prescribing of rapamycin and metformin for longevity indications is widespread in private clinics across Europe. Off-label prescribing as such is a matter of clinical freedom, but off-label <em>promotion</em> by or on behalf of the marketing-authorisation holder is prohibited: advertising must conform to the summary of product characteristics, and advertising of unauthorised products or indications is not permitted.<a href="#_ftn20" id="_ftnref20">[20]</a> Longevity clinics are increasingly the vehicle through which promotional messaging reaches patients, and enforcement authorities have begun to take notice. Second, good manufacturing practice: anything presented as a medicine must be manufactured under an EU manufacturing authorisation and EU GMP, with qualified persons and full traceability; compounding pharmacies producing “longevity peptides” have become a significant enforcement target. Third, unlicensed importation: a large part of the longevity-peptide market operates through personal importation and grey channels, and customs enforcement across the EU has visibly tightened.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. Medical Devices</em></h2>



<p>The MDR has fundamentally reshaped this space. Aesthetic devices – dermal fillers, energy-based devices used in longevity clinics, at-home devices marketed for “cellular rejuvenation” – are caught by Annex XVI even without a medical purpose. Three hot spots follow. Classification: many longevity wearables and applications become software as a medical device once they make a diagnostic or prognostic claim. Advertising: Article 7 of the MDR prohibits misleading claims and specifically prohibits ascribing to a device functions and properties it does not have, which operates in practice as a codified anti-washing rule for devices.<a href="#_ftn21" id="_ftnref21">[21]</a> Registration and vigilance: the first four modules of the EUDAMED database – actor registration, UDI/device registration, notified bodies and certificates, and market surveillance – have been mandatory since 28 May 2026, with legacy devices to be registered by 28 November 2026; the vigilance module is not yet mandatory, so serious incidents and field safety corrective actions continue to be reported to national competent authorities.<a href="#_ftn22" id="_ftnref22">[22]</a> Market withdrawals happen: a device sold as a “cellular biomarker analyser” without valid clinical evidence can be removed from the market by any national competent authority, and the MDR’s market-surveillance coordination means that one withdrawal can cascade across the Union.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Cosmetics and Aesthetic Products</em></h2>



<p>The Cosmetics Regulation governs anti-aging creams, serums, and topical actives. Two hot spots dominate. The first is the Product Information File: the responsible person must hold a complete file including a safety assessment and substantiation of every claim. The second is the Claims Regulation, Commission Regulation (EU) No 655/2013, with its six common criteria: legal compliance, truthfulness, evidential support, honesty, fairness, and informed decision-making.<a href="#_ftn23" id="_ftnref23">[23]</a> A claim such as “reverses skin aging at the cellular level” fails the evidential-support criterion unless a robust dossier stands behind it. Enforcement is largely national, but the Cosmetic Products Notification Portal is EU-wide, and non-compliant products are routinely notified through the Safety Gate rapid-alert system.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>D. Food Supplements and Novel Foods</em></h2>



<p>It is in the food and supplement space that the longevity industry is most creative and most exposed. Directive 2002/46/EC governs vitamins and minerals in supplements; everything else falls under the general food law of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002<a href="#_ftn24" id="_ftnref24">[24]</a> and, critically, the Novel Food Regulation. Nicotinamide mononucleotide (NMN), one of the most heavily marketed longevity molecules, is the paradigmatic case. NMN is treated as a novel food in the EU, which means it cannot lawfully be placed on the market as a supplement without pre-market authorisation by the Commission following an EFSA safety assessment. Nicotinamide riboside received such an authorisation in 2020.<a href="#_ftn25" id="_ftnref25">[25]</a> NMN has not – although the picture is now moving. In March 2026 EFSA’s NDA Panel adopted a positive opinion on the safety of β-NMN in food supplements at up to 300 mg per day for adults, and the opinion was published in May 2026.<a href="#_ftn26" id="_ftnref26">[26]</a> An EFSA opinion is a scientific assessment, not an authorisation; the Commission must still adopt an implementing act adding NMN to the Union list, and where the applicant has requested data protection the authorisation will initially be proprietary to that applicant’s specification. Until that act is adopted, NMN products on the shelves of European longevity clinics remain unauthorised novel foods. That is not a grey area; it is a non-compliant market operating in plain sight, and it is the kind of enforcement pipeline that eventually produces high-profile withdrawal actions. Once the Health Claims Regulation is added to the picture, the conclusion is unavoidable: the food and supplement leg of the longevity industry is the most legally exposed part of the entire sector.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">VI. Conclusions</h1>



<p>The longevity industry is a genuine scientific and commercial phenomenon, and much of the underlying research is serious. But lawyers advising companies, investors, clinicians, and, increasingly, regulators in this space must see it clearly: “longevity” is not a legal category. It is a marketing frame layered on top of four very different regulatory regimes. Three practical conclusions follow for anyone whose product touches European consumers.</p>



<p>First, always begin with classification. The word “longevity” conveys nothing about the applicable regime. Ask what the product is, how it is presented, and what it does, and let the regulatory regime follow from those answers.</p>



<p>Second, treat longevity claims the way green claims are now treated. The direction of enforcement is unmistakable. The Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition Directive, applicable from 27 September 2026, gives regulators a sharpened toolkit that will, sooner or later, be pointed at health and wellness claims. Substantiation is no longer optional.</p>



<p>Third, integrate AI Act compliance with sectoral compliance from the outset. For any longevity venture using AI in diagnostics or patient-facing decision support, the AI Act, the MDR, and the GDPR, soon joined by the European Health Data Space, form a single interlocking compliance architecture. The deferral of the AI Act’s high-risk obligations to 2027 and 2028 is a design window, not a reprieve. Retrofitting is expensive; designing for compliance is not.</p>



<p>The longevity industry will keep growing, and regulators will keep catching up. The lawyers who understand both the science and the sectoral map will be the ones clients call first.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Longevity economy estimates vary widely by definition; see, e.g., the periodic longevity-market reports of Bank of America Global Research and McKinsey Health Institute. The figure is offered here as an order of magnitude, not a precise valuation.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, art. 1(2), 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 [hereinafter Directive 2001/83]. At the time of writing, the new EU pharmaceutical package (a new directive on the Union code for medicinal products for human use and a new regulation on Union authorisation procedures) has been politically agreed and is in the final stage of formal adoption; the substantive rules discussed here are carried over into the new framework, which will apply after a transitional period of approximately two years from entry into force.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> See Nir Barzilai et al., Metformin as a Tool to Target Aging, 23 Cell Metabolism 1060 (2016) (describing the design of the Targeting Aging with Metformin (TAME) trial around a composite of age-related diseases).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Food Supplements, 2002 O.J. (L 183) 51.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on Novel Foods, 2015 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Novel Food Regulation].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on Cosmetic Products, 2009 O.J. (L 342) 59 [hereinafter Cosmetics Regulation].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on Medical Devices, Annex XVI, 2017 O.J. (L 117) 1 [hereinafter MDR]; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2346 of 1 December 2022 Laying Down Common Specifications for the Groups of Products Without an Intended Medical Purpose Listed in Annex XVI, 2022 O.J. (L 311) 60.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a> Case 227/82, Van Bennekom, ECLI:EU:C:1983:354 (establishing that a product is a medicinal product “by presentation” where it is described or recommended as having therapeutic or prophylactic properties, irrespective of its actual efficacy); Case C-319/05, Comm’n v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2007:678 (garlic capsules); Case C-140/07, Hecht-Pharma GmbH v. Staatliches Gewerbeaufsichtsamt Luneburg, ECLI:EU:C:2009:5 (classification “by function” requires a case-by-case assessment of pharmacological, immunological or metabolic properties). See also Directive 2001/83, supra note 2, art. 2(2) (in cases of doubt, the medicinal-products regime prevails).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref9" id="_ftn9">[9]</a> Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods, arts. 10, 13, 14, 2006 O.J. (L 404) 9 [hereinafter Health Claims Regulation]. The EU Register of nutrition and health claims is maintained by the European Commission.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref10" id="_ftn10">[10]</a> Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 [hereinafter UCPD].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref11" id="_ftn11">[11]</a> Directive (EU) 2024/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 Amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as Regards Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, OJ L, 2024/825, 6.3.2024 [hereinafter ECGT Directive]. Member States were required to transpose the Directive by 27 March 2026; its provisions apply from 27 September 2026. The separate Green Claims Directive proposal, which would have introduced ex ante verification of explicit environmental claims, was withdrawn by the Commission in 2025 and is not discussed here.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref12" id="_ftn12">[12]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024 [hereinafter AI Act].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref13" id="_ftn13">[13]</a> AI Act, supra note 12, art. 6(1) &amp; Annex I, § A (listing the MDR and Regulation (EU) 2017/746 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices). The Annex I route applies where the AI system is a product, or a safety component of a product, that is itself subject to third-party conformity assessment under the listed Union harmonisation legislation.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref14" id="_ftn14">[14]</a> AI Act, supra note 12, arts. 9–15, 17, 43, 72.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref15" id="_ftn15">[15]</a> Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as Regards the Simplification of Certain Obligations (“Digital Omnibus on AI”), OJ L, 2026/1744, 24.7.2026 (in force 27 July 2026). The Regulation defers the high-risk obligations for stand-alone (Annex III) systems to 2 December 2027 and for AI embedded in products covered by Annex I, including medical devices, to 2 August 2028; the Article 50 transparency obligations continue to apply from 2 August 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref16" id="_ftn16">[16]</a> Eur. Medicines Agency, Reflection Paper on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Medicinal Product Lifecycle, EMA/CHMP/CVMP/83833/2023 (adopted Sept. 2024).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref17" id="_ftn17">[17]</a> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, arts. 9(2)(j), 89, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref18" id="_ftn18">[18]</a> Regulation (EU) 2025/327 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2025 on the European Health Data Space, OJ L, 2025/327, 5.3.2025 [hereinafter EHDS Regulation]. The Regulation entered into force on 26 March 2025 and applies in stages: most provisions from 26 March 2027, and the core secondary-use chapter from 26 March 2029 (2031 for certain data categories). See id. art. 105.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref19" id="_ftn19">[19]</a> EHDS Regulation, supra note 18, arts. 50–54 (secure processing environments; permitted and prohibited purposes of secondary use).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref20" id="_ftn20">[20]</a> Directive 2001/83, supra note 2, art. 87(2) (all parts of advertising must comply with the particulars listed in the summary of product characteristics), arts. 40–53 (manufacturing authorisation and good manufacturing practice) and art. 87(1) (prohibition of advertising of medicinal products without a marketing authorisation).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref21" id="_ftn21">[21]</a> MDR, supra note 7, art. 7.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref22" id="_ftn22">[22]</a> Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2371 of 26 November 2025 (declaring the first four EUDAMED modules functional), OJ L, 2025/2371, 27.11.2025; Regulation (EU) 2024/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024, OJ L, 2024/1860, 9.7.2024 (gradual roll-out of EUDAMED). The four modules (actor registration, UDI/device registration, notified bodies and certificates, market surveillance) are mandatory from 28 May 2026; legacy devices remaining on the market must be registered by 28 November 2026. The vigilance and clinical-investigation modules are not yet mandatory, and serious incidents continue to be reported to national competent authorities.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref23" id="_ftn23">[23]</a> Cosmetics Regulation, supra note 6, arts. 11, 13, 20; Commission Regulation (EU) No 655/2013 of 10 July 2013 Laying Down Common Criteria for the Justification of Claims Used in Relation to Cosmetic Products, Annex, 2013 O.J. (L 190) 31.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref24" id="_ftn24">[24]</a> Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref25" id="_ftn25">[25]</a> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/16 of 10 January 2020 Authorising the Placing on the Market of Nicotinamide Riboside Chloride as a Novel Food, 2020 O.J. (L 7) 6.</p>



<p><a id="_ftn26" href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> EFSA Panel on Nutrition, Novel Foods and Food Allergens, Safety of Beta-Nicotinamide Mononucleotide (β-NMN) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 and the Bioavailability of Nicotinamide from This Source in the Context of Directive 2002/46/EC, 24 EFSA J. e10007 (2026) (opinion adopted 4 March 2026, published 11 May 2026). Authorisation requires a Commission implementing act amending the Union list established by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470; at the time of writing no such act has been published, and any authorisation granted on the basis of proprietary data will initially benefit only the applicant. See Novel Food Regulation, supra note 5, arts. 12, 26.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective-2/">Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>A Human in the Loop, Data under Control. The GDPR and the AI Act in Implementation Practice</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/ai-act-and-gdpr-ai-governance-compliance/</link>
					<comments>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/ai-act-and-gdpr-ai-governance-compliance/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 09:55:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IT, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[algorithmic bias]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Protection Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DPIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FRIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-risk AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[large language models]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Machine Learning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[personal data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PRIVACY]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workplace AI]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8947</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: October 05, 2026 Implementing artificial intelligence in an organisation does not begin with choosing a tool, but with answering the question of who we are in the AI value chain and what we are responsible for. This article sets out the relationship between the GDPR and the AI Act: from the roles of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/ai-act-and-gdpr-ai-governance-compliance/">A Human in the Loop, Data under Control. The GDPR and the AI Act in Implementation Practice</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color"><strong>Publication date: October 05, 2026</strong></mark></p>



<p>Implementing artificial intelligence in an organisation does not begin with choosing a tool, but with answering the question of who we are in the AI value chain and what we are responsible for. This article sets out the relationship between the GDPR and the AI Act: from the roles of provider, deployer and controller, through algorithmic risks, the limits of lawfulness in the workplace and the rights of individuals, to the DPIA, the FRIA and the AI Governance model. It reflects the legal position following the entry into force of the Polish Act on Artificial Intelligence Systems and the postponement of the AI Act application dates by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.</p>



<span id="more-8947"></span>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Introduction</strong></h2>



<p>Rapid technological progress and the widespread deployment of systems based on artificial intelligence are permanently reshaping the landscape of modern economic and social life. The use of machine learning algorithms and large language models in professional processes opens up unprecedented opportunities for optimisation, allowing the automation of tasks that previously required prolonged human effort. This technological efficiency, however, brings significant ethical and legal challenges and calls into question existing standards of privacy protection. In an era of such profound digital transformation, the key task is to develop a regulatory framework that balances the drive for innovation against the imperative of protecting fundamental rights. It must be remembered that AI systems, despite their apparent infallibility, operate on data that may be erroneous, biased or out of date. As a result, algorithm-based decision-making processes directly affect the legal and personal situation of natural persons, which creates a need to define precisely who is responsible for the outcome of the technology.</p>



<p>Regardless of how advanced AI tools become, the paradigm of human oversight must remain the fundamental principle of safe implementation. A human being cannot be reduced to a mere recipient of output data; they must perform an active supervisory function and act as a guarantor of reliability and safety when the algorithm fails. The AI Act<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> establishes rigorous procedures and imposes specific restrictions on providers, deployers and other links in the artificial intelligence value chain. In relation to the GDPR<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a>, the AI Act is complementary: it does not repeal existing data protection principles but refines them in a technological context. The AI Act adds an additional layer of product-related and ethical obligations, ensuring that algorithms are used with respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual. Much of this framework already applies: the prohibitions in Article 5 AI Act have applied since 2 February 2025 and the transparency obligations in Article 50 AI Act since 2 August 2026, while Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (the so-called Digital Omnibus on AI) has postponed the application of the obligations for stand-alone high-risk systems listed in Annex III to 2 December 2027. In Poland, the national framework is set out in the Act of 3 July 2026 on Artificial Intelligence Systems (Journal of Laws, item 1003), which established the Commission for the Development and Safety of Artificial Intelligence (KRiBSI) as the market surveillance authority.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>1st         Who Is Who in the AI Ecosystem: Provider, Deployer, Controller</strong></h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>a)    Provider or Deployer? The Answer Determines the Scope of Liability</strong></h3>



<p>Defining an organisation&#8217;s role in the artificial intelligence ecosystem is of key importance for determining its legal obligations precisely. It must be established whether a given entity acts as the provider of an AI system or is merely a deployer of a ready-made technological solution. Under Article 3(3) AI Act, a provider is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body that develops an AI system (or a general-purpose AI model) or has it developed, and places it on the market or puts it into service under its own name or trademark, whether for payment or free of charge. The provider&#8217;s principal task is therefore to create the technology and ensure its compliance with rigorous safety and data quality requirements before the commercialisation stage. Most organisations using AI systems will not act as providers but as deployers. This distinction is fundamental to risk analysis: while the provider is responsible for the architecture and the training process (compliance of the “product”), the deployer is responsible for how the system is operated, for instructions to employees and for the lawfulness of the data entered into the model during the inference phase.</p>



<p>Under Article 3(4) AI Act, a deployer may be a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body that uses an AI system under its authority. These features clearly distinguish the provider of an AI system from an entity that merely uses the supplied system and exercises authority over it. In addition, an entity using artificial intelligence systems may acquire the status of a controller of personal data once it meets the definitional criteria set out in Article 4(7) GDPR. A controller is therefore a natural or legal person, public authority or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. It should be stressed that an AI system itself has no legal personality, and responsibility for its actions rests with the entity that decides on its deployment and operating parameters. Data processing in this context takes place through operations or sets of operations performed on personal data by automated means, which falls within the broad definition in Article 4(2) GDPR. These processes include, in particular, the collection, recording, adaptation, consultation and use of data by algorithms in order to generate results (<em>output</em>). In the case of AI systems, this processing is highly automated and is usually aimed at optimising and increasing the operational efficiency of information processes, which places a particular duty on the controller to keep control over every stage of the data life cycle.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>b)    When an AI System Becomes a High-Risk System</strong></h3>



<p>Under the system adopted in the AI Act, the correct classification of artificial intelligence systems is of key importance for organisations, since solutions classified as high-risk systems are subject to the most stringent legal regime. An AI system acquires that status if it meets the conditions set out in Article 6(1) AI Act (this concerns systems that are products, or safety components of products, subject to EU certification) or if it is expressly listed in Annex III to the Regulation. That catalogue covers areas of critical importance for fundamental rights, such as biometrics and the categorisation of persons, the management of critical infrastructure, and education and vocational training. Particular attention should be paid to employment and workers management, access to essential public and commercial services, and systems used in law enforcement, migration management and the administration of justice. Classifying a technology in this category obliges the controller not only to ensure high-quality data and human oversight in accordance with the AI Act, but also to comply strictly with the GDPR, which in most cases will include carrying out a full data protection impact assessment (DPIA).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>c)     Transparency, Instructions for Use and Human Oversight: Obligations in Practice</strong></h2>



<p>Providers must ensure that AI systems intended to interact directly with natural persons are designed and developed in such a way that the persons concerned are informed that they are interacting with an AI system (Article 50(1) AI Act). High-risk AI systems must also be designed and developed in accordance with the principle of transparency of their operation (Article 13 AI Act), which enables deployers to interpret the system&#8217;s output and use it appropriately. It is also essential to attach instructions for use in an appropriate format, containing complete and comprehensible information for deployers. While AI systems are in use, it must be possible for natural persons to oversee the system (Article 14 AI Act) in order to prevent risks to health, safety or fundamental rights.</p>



<p>Deployers of high-risk AI systems must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that they use such systems in accordance with the instructions for use supplied by the provider (Article 26(1) AI Act). Under Article 26(11) AI Act, deployers of the high-risk AI systems referred to in Annex III that make decisions, or assist in making decisions, related to natural persons must fulfil their information obligation before actually using the high-risk AI system, by clearly informing those persons that such technology is being used in relation to them.</p>



<p>In order to give full effect to the requirements of the AI Act, deployers are also obliged to assign human oversight to natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority, as well as the necessary organisational support. Under Article 14(2) of the Regulation, “<em>human oversight shall aim to prevent or minimise the risks to health, safety or fundamental rights (…)</em>”. Article 14(4), in turn, requires providers to deliver a high-risk AI system to the deployer in such a way as to enable the natural persons to whom human oversight is assigned, among other things, “<em>to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on the output produced by a high-risk AI system (automation bias), in particular for high-risk AI systems used to provide information or recommendations for decisions to be taken by natural persons</em>”.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>d)    Training and Inference: Where the Data Risk Hides in Language Models</strong></h2>



<p>The foundation of large language models (LLMs) is the processing of vast quantities of data, enabling the generation of text and the performance of advanced natural-language tasks. As tools belonging to generative artificial intelligence, these models operate on the basis of the statistical prediction of successive tokens (words or parts of words) in response to instructions entered by the user, known as prompts. In market and corporate practice, the most common are the GPT series models (OpenAI), implemented in solutions such as ChatGPT and Microsoft Copilot, as well as the Llama family of models (Meta), DeepSeek and the Polish projects Bielik and PLLuM. From a data protection perspective, the key distinction is between the two fundamental phases of a model&#8217;s operation: training and inference.</p>



<p><strong>Training phase</strong></p>



<p>In this phase, the substantive “intelligence” of the model is created. The process is based on the analysis of enormous data sets (Big Data) in order to detect statistical correlations between tokens. It should be emphasised that an LLM does not interpret content cognitively (in the human sense) but calculates the probability of the next element in a sequence. The data is often obtained through the mass collection of content from the open internet (web scraping). From the GDPR perspective, this is the most controversial stage, because the controller of personal data (usually the provider of the system) must demonstrate a specific legal basis and purpose for the processing (Article 6 GDPR). At this stage the provider becomes responsible for the quality of the data sets. Under Article 10 AI Act, training data sets must be relevant, sufficiently representative and, to the best extent possible, free of errors and complete in view of the intended purpose of the system.</p>



<p><strong>Inference phase</strong></p>



<p>The inference phase is the operational stage in which the trained model generates answers to specific user queries (prompts), using the statistical weights developed during training. In this phase the model does not, as a rule, “learn” in real time but processes the information supplied to it at a given moment. From the perspective of an organisation deploying an AI system, this is the area of the highest legal risk. The key problem is employees entering customer data, personal information or trade secrets into queries sent to an external model. Such conduct constitutes a transfer of data to the provider&#8217;s servers, which often involves a transfer outside the European Economic Area (EEA). In this scenario the organisation acquires the status of a deployer within the meaning of Article 3(4) AI Act. Under Article 4(7) GDPR, the organisation, as the controller of its employees&#8217; and customers&#8217; data, bears full responsibility for the content of the information that reaches the AI system. So while the training phase remains the domain of large technology corporations (providers), the inference phase is the area in which every business bears direct responsibility for the security and lawfulness of the prompts it generates.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>2nd    Bias, Hidden Scoring and Explainability: Algorithmic Risks under Article 5 GDPR and Article 10 AI Act</strong></h2>



<p>The practical implementation of artificial intelligence systems in socially sensitive areas, such as the recruitment of employees or the assessment of creditworthiness, requires the systematic management of the risk of algorithmic error. The key challenge is to ensure the explainability of AI and to combat effectively the phenomenon of bias, which can lead to the discrimination of entire social groups. The foundation for counteracting these risks under data protection law is the set of principles expressed in Article 5(1) GDPR. Under the principle of transparency (point (a)), the organisation must be able to explain to the data subject the logic behind an autonomous decision of the algorithm. The principle of data minimisation (point (c)), in turn, requires the information collected to be limited to what is necessary for the purpose, which prevents models from being fed with redundant data or data that has no objective bearing on the result of the analysis. In this context, the prohibition of so-called hidden scoring takes on particular significance; this means an AI system covertly assessing, for example, job candidates by assigning them points without ensuring adequate transparency of the process. The controller, as the employer, is obliged under Article 13(2)(f) GDPR to provide the data subject with information about the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling (referred to in Article 22(1) and (4)), and meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.</p>



<p>AI systems frequently rely on profiling mechanisms, that is, the automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of that data to evaluate certain aspects of a natural person, in particular their competence, expected work performance or other characteristics relevant to the purpose for which the AI tool is used. Under Article 22(1) GDPR, “<em>the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her</em>”, unless the decision is necessary for entering into or performing a contract, is authorised by Union or Member State law, or is based on the data subject&#8217;s explicit consent (Article 22(2) GDPR). Profiling as such is not prohibited in principle, but its use is subject to significant restrictions, particularly where it leads to decisions with significant effects on the person being profiled. In practice, this means that special care must be taken in designing and using AI tools, particularly with regard to the risk of bias. These systems learn from historical data, which may lead to the replication of earlier decision patterns and to unintended discrimination, for example on grounds of age, state of health or other personal characteristics. It is therefore essential to ensure transparency of the systems&#8217; operation, adequate human oversight and the ability to verify and challenge the results generated by AI.</p>



<p>Relying solely on the rules contained in the GDPR is not enough, however, when confronted with deep neural networks, which is why a key role is played by Article 10 AI Act, which governs data and data governance in high-risk AI systems. That provision imposes rigorous obligations on providers to examine and verify training, validation and testing data. These data sets must be relevant, sufficiently representative and, to the best extent possible, free of errors and complete in view of the specific geographical, behavioural or functional setting in which the system is to operate. This requirement directly compels organisations to apply procedures for detecting and neutralising hidden bias (bias mitigation). For example, a recruitment algorithm trained on the historical data of a company in which mainly men were promoted may classify the female gender as a negative feature; Article 10 AI Act requires such anomalies to be actively monitored and corrected at the design stage and through continuous oversight of the system&#8217;s operation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>3rd      Can an Employer Require the Use of AI? The Limits of Lawfulness in the Workplace</strong></h2>



<p>Assessing the lawfulness of deploying artificial intelligence systems in the workplace requires a precise delineation of the boundary between the employer&#8217;s managerial prerogatives and the fundamental rights of employees. Whether an employee can be required to use AI tools depends on the nature of the tool and the extent of its intrusion into the employee&#8217;s privacy. While issuing a work instruction to use AI as simple support in daily duties falls within the law, the deployment of monitoring, evaluation or biometric systems encounters strict legal barriers. The legal basis for deploying standard algorithms that optimise work processes is most often Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, that is, the legitimate interest of the controller (the employer). Its application is conditional, however, on passing the so-called balancing test, which must show that the employer&#8217;s economic or organisational interests do not override the autonomy, rights and freedoms of the persons employed. In the case of high-risk AI tools, the balancing test will generally be harder to pass, and legitimate interest alone may prove insufficient, particularly where the processing leads to decisions of the kind referred to in Article 22 GDPR.</p>



<p>The situation becomes radically more complicated where an AI system requires the processing of biometric data in order to operate (for example, facial recognition systems used to record working time or to analyse an employee&#8217;s emotions). Biometric data belong to the special categories of data whose processing is, as a rule, prohibited under Article 9(1) GDPR. For an employer to use such data lawfully, one of the exceptional conditions in Article 9(2) GDPR must be met; in the reality of Polish labour law this most often requires the employee&#8217;s explicit and fully voluntary consent (subject to the requirements of Article 22¹ᵇ of the Labour Code) or a specific legal provision imposing such an obligation on safety grounds. The employee&#8217;s lack of genuine freedom of choice in the relationship with the employer makes such consent extremely difficult to defend before the supervisory authorities.</p>



<p>The ultimate barrier to the implementation of high-risk algorithmic AI systems is Article 5 AI Act, which introduces a categorical list of practices prohibited in the European Union. On that basis it is unlawful to deploy AI systems used for so-called <em>social scoring</em> (the point-based classification of citizens or employees on the basis of their social behaviour), as well as systems that carry out biometric categorisation in order to infer sensitive characteristics (for example political opinions or sexual orientation). Moreover, in the context of employment relationships, the AI Act prohibits the use of emotion recognition systems in the workplace (Article 5(1)(f) AI Act), except for systems put in place for medical or safety reasons, which in practice closes the door to employers algorithmically testing the mood or stress levels of their staff. These prohibitions have applied since 2 February 2025, and Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 extends their catalogue from 2 December 2026.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>4th       Individuals versus the Algorithm: Erasure, Human Intervention, Transparency</strong></h2>



<p>The informational and technological asymmetry between the individual and the entities deploying artificial intelligence systems requires effective instruments of legal protection. The greatest controversy in this area currently surrounds the exercise of rights of an erasure nature. Enforcing the right to be forgotten under Article 17 GDPR encounters a fundamental technical barrier in the form of the so-called “memory” of generative models and neural networks. In traditional databases, deleting information means erasing a specific record. In the case of AI models, input data becomes irreversibly integrated into the structure of the model&#8217;s mathematical weights during the training process. Reversing that state, described in the literature as machine unlearning, is a complex and costly process and often simply impossible without retraining the model in its entirety. This creates a deep conflict between the individual&#8217;s right to demand the erasure of their data and the architecture of modern technologies.</p>



<p>Another key safeguard is Article 22 GDPR, which lays down a general prohibition on subjecting natural persons to decisions based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produce legal effects concerning them or similarly significantly affect them. This provision gives the individual the right to obtain human intervention (<em>human-in-the-loop</em>), to express their own point of view and to contest a decision taken by an algorithm (for example, an automated refusal of credit or rejection of a job application). Supervisory authorities&#8217; guidelines and the case law of the CJEU (including the judgment of 7 December 2023 in Case C-634/21 SCHUFA Holding) indicate that human involvement in the decision-making process may not be fictitious or token; a manager or analyst must have a real ability to change the verdict generated by the AI. These guarantees are complemented, at the level of direct interaction with the technology, by the information obligations arising from Article 50 AI Act, applicable since 2 August 2026. That provision imposes strict operational transparency requirements on providers and deployers of artificial intelligence systems. Under it, every natural person interacting with an AI system, such as a chatbot or voice assistant, must be clearly and promptly informed of that fact, unless this is obvious from the context of use. Equally strict obligations apply to the labelling of synthetically generated content, including so-called deepfakes. Deployers of AI systems that generate or manipulate images, audio or video content in such a way that it closely resembles authentic persons or events are legally required to disclose that the content has been artificially generated. The purpose of this regulation is to protect the cognitive autonomy of the individual and to counter mass disinformation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>5th       Four Risk Tiers and a New Supervisory Map: KRiBSI alongside the President of the Personal Data Protection Office</strong></h2>



<p>A key element of the EU strategy for regulating artificial intelligence is the risk-based approach, which directly determines the scope of the legal obligations imposed on organisations. The Artificial Intelligence Act introduces a rigid division of systems into four categories: prohibited practices (posing an unacceptable risk to fundamental rights), high-risk systems, limited-risk systems (mainly subject to information obligations) and minimal-risk systems. From the operational perspective of businesses and public institutions, the most important category is that of high-risk systems, whose definition and classification mechanism are governed by Article 6 AI Act. That provision refers directly to Annex III to the AI Act, which contains a closed catalogue of critical areas, including workers management and access to employment (HR), education and vocational training, as well as law enforcement and the management of critical infrastructure. Implementing AI tools in these sectors triggers a strict legal regime, including the need to implement a risk management system, ensure high-quality data and provide human oversight. Under Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, these obligations will apply to stand-alone systems listed in Annex III from 2 December 2027 and to systems embedded in products covered by Annex I from 2 August 2028; the postponement does not, however, change the scope of the requirements but merely gives organisations time to implement them.</p>



<p>From the perspective of mapping risk within an organisation, this classification has profound consequences under data protection law. The Act of 3 July 2026 on Artificial Intelligence Systems entrusted market surveillance to the Commission for the Development and Safety of Artificial Intelligence (KRiBSI), which from 28 October 2026 acquires full powers of inspection and the power to impose the fines provided for in the AI Act. This does not, however, exclude the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (PUODO). Under Article 74(8) AI Act, in respect of the high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III, point 1 (biometrics, in so far as used for law enforcement, migration and the administration of justice), point 6 (law enforcement), point 7 (migration and asylum) and point 8 (administration of justice and democratic processes), market surveillance is linked to the data protection authorities, and the PUODO consistently emphasised, already in its comments on the draft act, that any processing of personal data in AI systems remains within its competence under the GDPR. This means that a compliance audit cannot be limited to a standard data protection impact assessment (DPIA). The organisation must take account of a dual supervision model in which KRiBSI verifies the system&#8217;s compliance with the AI Act, while the data protection authority retains full investigative and corrective powers in respect of the processing of personal data, including the data used to build the model. Ignoring this dual competence at the system design stage (<em>privacy and compliance by design</em>) exposes controllers to a serious risk of financial penalties and administrative sanctions in the form of an order to shut down the algorithm immediately.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>6th       DPIA and FRIA: from a Document in a Drawer to a Dialogue with the Regulator</strong></h2>



<p>Because of their systemic and often unpredictable impact on privacy, the deployment of advanced artificial intelligence systems in most cases automatically triggers an obligation to carry out a data protection impact assessment. Under Article 35 GDPR, that assessment (Data Protection Impact Assessment, DPIA) is mandatory whenever processing using new technologies is likely to result in a high risk to the rights or freedoms of natural persons, which, in the context of recruitment or credit-assessment algorithms (mentioned above in relation to the principles of minimisation and transparency in Article 5 GDPR), is an operational standard. The contemporary AI legal regime, however, dramatically extends that obligation. Under Article 27 AI Act, public bodies and private entities providing public services, as well as deployers of the high-risk AI systems referred to in Annex III, point 5(b) and (c), are required to carry out a rigorous fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA). The entities referred to in Annex III, point 5(b) and (c) AI Act are those using high-risk AI systems to evaluate the creditworthiness of natural persons or establish their credit score, and systems used for risk assessment and pricing in relation to natural persons in the case of life and health insurance. This mechanism cannot operate in isolation from the GDPR; in practice, the FRIA becomes an integral, deeper extension of the classic DPIA, requiring the organisation to examine the impact of the algorithm not only on privacy but also on human dignity, non-discrimination and the right to a fair trial, that is, the impact on the fundamental rights of the persons in relation to whom the AI systems are used.</p>



<p>The traditional approach, in which the DPIA was merely an internal, static corporate document filed away in a drawer, is becoming a thing of the past when confronted with Article 57(10) AI Act, which governs so-called regulatory sandboxes. These sandboxes, which are controlled testing environments for innovative AI solutions, redefine the relationship between the controller and the supervisory authority. An organisation that decides to participate in a regulatory sandbox is legally obliged to cooperate closely and transparently with the authority operating the sandbox (in Poland, KRiBSI) and, in so far as the system under test processes personal data, also with the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (Article 57(10) AI Act). In this new model of cooperation, the DPIA process evolves into a tool for a dynamic, multilateral dialogue with the state authority. The results of the risk analysis are consulted on an ongoing basis, which makes it possible to eliminate algorithmic bias under the regulator&#8217;s eye before the system is commercialised. Such a compliance model not only minimises the risk of severe financial penalties but also makes it possible to build AI systems that are safe and transparent from the stage of their technological incubation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>7th       AI Governance: How to Implement AI in an Organisation and Be Able to Prove It</strong></h2>



<p>Effective management of artificial intelligence systems within an organisation requires a multi-level oversight model (AI Governance<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a>) that combines technical protective measures with a systematic assessment of legal risk. The foundation for designing safe algorithms is formed by the principles of data protection by design and by default, codified in Article 25 GDPR. They oblige the organisation to take privacy protection and data minimisation into account at the earliest stage of creating the architecture of the AI model, and also when selecting training data and model parameters. Article 32 GDPR, in turn, which lays down the principle of security of processing, takes on an entirely new technological dimension in the world of autonomous systems. Classic IT safeguards (such as encryption or access control) are no longer sufficient against the specific vulnerabilities of neural networks. Ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of data requires controllers to actively harden models against a new generation of cyberattacks, including <em>adversarial attacks</em><a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a>, attempts to poison training data sets (<em>data poisoning</em>) and model inversion techniques aimed at extracting the personal data used to build the model.</p>



<p>The formal tool for verifying these safeguards and estimating the risks to natural persons remains the data protection impact assessment (DPIA) carried out under Article 35 GDPR. Because of the informational asymmetry and intrusiveness of AI models, however, this assessment ceases to be merely an internal, static document and becomes a platform for continuous monitoring. For artificial intelligence systems classified as high-risk solutions, the traditional DPIA must be integrated with the new, strict obligation under Article 27 AI Act: the fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA). Only the synergy of the technical resilience of the model with a transparently conducted DPIA/FRIA procedure enables an organisation to demonstrate compliance and lawfully keep an AI system in commercial use.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Summary and Conclusions</strong></h1>



<p>The analysis shows that the implementation of artificial intelligence systems, including advanced large language models (LLMs), redefines existing standards of privacy protection and requires organisations to build entirely new governance structures. The key to ensuring the lawfulness of data processing is the precise identification of the entity&#8217;s role in the AI ecosystem. The distinction between the provider, responsible for the training phase and the quality of the product data, and the deployer, which as controller bears full responsibility for the inference phase and the content of the prompts entered, is the starting point for effectively mapping regulatory risk under the GDPR and the Artificial Intelligence Act.</p>



<p>The main challenge for modern organisations is the management of specific algorithmic risks, such as the lack of explainability of machine decisions and hidden bias, which in sensitive areas such as recruitment or credit assessment may lead to the replication of discriminatory social patterns. Traditional data protection principles, in particular the principles of transparency and minimisation, gain strong support from Article 10 AI Act. That provision revolutionises compliance processes by imposing strict requirements for the verification of training data, with the aim of actively neutralising bias at the system design stage. Furthermore, the right to be forgotten (Article 17 GDPR) encounters a technological barrier in the form of the mathematical memory of neural networks, which means that the exercise of individuals&#8217; rights against the algorithm requires advanced procedures such as machine unlearning, and the unconditional guarantee of real rather than merely token human oversight (<em>human-in-the-loop</em>).</p>



<p>Equally important is the categorisation of systems by level of risk. Classifying AI tools as high-risk (for example in the employment sector or financial scoring) triggers strict information obligations and absolute prohibitions of impermissible practices, which include emotion recognition systems in the workplace and biometric profiling to infer sensitive characteristics. In this context, the classic data protection impact assessment (DPIA) is evolving: for high-risk systems it must be integrated with the fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA) under Article 27 AI Act. In addition, the analysis of institutional roles points to a model of supervision shared between the newly established Commission for the Development and Safety of Artificial Intelligence (KRiBSI) and the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (PUODO), which retains full competence wherever an AI system processes personal data, while risk assessment processes cease to be static documents and become part of a dynamic dialogue with the regulator, including within regulatory sandboxes.</p>



<p>Consequently, the lawful and ethical use of artificial intelligence in modern business is not possible without a comprehensive oversight model: <em>AI Governance</em>. Traditional IT security measures must be extended to include mechanisms that harden models against a new generation of cyberattacks, such as <em>adversarial</em> attacks and <em>data poisoning</em>. The synergy of the principles of <em>privacy by design</em> and <em>privacy by default</em> with the rigorous procedures of the AI Act and the GDPR leads to the conclusion that the EU legal framework does not block innovation but civilises the process of digital transformation. It guarantees that technological development takes place within the limits of the law, with respect for the personhood and cognitive autonomy of the human being.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Bibliography</strong></h2>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Legislation</strong></h2>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1, as amended) – hereinafter: GDPR</li>



<li>Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024) – hereinafter: AI Act</li>



<li>Act of 26 June 1974 – Labour Code (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2025, item 277, as amended).</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Online Sources</strong></h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Letter of [date] issued by the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, ref. DOL.401.354.2024, <em>Comments of the PUODO on the draft Act on Artificial Intelligence Systems</em>, www.uodo.gov.pl.</li>



<li>Wolters Kluwer: “<em>Przetwarzanie danych osobowych na podstawie prawnie uzasadnionego interesu administratora</em>” [Processing of personal data on the basis of the controller&#8217;s legitimate interest], 12.12.2025, available online: https://www.lex.pl/test-rownowagi-rodo,43864.html</li>



<li>European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS): <em>Artificial Intelligence Act: State of play and implementation challenges, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) At a Glance Briefing</em>, Brussels 2026, [online], available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2026/785673/EPRS_ATA(2026)785673_EN.pdf (accessed: 29.05.2026).</li>



<li>Biznes Myśli: <em>Fine-tuning LLM – fakty i mity. Jak skutecznie dotrenować duży model językowy</em> [Fine-tuning LLMs – facts and myths. How to fine-tune a large language model effectively], [online], available at: https://biznesmysli.pl/fine-tuning-llm-fakty-i-mity/ (accessed: 29.05.2026).</li>



<li>LegalGeek: <em>AI Act vs RODO. Jak sztuczna inteligencja wpływa na ochronę danych osobowych</em> [AI Act vs GDPR. How artificial intelligence affects personal data protection], Legal Knowledge Portal for Business, [online], available at: https://legalgeek.pl/blog/ai-act-vs-rodo/ (accessed: 29.05.2026).</li>



<li>Wikipedia (the free encyclopedia): <em>Duży model językowy</em> [Large language model], [online], available at: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Du%C5%BCy_model_j%C4%99zykowy (accessed: 29.05.2026).</li>



<li>Data Science Robię: <em>AI Governance – co to takiego i dlaczego jest teraz kluczowe?</em> [AI Governance – what is it and why is it now key?], [online], available at: https://www.datasciencerobie.pl/ai-governance-co-to-takiego/ (accessed: 02.06.2026).</li>
</ul>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024) – hereinafter: AI Act</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1, as amended) – hereinafter: GDPR</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> Data Science Robię: AI Governance – co to takiego i dlaczego jest teraz kluczowe? [AI Governance – what is it and why is it now key?], [online], available at: https://www.datasciencerobie.pl/ai-governance-co-to-takiego/ (accessed: 02.06.2026).</p>



<p><a id="_ftn4" href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> adversarial attacks – the deliberate manipulation of input data in order to deceive the algorithm.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/ai-act-and-gdpr-ai-governance-compliance/">A Human in the Loop, Data under Control. The GDPR and the AI Act in Implementation Practice</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 19:35:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PHARMACEUTICAL, HEALTHCARE & LIFE SCIENCES LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Regulatory Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Health Data Space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Food Supplements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Health Claims]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[health tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Life Sciences Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Longevity Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Longevity Washing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Medical Devices Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Novel Foods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pharmaceutical Law]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8913</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: September 15, 2026 ABA ILS, Life Sciences and Healthcare Committee, September 2026Prepared by KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI KG LEGAL I. Introduction The longevity economy is commonly estimated at several hundred billion dollars worldwide and continues to grow rapidly.[1] Venture capital flows into biotechnology companies that promise to slow, halt, or reverse aging. Clinics from Zurich [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective/">Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color"><strong>Publication date: September 15, 2026</strong></mark></p>



<figure class="wp-block-video"><video controls src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/ABA_Call_Longevity_Presentation-wrzesien.mp4"></video></figure>



<p class="has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background has-large-font-size">ABA ILS, Life Sciences and Healthcare Committee, September 2026Prepared by KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI KG LEGAL</p>



<span id="more-8913"></span>



<p class="has-medium-font-size">I. Introduction</p>



<p>The longevity economy is commonly estimated at several hundred billion dollars worldwide and continues to grow rapidly.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Venture capital flows into biotechnology companies that promise to slow, halt, or reverse aging. Clinics from Zurich to Seoul to Miami sell “longevity programmes.” Supplement brands attach the word “longevity” to products ranging from NAD precursors to collagen powders. And yet the word “longevity” does not exist as a legal category in European Union law. There is no definition, no register, no certification scheme, and no authority empowered to decide what may or may not describe itself as a longevity product, a longevity clinic, or a longevity company.</p>



<p>The gap between an enormous market and a non-existent legal definition is precisely where legal risk accumulates. Where there is no definition, there is classification risk, claims risk, and enforcement risk. There is also a phenomenon that this article, borrowing from the vocabulary of environmental marketing, calls “longevity washing.”</p>



<p>This article examines the longevity industry through the lens of EU regulatory law. The EU framework governs a market of some 450 million consumers and, because it is horizontal, sector-specific, and increasingly enforcement-oriented, it offers a useful point of comparison for practitioners in the United States, Asia, and Latin America. Part II explains why “longevity” is not a legal category and introduces the borderline-product problem that follows from that fact. Part III develops the concept of longevity washing and its consumer-facing, unfair-commercial-practice, and investor-facing dimensions. Part IV addresses the regulation of artificial intelligence in longevity research and diagnostics, including the revised timeline of the AI Act, the position of the European Medicines Agency on AI in the medicinal-product lifecycle, and the data-protection architecture formed by the GDPR and the European Health Data Space. Part V maps the sectoral “hot spots” across pharmaceuticals, medical devices, cosmetics, and food supplements. Part VI draws conclusions for practitioners.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">II. “Longevity” in the Eyes of the Law: The Borderline-Product Problem</h3>



<p>In EU regulatory law, aging is not a disease. The European Medicines Agency has never approved a medicinal product with “aging” as a therapeutic indication, and under Directive 2001/83/EC a medicinal product is defined by reference to the treatment or prevention of disease or the restoration, correction, or modification of physiological functions.<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> The position in the United States is comparable. The long-running debate around the Targeting Aging with Metformin (TAME) trial illustrates the point: its designers had to negotiate a trial protocol with the Food and Drug Administration that targets aging indirectly, through a composite of age-related diseases, precisely because “aging” itself is not an approvable indication.<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a></p>



<p>The consequence is profound. A company cannot lawfully market a product “to treat aging.” The entire longevity industry therefore operates in the space of indirect claims: “supports healthy aging,” “promotes cellular health,” “extends healthspan.” Each of those phrases pushes the product toward one of several very different regulatory regimes.</p>



<p>This is the borderline-product problem, and it is the single most important legal concept in the sector. The same molecule – an NAD precursor, for example – may be: a medicinal product, if it is presented as treating or preventing disease or exerts a significant pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic effect; a food supplement under Directive 2002/46/EC;<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> a novel food requiring pre-market authorisation under Regulation (EU) 2015/2283;<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a> a cosmetic under Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, if applied to the skin with a claim limited to appearance;<a href="#_ftn6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a> or a medical device. The last category is broader than it may appear: since the Medical Device Regulation (MDR) came into application, products listed in its Annex XVI – dermal fillers, certain energy-based aesthetic equipment – are regulated as devices even where they have no medical purpose at all.<a href="#_ftn7" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a></p>



<p>Classification does not follow the label a company chooses. It follows presentation, composition, and route of administration. The Court of Justice of the European Union has held for four decades that a product is a medicinal product “by presentation” where it is described or recommended as having properties for treating or preventing disease, irrespective of whether it actually has those properties; and that classification “by function” turns on a case-by-case scientific assessment of the product’s actual pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic action, not on the manufacturer’s intention.<a href="#_ftn8" id="_ftnref8">[8]</a> Marketing language alone can therefore reclassify a product and, with it, the entire compliance burden: marketing authorisation, good manufacturing practice, pharmacovigilance, and advertising restrictions.</p>



<p>When a client says “we are a longevity company,” the first question counsel should ask is: <em>which regime are you actually in?</em> “Longevity” is a marketing word. The law knows only medicines, devices, foods, and cosmetics.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">III. Longevity Washing: When the Claim Outruns the Science</h3>



<p>Greenwashing – claiming environmental virtue one does not have – is a familiar concept. Longevity washing is its younger sibling: labelling a product, a clinic, a research programme, or an entire company as “longevity-focused” when the science, the indication, or the business model does not support that description. The practice matters legally for three reasons.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. Consumer-Facing Claims</em></h2>



<p>Under the Health Claims Regulation, any health claim made on a food – and food supplements are foods – must be specifically authorised and listed in the EU register.<a href="#_ftn9" id="_ftnref9">[9]</a> Claims such as “slows aging,” “supports cellular repair,” or “extends lifespan” are not authorised health claims. National authorities in the EU and the United Kingdom have treated phrases such as “cellular repair” and even “healthy aging” as impermissible where they imply a physiological mechanism or a reduction of disease risk. A substantial part of the longevity supplement market is thus operating with claims that would not survive enforcement scrutiny.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. Unfair Commercial Practices and the Greenwashing Template</em></h2>



<p>The second layer is the general prohibition of misleading commercial practices under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD).<a href="#_ftn10" id="_ftnref10">[10]</a> Here the EU has recently built an entire enforcement architecture against greenwashing that repays close study by anyone advising on health claims. The Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition Directive amends the UCPD to prohibit generic environmental claims – “eco-friendly,” “climate-neutral” – unless the trader can demonstrate recognised excellent environmental performance, and it adds a series of specific greenwashing practices to the UCPD’s blacklist. Its provisions apply across the Union from 27 September 2026.<a href="#_ftn11" id="_ftnref11">[11]</a></p>



<p>The Directive should be read as a template. If “climate-neutral” now requires substantiation, it is a very short doctrinal step for regulators and courts to demand the same of “clinically proven to slow biological aging.” The methodology of anti-greenwashing enforcement – generic claim, absence of substantiation, misleading omission – maps directly onto longevity claims. The UCPD’s general clauses on misleading actions and omissions already provide the legal basis; what the green-claims reform supplies is a worked example of how those clauses can be operationalised against vague virtue-signalling.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Investor-Facing Washing</em></h2>



<p>The third dimension is of particular relevance to transactional lawyers. Start-ups increasingly brand themselves as “longevity biotech” because that is where the capital is, even when the underlying asset is a conventional dermatology product or a wellness application. For investors, this creates due-diligence risk: is the “longevity platform” in fact a regulated medicinal pipeline, with all the timeline and cost that implies, or a supplement business one enforcement letter away from relabelling? Misclassification discovered after investment is a valuation event. For the company, aggressive longevity framing in fundraising materials can generate liability under securities and misrepresentation rules in multiple jurisdictions. In due diligence on a longevity start-up, the regulatory classification memorandum is not an annex to the deal; it <em>is</em> the deal.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">IV. Artificial Intelligence in Longevity Research and Diagnostics</h3>



<p>The longevity field is arguably the most AI-dependent sector in the life sciences, for a simple reason: aging is not one target but thousands of interacting biological processes. A geroprotective drug cannot be designed the way an antibiotic is designed. The entire aging phenotype must be modelled, and that means machine learning on large multi-omic datasets. AI is not an add-on in longevity; it is the core methodology. That raises three distinct regulatory questions under EU law.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. The AI Act</em></h2>



<p>Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the AI Act, is the most comprehensive horizontal AI regulation in force anywhere and applies to almost every AI system used in the longevity value chain.<a href="#_ftn12" id="_ftnref12">[12]</a> It adopts a risk-based structure – prohibited practices, high-risk systems, transparency obligations, and minimal-risk systems – and the critical category for this sector is high-risk. An AI system that is itself a medical device, or a safety component of one, under the MDR or the In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation, and that is subject to third-party conformity assessment under those instruments, is high-risk under Article 6(1) and Annex I of the AI Act.<a href="#_ftn13" id="_ftnref13">[13]</a> This captures, for example, an AI tool that estimates a patient’s “biological age” from a blood panel and uses that estimate to guide a clinical intervention; an AI-driven diagnostic that predicts age-related disease risk; and the software layer of many longevity-clinic platforms once it makes a diagnostic or prognostic claim.</p>



<p>High-risk status is not a prohibition; it is a compliance regime. It requires a risk-management system, data governance with representative and bias-tested training data, technical documentation, logging, human oversight, transparency to deployers, accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity, a conformity assessment, and post-market monitoring.<a href="#_ftn14" id="_ftnref14">[14]</a> For most longevity start-ups this is a wholly new compliance layer on top of MDR conformity assessment, and the two must be coordinated.</p>



<p>The timeline has recently changed, and practitioners should update their advice accordingly. The original AI Act applied the high-risk obligations from 2 August 2026 for stand-alone systems listed in Annex III and from 2 August 2027 for AI embedded in products covered by Annex I, including medical devices. The Digital Omnibus on AI, adopted as Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 and in force since 27 July 2026, defers those dates to 2 December 2027 and 2 August 2028 respectively.<a href="#_ftn15" id="_ftnref15">[15]</a> The deferral does not lighten the substantive regime; the prohibitions in Article 5, the obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models, and the transparency obligations of Article 50 (which apply from 2 August 2026) are unaffected. For longevity companies whose AI is a medical device, the practical effect is a compliance window of roughly two years, during which harmonised standards and notified-body capacity are expected to mature. The window is an opportunity to design AI Act compliance into the MDR technical file from the outset rather than to defer the exercise.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. AI in Drug Discovery and the European Medicines Agency</em></h2>



<p>The position for drug discovery is more nuanced. An AI model used purely internally to identify candidate molecules – the classic “AI for drug discovery” use case that dominates longevity-biotech pitch decks – is generally not, in itself, a high-risk AI system under the AI Act, because it does not make or materially influence decisions about individual patients. The regulatory question shifts instead to the European Medicines Agency. The EMA’s Reflection Paper on the use of AI in the medicinal product lifecycle sets out the Agency’s expectations from discovery through pharmacovigilance.<a href="#_ftn16" id="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Its core message is that the burden of proof rests on the sponsor to demonstrate that the AI model is fit for its regulatory purpose. That entails documented data provenance, model validation, a degree of explainability appropriate to the stage of development, and lifecycle management of the model itself.</p>



<p>If a longevity company tells its investors that “our AI discovered this molecule,” the regulator will eventually ask to see the model, the training data, and the validation. Vague AI claims in fundraising materials do not survive regulatory scrutiny and, increasingly, do not survive investor due diligence either.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Data: The GDPR and the European Health Data Space</em></h2>



<p>The third question concerns data, and it is here that longevity becomes uniquely difficult. Aging research is inherently longitudinal and multi-omic: genomic, epigenetic, and proteomic data, wearable data, and medical records, ideally across decades. Under the General Data Protection Regulation this is special-category data – health, genetic, and biometric data – and the available lawful bases are narrow.<a href="#_ftn17" id="_ftnref17">[17]</a> The scientific-research provisions of Article 9(2)(j) and Article 89 assist, but they are implemented differently in each Member State, which produces real fragmentation for pan-European longevity cohorts.</p>



<p>The European Health Data Space Regulation adds a second layer.<a id="_ftnref18" href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> It creates, for the first time, a mandatory EU-wide framework for the secondary use of electronic health data, administered by health-data-access bodies in each Member State. For longevity research the EHDS is potentially transformative, because it opens access to population-scale health data for research purposes. It also imposes strict conditions: purpose limitation, processing only within secure processing environments, a prohibition on re-identification, and specific prohibitions on using the data for advertising or marketing, for decisions detrimental to individuals such as insurance or employment decisions, or for developing products harmful to health.<a id="_ftnref19" href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> The secondary-use chapter applies from March 2029 for most data categories, but the lead time is short in the context of longitudinal cohorts. Longevity companies that intend to monetise health data – and many do – should be mapping their data flows against the EHDS regime now.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">V. Sector-by-Sector Regulatory Hot Spots</h3>



<p>Four sectoral silos together make up the longevity industry, and the same start-up frequently straddles two or three of them without realising it. In each silo, specific “hot spots” – advertising, manufacturing standards, registration, and market withdrawal – recur in practice.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>A. Pharmaceuticals</em></h2>



<p>True longevity drugs – rapamycin analogues, senolytics, geroprotectors – sit squarely within Directive 2001/83/EC and its implementing rules, and will continue to do so under the new pharmaceutical package once it applies. Three practical hot spots stand out. First, off-label prescribing of rapamycin and metformin for longevity indications is widespread in private clinics across Europe. Off-label prescribing as such is a matter of clinical freedom, but off-label <em>promotion</em> by or on behalf of the marketing-authorisation holder is prohibited: advertising must conform to the summary of product characteristics, and advertising of unauthorised products or indications is not permitted.<a href="#_ftn20" id="_ftnref20">[20]</a> Longevity clinics are increasingly the vehicle through which promotional messaging reaches patients, and enforcement authorities have begun to take notice. Second, good manufacturing practice: anything presented as a medicine must be manufactured under an EU manufacturing authorisation and EU GMP, with qualified persons and full traceability; compounding pharmacies producing “longevity peptides” have become a significant enforcement target. Third, unlicensed importation: a large part of the longevity-peptide market operates through personal importation and grey channels, and customs enforcement across the EU has visibly tightened.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>B. Medical Devices</em></h2>



<p>The MDR has fundamentally reshaped this space. Aesthetic devices – dermal fillers, energy-based devices used in longevity clinics, at-home devices marketed for “cellular rejuvenation” – are caught by Annex XVI even without a medical purpose. Three hot spots follow. Classification: many longevity wearables and applications become software as a medical device once they make a diagnostic or prognostic claim. Advertising: Article 7 of the MDR prohibits misleading claims and specifically prohibits ascribing to a device functions and properties it does not have, which operates in practice as a codified anti-washing rule for devices.<a href="#_ftn21" id="_ftnref21">[21]</a> Registration and vigilance: the first four modules of the EUDAMED database – actor registration, UDI/device registration, notified bodies and certificates, and market surveillance – have been mandatory since 28 May 2026, with legacy devices to be registered by 28 November 2026; the vigilance module is not yet mandatory, so serious incidents and field safety corrective actions continue to be reported to national competent authorities.<a href="#_ftn22" id="_ftnref22">[22]</a> Market withdrawals happen: a device sold as a “cellular biomarker analyser” without valid clinical evidence can be removed from the market by any national competent authority, and the MDR’s market-surveillance coordination means that one withdrawal can cascade across the Union.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>C. Cosmetics and Aesthetic Products</em></h2>



<p>The Cosmetics Regulation governs anti-aging creams, serums, and topical actives. Two hot spots dominate. The first is the Product Information File: the responsible person must hold a complete file including a safety assessment and substantiation of every claim. The second is the Claims Regulation, Commission Regulation (EU) No 655/2013, with its six common criteria: legal compliance, truthfulness, evidential support, honesty, fairness, and informed decision-making.<a href="#_ftn23" id="_ftnref23">[23]</a> A claim such as “reverses skin aging at the cellular level” fails the evidential-support criterion unless a robust dossier stands behind it. Enforcement is largely national, but the Cosmetic Products Notification Portal is EU-wide, and non-compliant products are routinely notified through the Safety Gate rapid-alert system.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><em>D. Food Supplements and Novel Foods</em></h2>



<p>It is in the food and supplement space that the longevity industry is most creative and most exposed. Directive 2002/46/EC governs vitamins and minerals in supplements; everything else falls under the general food law of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002<a href="#_ftn24" id="_ftnref24">[24]</a> and, critically, the Novel Food Regulation. Nicotinamide mononucleotide (NMN), one of the most heavily marketed longevity molecules, is the paradigmatic case. NMN is treated as a novel food in the EU, which means it cannot lawfully be placed on the market as a supplement without pre-market authorisation by the Commission following an EFSA safety assessment. Nicotinamide riboside received such an authorisation in 2020.<a href="#_ftn25" id="_ftnref25">[25]</a> NMN has not – although the picture is now moving. In March 2026 EFSA’s NDA Panel adopted a positive opinion on the safety of β-NMN in food supplements at up to 300 mg per day for adults, and the opinion was published in May 2026.<a href="#_ftn26" id="_ftnref26">[26]</a> An EFSA opinion is a scientific assessment, not an authorisation; the Commission must still adopt an implementing act adding NMN to the Union list, and where the applicant has requested data protection the authorisation will initially be proprietary to that applicant’s specification. Until that act is adopted, NMN products on the shelves of European longevity clinics remain unauthorised novel foods. That is not a grey area; it is a non-compliant market operating in plain sight, and it is the kind of enforcement pipeline that eventually produces high-profile withdrawal actions. Once the Health Claims Regulation is added to the picture, the conclusion is unavoidable: the food and supplement leg of the longevity industry is the most legally exposed part of the entire sector.</p>



<h1 class="wp-block-heading">VI. Conclusions</h1>



<p>The longevity industry is a genuine scientific and commercial phenomenon, and much of the underlying research is serious. But lawyers advising companies, investors, clinicians, and, increasingly, regulators in this space must see it clearly: “longevity” is not a legal category. It is a marketing frame layered on top of four very different regulatory regimes. Three practical conclusions follow for anyone whose product touches European consumers.</p>



<p>First, always begin with classification. The word “longevity” conveys nothing about the applicable regime. Ask what the product is, how it is presented, and what it does, and let the regulatory regime follow from those answers.</p>



<p>Second, treat longevity claims the way green claims are now treated. The direction of enforcement is unmistakable. The Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition Directive, applicable from 27 September 2026, gives regulators a sharpened toolkit that will, sooner or later, be pointed at health and wellness claims. Substantiation is no longer optional.</p>



<p>Third, integrate AI Act compliance with sectoral compliance from the outset. For any longevity venture using AI in diagnostics or patient-facing decision support, the AI Act, the MDR, and the GDPR, soon joined by the European Health Data Space, form a single interlocking compliance architecture. The deferral of the AI Act’s high-risk obligations to 2027 and 2028 is a design window, not a reprieve. Retrofitting is expensive; designing for compliance is not.</p>



<p>The longevity industry will keep growing, and regulators will keep catching up. The lawyers who understand both the science and the sectoral map will be the ones clients call first.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Longevity economy estimates vary widely by definition; see, e.g., the periodic longevity-market reports of Bank of America Global Research and McKinsey Health Institute. The figure is offered here as an order of magnitude, not a precise valuation.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, art. 1(2), 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 [hereinafter Directive 2001/83]. At the time of writing, the new EU pharmaceutical package (a new directive on the Union code for medicinal products for human use and a new regulation on Union authorisation procedures) has been politically agreed and is in the final stage of formal adoption; the substantive rules discussed here are carried over into the new framework, which will apply after a transitional period of approximately two years from entry into force.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> See Nir Barzilai et al., Metformin as a Tool to Target Aging, 23 Cell Metabolism 1060 (2016) (describing the design of the Targeting Aging with Metformin (TAME) trial around a composite of age-related diseases).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Food Supplements, 2002 O.J. (L 183) 51.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on Novel Foods, 2015 O.J. (L 327) 1 [hereinafter Novel Food Regulation].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on Cosmetic Products, 2009 O.J. (L 342) 59 [hereinafter Cosmetics Regulation].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on Medical Devices, Annex XVI, 2017 O.J. (L 117) 1 [hereinafter MDR]; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2346 of 1 December 2022 Laying Down Common Specifications for the Groups of Products Without an Intended Medical Purpose Listed in Annex XVI, 2022 O.J. (L 311) 60.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a> Case 227/82, Van Bennekom, ECLI:EU:C:1983:354 (establishing that a product is a medicinal product “by presentation” where it is described or recommended as having therapeutic or prophylactic properties, irrespective of its actual efficacy); Case C-319/05, Comm’n v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2007:678 (garlic capsules); Case C-140/07, Hecht-Pharma GmbH v. Staatliches Gewerbeaufsichtsamt Luneburg, ECLI:EU:C:2009:5 (classification “by function” requires a case-by-case assessment of pharmacological, immunological or metabolic properties). See also Directive 2001/83, supra note 2, art. 2(2) (in cases of doubt, the medicinal-products regime prevails).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref9" id="_ftn9">[9]</a> Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on Nutrition and Health Claims Made on Foods, arts. 10, 13, 14, 2006 O.J. (L 404) 9 [hereinafter Health Claims Regulation]. The EU Register of nutrition and health claims is maintained by the European Commission.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref10" id="_ftn10">[10]</a> Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 [hereinafter UCPD].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref11" id="_ftn11">[11]</a> Directive (EU) 2024/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 Amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as Regards Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, OJ L, 2024/825, 6.3.2024 [hereinafter ECGT Directive]. Member States were required to transpose the Directive by 27 March 2026; its provisions apply from 27 September 2026. The separate Green Claims Directive proposal, which would have introduced ex ante verification of explicit environmental claims, was withdrawn by the Commission in 2025 and is not discussed here.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref12" id="_ftn12">[12]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024 [hereinafter AI Act].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref13" id="_ftn13">[13]</a> AI Act, supra note 12, art. 6(1) &amp; Annex I, § A (listing the MDR and Regulation (EU) 2017/746 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices). The Annex I route applies where the AI system is a product, or a safety component of a product, that is itself subject to third-party conformity assessment under the listed Union harmonisation legislation.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref14" id="_ftn14">[14]</a> AI Act, supra note 12, arts. 9–15, 17, 43, 72.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref15" id="_ftn15">[15]</a> Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as Regards the Simplification of Certain Obligations (“Digital Omnibus on AI”), OJ L, 2026/1744, 24.7.2026 (in force 27 July 2026). The Regulation defers the high-risk obligations for stand-alone (Annex III) systems to 2 December 2027 and for AI embedded in products covered by Annex I, including medical devices, to 2 August 2028; the Article 50 transparency obligations continue to apply from 2 August 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref16" id="_ftn16">[16]</a> Eur. Medicines Agency, Reflection Paper on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Medicinal Product Lifecycle, EMA/CHMP/CVMP/83833/2023 (adopted Sept. 2024).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref17" id="_ftn17">[17]</a> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, arts. 9(2)(j), 89, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref18" id="_ftn18">[18]</a> Regulation (EU) 2025/327 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2025 on the European Health Data Space, OJ L, 2025/327, 5.3.2025 [hereinafter EHDS Regulation]. The Regulation entered into force on 26 March 2025 and applies in stages: most provisions from 26 March 2027, and the core secondary-use chapter from 26 March 2029 (2031 for certain data categories). See id. art. 105.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref19" id="_ftn19">[19]</a> EHDS Regulation, supra note 18, arts. 50–54 (secure processing environments; permitted and prohibited purposes of secondary use).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref20" id="_ftn20">[20]</a> Directive 2001/83, supra note 2, art. 87(2) (all parts of advertising must comply with the particulars listed in the summary of product characteristics), arts. 40–53 (manufacturing authorisation and good manufacturing practice) and art. 87(1) (prohibition of advertising of medicinal products without a marketing authorisation).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref21" id="_ftn21">[21]</a> MDR, supra note 7, art. 7.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref22" id="_ftn22">[22]</a> Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2371 of 26 November 2025 (declaring the first four EUDAMED modules functional), OJ L, 2025/2371, 27.11.2025; Regulation (EU) 2024/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024, OJ L, 2024/1860, 9.7.2024 (gradual roll-out of EUDAMED). The four modules (actor registration, UDI/device registration, notified bodies and certificates, market surveillance) are mandatory from 28 May 2026; legacy devices remaining on the market must be registered by 28 November 2026. The vigilance and clinical-investigation modules are not yet mandatory, and serious incidents continue to be reported to national competent authorities.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref23" id="_ftn23">[23]</a> Cosmetics Regulation, supra note 6, arts. 11, 13, 20; Commission Regulation (EU) No 655/2013 of 10 July 2013 Laying Down Common Criteria for the Justification of Claims Used in Relation to Cosmetic Products, Annex, 2013 O.J. (L 190) 31.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref24" id="_ftn24">[24]</a> Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref25" id="_ftn25">[25]</a> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/16 of 10 January 2020 Authorising the Placing on the Market of Nicotinamide Riboside Chloride as a Novel Food, 2020 O.J. (L 7) 6.</p>



<p><a id="_ftn26" href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> EFSA Panel on Nutrition, Novel Foods and Food Allergens, Safety of Beta-Nicotinamide Mononucleotide (β-NMN) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2015/2283 and the Bioavailability of Nicotinamide from This Source in the Context of Directive 2002/46/EC, 24 EFSA J. e10007 (2026) (opinion adopted 4 March 2026, published 11 May 2026). Authorisation requires a Commission implementing act amending the Union list established by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2470; at the time of writing no such act has been published, and any authorisation granted on the basis of proprietary data will initially benefit only the applicant. See Novel Food Regulation, supra note 5, arts. 12, 26.</p>
<p> </p>



<p>#LongevityIndustry #LongevityWashing #EURegulatoryLaw #ArtificialIntelligence #AIAct #HealthcareLaw #LifeSciencesLaw #HealthTech #MedicalDevices #PharmaceuticalLaw #GDPR #EuropeanHealthDataSpace #EUlaw #HealthClaims #NovelFoods</p>


<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/longevity-washing-ai-and-the-regulatory-fault-lines-of-the-longevity-industry-a-european-perspective/">Longevity Washing, AI and the Regulatory Fault Lines of the Longevity Industry: A European Perspective</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>The MyDr Data Breach – Lessons for Healthcare Service Providers and e-Health Platforms</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 20:30:11 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: September 07, 2026 What happened On 10 August 2026, MyDr, one of Poland&#8217;s largest providers of electronic medical records software, confirmed that it had been the target of a deliberate criminal attack on its systems. Two days later, the Ministry of Digital Affairs announced that the incident may affect close to 19 million [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/mydr-data-breach-lessons-for-healthcare-providers-kglegal/">The MyDr Data Breach – Lessons for Healthcare Service Providers and e-Health Platforms</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: September 07, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What happened</strong></h2>



<div class="wp-block-media-text is-stacked-on-mobile" style="grid-template-columns:42% auto"><figure class="wp-block-media-text__media"><video controls src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/generated-video-1-1.mp4"></video></figure><div class="wp-block-media-text__content">
<p>On 10 August 2026, MyDr, one of Poland&#8217;s largest providers of electronic medical records software, confirmed that it had been the target of a deliberate criminal attack on its systems. Two days later, the Ministry of Digital Affairs announced that the incident may affect close to 19 million individuals and more than 12,000 healthcare facilities, and that the exfiltrated database exceeds 2 terabytes.</p>
</div></div>



<p>The attackers supplied the security portal Zaufana Trzecia Strona with a data sample suggesting that they hold PESEL numbers (Polish national identification numbers) and at least fragments of prescription information.</p>



<span id="more-8909"></span>



<p>To date, the company has not publicly confirmed the full scope and nature of the compromised data, referring instead to a pending forensic analysis. The investigation is being conducted by the Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime under the supervision of the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor&#8217;s Office, and the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) has opened an inspection covering the technical and organisational measures applied and the underlying risk analysis. Since 29 August, the dataset from the incident has been available on the government portal bezpiecznedane.gov.pl, where anyone can check whether their data was affected.</p>



<p>The scale of the incident prompted the Ministry of Digital Affairs to announce, within three weeks, a legislative package branded the &#8220;Cyber Five&#8221;. Its key elements include certification of entities processing medical data within the existing national cybersecurity certification framework; a mandatory risk assessment before processing begins and at least every two years thereafter; new obligations for entities serving more than 100 controllers or processing data of more than 100,000 individuals (including rapid transfer of affected persons&#8217; data to CSIRT NASK and a duty to inform client facilities about the level of their own security); and notifications of medical events via the mObywatel and mojeIKP applications. The amendments are to cover the Act on Patients&#8217; Rights and the legislation governing the National Cybersecurity System.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why roles in the processing chain decide everything</strong></h2>



<p>From a legal standpoint, the critical point is that, in relation to medical records, MyDr acts as a processor, while each facility – from a large clinic network to a single-doctor practice – remains the controller. The consequences of this structure became fully apparent after the incident:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>The obligation to notify UODO (Article 33 GDPR) and to communicate the breach to patients (Article 34 GDPR)</strong> rests with the controller, i.e. the facility. The processor is merely required to inform the controller &#8220;without undue delay&#8221; (Article 33(2) GDPR). In practice, thousands of healthcare providers had to assess risk and communicate with patients on the basis of fragmentary information from the supplier.</li>



<li><strong>Liability for damages (Article 82 GDPR)</strong> is joint and several: a patient may sue the facility, the supplier, or both. The processor is liable where it has failed to comply with obligations specifically imposed on processors by the GDPR or acted contrary to the controller&#8217;s instructions – but the facility is liable for having entrusted data to an entity that did not provide sufficient guarantees (Article 28(1) GDPR).</li>



<li><strong>Sector-specific requirements under the Act on Patients&#8217; Rights</strong> (Article 24(4)) impose on any entity entrusted with the processing of medical records a duty of confidentiality and data security – this is precisely the provision now slated for extension to include certification and minimum technological standards.</li>
</ul>



<p>Deputy Minister of Digital Affairs Dariusz Standerski stated openly that in this case, liability under the contract remained entirely with the controllers, i.e. small medical practices. This is the most important lesson of the incident: a data processing agreement is not a formality but the document that, on the day of a breach, determines who pays.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>How a healthcare service provider can protect itself</strong></h2>



<p><strong>1. The data processing agreement and the main contract as risk-allocation tools.</strong> Standard DPA templates offered by software vendors focus on satisfying the minimum requirements of Article 28(3) GDPR. A healthcare provider should negotiate further: a precise deadline and format for incident notification (e.g. 24 hours, with a defined scope of information enabling a risk assessment); audit and penetration-testing rights; an obligation to maintain specified certifications (ISO 27001 and, in future, certification under the National Cybersecurity System Act); a duty to cooperate in communications with patients and the supervisory authority; liability and recourse clauses not capped at the annual fee; and a requirement that the vendor hold cyber insurance with a defined sum insured, with the facility named as a co-insured or beneficiary.</p>



<p><strong>2. Cyber and liability insurance.</strong> Standard professional liability policies for healthcare providers typically do not cover the cost of notifying patients, crisis management, administrative fines or claims arising from data breaches. A dedicated cyber policy covers these elements, but its exclusions must be read carefully: insurers increasingly condition cover on the implementation of MFA, system patching and backups, and an incident at an external supplier (a so-called <em>third-party breach</em>) is often covered only under an express extension. It is also worth verifying whether the software vendor&#8217;s own policy actually exists and what its limit is – given the number of facilities relying on a single system, such amounts may prove illusory.</p>



<p><strong>3. A map of relationships between entities.</strong> In a real-world e-health ecosystem, patient data flows between the facility, the EMR vendor, the hosting or cloud provider, the e-prescription and e-referral operator, laboratories, IT subcontractors and billing companies. Each link is a distinct legal relationship: processing on behalf of the controller, sub-processing (Article 28(2) and (4) GDPR) or joint controllership (Article 26 GDPR). A facility should maintain an up-to-date register of these entities, know where the data is physically located and control the chain of sub-processors – a &#8220;general&#8221; consent to sub-processors without a list and without a right to object is, in practice, an abdication of control.</p>



<p><strong>4. Anonymisation, pseudonymisation and data minimisation.</strong> Data that is not in the system cannot leak. Healthcare providers and vendors should separate identifiers (PESEL numbers, contact details) from clinical data, apply pseudonymisation (Article 4(5) and Article 32(1)(a) GDPR) in test, analytical and research environments, and store statistical data exclusively in anonymised form. It should be remembered that anonymisation is an irreversible process and only such a process removes data from the scope of the GDPR; pseudonymisation remains processing of personal data, but it significantly limits the consequences of a breach and is a valuable argument both in proceedings before UODO and in litigation over damages.</p>



<p><strong>5. Internal obligations and incident readiness.</strong> A breach response procedure should be tested, not merely written down: who decides on notifying UODO within 72 hours, who communicates with patients, who with the media, who secures the evidence. Regular risk analysis and a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) for EMR systems – which, given their scale and the categories of data involved, almost always meet the criteria of Article 35 GDPR – is an obligation already today, and once the &#8220;Cyber Five&#8221; enters into force it will additionally become a sector-specific requirement with a prescribed frequency.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>AI-enabled attacks</strong></h2>



<p>The healthcare sector is particularly exposed to a new generation of AI-supported attacks. Large language models enable the mass generation of credible phishing messages in flawless Polish, personalised on the basis of data from previous breaches – a PESEL number, a surname and information about a prescription are enough to construct a convincing message &#8220;from your clinic&#8221; or &#8220;from the National Health Fund&#8221;. AI tools also automate the discovery of vulnerabilities in systems and the generation of malicious code, shortening the window between disclosure of a vulnerability and its exploitation. There is a growing number of cases involving voice deepfakes used to impersonate medical staff or IT administrators in order to obtain access credentials.</p>



<p>For vendors and facilities, this means that traditional &#8220;don&#8217;t click suspicious links&#8221; training is no longer sufficient. Technical mechanisms are required (phishing-resistant MFA, network segmentation, AI-assisted anomaly monitoring on the defensive side), together with identity verification procedures for every request for data access or a change of permissions. Regulatory risk should also be kept in mind: AI systems deployed in healthcare facilities – including tools supporting diagnostics or triage – fall under the AI Act, and their integration with EMR systems constitutes yet another link in the processing chain that must be reflected in contracts and in the risk analysis.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>How we support institutional clients</strong></h2>



<p>KG Legal advises healthcare providers, medical networks, telemedicine platform and e-health software vendors, and investors in this sector on managing liability for data. Our support includes auditing existing data processing agreements and IT supplier contracts for risk allocation; negotiating liability, recourse and insurance clauses; mapping the chain of processors and vetting subcontractors; preparing and testing breach response procedures; handling notifications to UODO and communications with patients; and representation in inspection proceedings and in damages litigation. For medical technology vendors, we prepare documentation and contract templates meeting the requirements of the GDPR, the Act on Patients&#8217; Rights, NIS2 and – once enacted – the &#8220;Cyber Five&#8221; provisions, and we assess the compliance of AI-based solutions with the AI Act and the MDR. Our aim is that, on the day an incident occurs, the client knows exactly who is responsible for what and has evidence of having exercised due diligence.</p>



<p><em>Facts as at 2 September 2026, based on statements by MyDr, the Ministry of Digital Affairs and UODO, and press reports. This article is for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.</em></p>
<p>#MyDr #DataBreach #HealthcareCybersecurity #HealthcareData #DataProtection #GDPR #Cybersecurity #HealthTech #eHealth #DigitalHealth #MedicalRecords #EMR #PatientData #PatientPrivacy #UODO #Poland #CyberRisk #CyberInsurance #IncidentResponse #DataPrivacy #NIS2 #CyberFive #ISO27001 #AIAct #AIinHealthcare #AICybersecurity #MedTech #Telemedicine #CyberResilience #DataSecurity</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/pharmaceutical-healthcare-life-sciences-law/mydr-data-breach-lessons-for-healthcare-providers-kglegal/">The MyDr Data Breach – Lessons for Healthcare Service Providers and e-Health Platforms</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>Our Report on the Legal Landscape of the Drone Industry Is Today’s Main Feature on Lexology</title>
		<link>https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/kg-legal-news/our-report-on-the-legal-landscape-of-the-drone-industry-is-todays-main-feature-on-lexology/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 12:02:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[KG LEGAL NEWS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence financing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Law]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Use Technology]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[legal landscape]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lexology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regulatory landscape]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SANCTIONS]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8904</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: September 07, 2026 We are pleased to share that our in-depth report on the legal and technological landscape of the drone industry is featured today as the leading content on Lexology&#8217;s homepage. The report examines the rapidly evolving drone ecosystem through nine interconnected legal and regulatory pillars, including aviation law, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/kg-legal-news/our-report-on-the-legal-landscape-of-the-drone-industry-is-todays-main-feature-on-lexology/">Our Report on the Legal Landscape of the Drone Industry Is Today’s Main Feature on Lexology</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Publication date: September 07, 2026</mark></strong></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="602" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY-1024x602.png" alt="" class="wp-image-8905" srcset="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY-1024x602.png 1024w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY-300x176.png 300w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY-768x451.png 768w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY-1536x902.png 1536w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/AI-DRONE-WARFARE-LEXOLOGY.png 1583w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>



<span id="more-8904"></span>



<p>We are pleased to share that our in-depth report on the legal and technological landscape of the drone industry is featured today as the leading content on Lexology&#8217;s homepage.</p>



<p>The report examines the rapidly evolving drone ecosystem through nine interconnected legal and regulatory pillars, including aviation law, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, data protection, sanctions, export controls, dual-use technologies and defence-sector financing.</p>



<p>As drone technologies advance faster than many existing regulatory frameworks, companies, investors and advisers must navigate an increasingly complex environment spanning civilian, dual-use and military applications.</p>



<p>We invite you to read the full report on our blog, available without a paywall:</p>



<p><blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="V2PD940UnY"><a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-warfare/">Drone Warfare</a></blockquote><iframe class="wp-embedded-content" sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted"  title="&#8222;Drone Warfare&#8221; &#8212; KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-warfare/embed/#?secret=LBenNwlEFP#?secret=V2PD940UnY" data-secret="V2PD940UnY" width="500" height="282" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no"></iframe> </p>



<p>#DroneLaw #DroneTechnology #UAS #ArtificialIntelligence #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #DualUse #DefenceIndustry #AviationLaw #ExportControls #Sanctions #RegulatoryCompliance #TechnologyLaw #Innovation #LegalAnalysis</p>
<p> </p>




<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/kg-legal-news/our-report-on-the-legal-landscape-of-the-drone-industry-is-todays-main-feature-on-lexology/">Our Report on the Legal Landscape of the Drone Industry Is Today’s Main Feature on Lexology</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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		<title>Drone Warfare</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jakub]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 13:55:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[IT, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY LAW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-Drone Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autonomous Weapon Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BVLOS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Counter-Drone Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Critical Infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Use Export Controls]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Use Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Use Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Drone Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[High-Risk AI Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIS2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[personal data protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Polish Drone Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U-space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAV Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aircraft Systems]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.kg-legal.eu/?p=8874</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Publication date: August 26, 2026 The Legal Environment and Practical Aspects of Dual-Use Technology – the Ukrainian Conflict as a Lens on the Development of EU Regulation and the Polish Jurisdiction &#8211; Expanded Edition &#8211; Legal status as at 25 August 2026 Authors: attorney-at-law (radca prawny) K. Jakub Gładkowski (corporate practice, court and regulatory representation), [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-warfare/">Drone Warfare</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color"><strong>Publication date: August 26, 2026</strong></mark></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Legal Environment and Practical Aspects of Dual-Use Technology – the Ukrainian Conflict as a Lens on the Development of EU Regulation and the Polish Jurisdiction &#8211; Expanded Edition &#8211; Legal status as at 25 August 2026</h3>



<p><em>Authors: attorney-at-law (radca prawny) K. Jakub Gładkowski (corporate practice, court and regulatory representation), attorney-at-law (radca prawny) Małgorzata Kiełtyka (M&amp;A, high-technology and highly regulated sectors) – KG Legal Kiełtyka Gładkowski Spółka Partnerska Kancelaria Radców Prawnych; iSTART1 programme.</em></p>



<p><em>This material is of a popular-science and informational nature. It does not constitute legal advice or a binding opinion. Before citing any specific provision, the current consolidated version in EUR-Lex and the current entry in the Polish Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) should be verified in each case.</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image.png" target="_blank" rel=" noreferrer noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="980" height="551" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image.png" alt="" class="wp-image-8875" srcset="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image.png 980w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-300x169.png 300w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-768x432.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 980px) 100vw, 980px" /></a></figure>



<span id="more-8874"></span>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading"><em>Abstract</em></h4>



<p class="has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has become a lens in which the future of dual-use unmanned technology is brought into focus – and, at the same time, a barometer of the direction its regulation will take. Within two to three years, technological progress has occurred which, in peacetime conditions, would have taken decades. This article combines two perspectives: a technological taxonomy of drone warfare and a map of the legal environment of the European Union and Poland, encompassing nine mutually interpenetrating regulatory pillars – from product certification and airspace management, through artificial intelligence, export control, defence financing, satellite communications, cybersecurity and personal data protection, to international law and the national regime.</p>



<p class="has-white-color has-vivid-red-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-6caed12e936c828f3ed6d240556392b7"><strong>The thesis to be verified is that the legal regime of the UAV sector is structurally dual-track: on the civil track, law operates as a consequence of need and as a risk-dampening factor, whereas on the defence track it operates as a driver of development. The mechanism separating the two tracks is the military exclusion in Article 2(3) of the Artificial Intelligence Act and the analogous defence exclusions in successive instruments, while the line of dispute is the increasingly blurred dual-use boundary. We analyse seven concrete points of friction between the tracks and formulate a practical qualification map and a 2026–2028 compliance calendar for manufacturers, operators and investors in this sector.</strong></p>



<p><em><strong>Keywords:</strong> unmanned aircraft, dual use, Artificial Intelligence Act, high-risk systems, autonomous weapon systems, export control, U-space, NIS2, CER, personal data protection, European Drone Defence Initiative.</em></p>



<div class="wp-block-media-text has-media-on-the-right is-stacked-on-mobile is-vertically-aligned-center has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-74fa267e46e25de8e613770e79a485db"><div class="wp-block-media-text__content">
<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Part I: the Legal Environment and Practical Aspects of Dual-Use Technology</h3>
</div><figure class="wp-block-media-text__media"><video controls src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/output.mp4"></video></figure></div>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">1 Introduction</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">1.1 Nineteen objects over Poland – the moment when law caught up with reality</h3>



<p>The impulse to look at the drone problem not merely as a tactical phenomenon but as a growing strategic threat to Europe comes from reports circulating in the analytical and milblogger space – based on statements of Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) – that Russia is already producing more jet-powered variants of the Geran-4 and Geran-5 than piston-engined Geran-2s, with figures in the order of approximately 3,000 jet platforms per month against approximately 2,800 piston variants. Assessments of this kind, even if they call for source-related caution, are of significant analytical importance: they show that the scale of Russian production of unmanned means of aerial attack may exceed the framework of a war of attrition against Ukraine and may be perceived as a capability able to support a broader campaign of pressure or threat directed at European states. In this sense, the drone problem is no longer an exclusively military issue, but also a stimulus for a fresh reading of the legal environment of unmanned technologies in Europe – from aviation law, through export control and AI, to cybersecurity, the protection of critical infrastructure and state security.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>



<p>On the night of 9/10 September 2025, a dozen or so unmanned aircraft flew into Polish airspace; some of them were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was not an isolated incident – the Romanian government had reported violations as early as January 2025, and in August of the same year a Russian Geran-2-type platform came down near Osiny in eastern Poland. The September event, however, carried a different weight: it triggered consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, led to the launch of NATO’s operation _Eastern Sentry_, and, in the EU dimension, to the announcement of a “drone wall”, subsequently transformed into the <strong>European Drone Defence Initiative (EDDI)</strong> and <strong>Eastern Flank Watch</strong>.</p>



<p>The current phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict makes it plain that both sides are developing unmanned technologies according to different operational logics and economics of use. The Russian side has to a greater extent expanded the segment of drones performing a function complementary to classic means of aerial attack: decoys, platforms imitating the actual strike assets, and cheap carriers used to saturate air defence and force the expenditure of effectors on the Ukrainian side. The Ukrainian side, conversely, is developing more broadly the segment of long-range drones with a real strike function, whose principal purpose is to strike rear-area infrastructure, including refineries, logistics and other objects of high operational value. This difference matters not only militarily but also in legal-regulatory terms, because it translates into different risk profiles as regards the qualification of dual-use technology, liability for the use of means of aerial attack, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the economics of air defence. In practice, the Russian model relies to a considerable degree on forcing a costly defensive reaction on the adversary’s side, whereas the Ukrainian model aims at the asymmetric striking of rear-area targets using relatively cheap platforms, which further deepens the problem of cost disproportionality between a cheap drone and an expensive defensive effector, such as the missiles of the S-300, S-400, Tor or Pantsir systems. In this sense, the conflict is a lens not only of the development of technology, but also of the transformation of the regulatory logic itself: law must now contend not with a single device, but with entire models of the operational use of unmanned technologies.<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a></p>



<p>For the lawyer, however, something else is most important. The facts give rise to questions about an asymmetry which is the crux of the entire regulatory problem: against platforms with a unit cost counted in thousands of dollars, systems were used whose single effector should cost hundreds of thousands. This cost asymmetry is not merely a budgetary problem. It forces the burden of defence to be shifted onto solutions that are cheap, mass-produced and increasingly autonomous – and therefore precisely onto that class of technology which European Union law regulates most cautiously on the civil side and almost not at all on the military side.</p>



<p><strong>The new regulatory architecture of drone security: from EU strategy to the obligations of critical infrastructure operators and AI systems</strong></p>



<p>Over the following months, the legislative tempo concerning unmanned systems accelerated in a manner unprecedented for this sector. The existing drone regulations had concentrated primarily on aviation safety, the rules for conducting operations, and technical requirements for operators and manufacturers. In 2026, however, a significant shift of regulatory emphasis took place: the drone began to be treated not only as an aviation device, but also as a potential tool of threat to critical infrastructure and as a system that may be subject to the requirements of artificial intelligence regulation.</p>



<p>The first element of this new architecture was the <strong>Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security</strong> (COM(2026) 81 final) presented by the European Commission on 11 February 2026.<a href="#_ftn3" id="_ftnref3">[3]</a> This document does not constitute a legally binding act within the meaning of Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,<a href="#_ftn4" id="_ftnref4">[4]</a> but has the character of a European Commission communication – a political and programmatic instrument belonging to the category of so-called soft law. It does not establish direct obligations for Member States, undertakings or critical infrastructure operators, but it sets the direction of the European Union’s future legislative and organisational actions.</p>



<p>The significance of this document lies above all in a change in the way threats connected with unmanned aircraft are perceived. The Commission indicated that the rapid development of drone technologies, their commercial availability and the possibility of their use by entities conducting hostile activities make it necessary to build a European security system encompassing both protection against unauthorised drone operations (counter-drone) and the strengthening of the resilience of Member States’ infrastructure.</p>



<p>The Action Plan provides for the development of Member States’ capabilities in detecting, identifying and neutralising threats caused by drones, better information exchange between security authorities, and the development of counter-drone technologies. Particular importance was attached to the protection of critical infrastructure, military facilities, the external borders of the European Union, and places particularly exposed to the unlawful use of drones.</p>



<p>The European Commission’s Action Plan should accordingly be treated as the first level of the new regulation – the strategic level. It does not yet impose specific legal obligations, but it creates the political justification for subsequent legislative changes at national and EU level.</p>



<p>The second level was the intervention of the Polish legislator. The Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts introduced solutions enabling the use of jamming devices in the protection of critical infrastructure.<a href="#_ftn5" id="_ftnref5">[5]</a></p>



<p>This amendment<a href="#_ftn6" id="_ftnref6">[6]</a> is of particular importance because, for the first time in the Polish legal system, an express basis was created for the application of measures interfering with the communications or control of unmanned aircraft by entities connected with the protection of critical infrastructure. It must, however, be precisely noted that the legislator did not grant critical infrastructure operators an independent right to use jamming devices.<a href="#_ftn7" id="_ftnref7">[7]</a> The legal construction was shaped at two levels.</p>



<p>First, <strong>Article 16c</strong>,<a href="#_ftn8" id="_ftnref8">[8]</a> added to the Act on Crisis Management, grants the critical infrastructure operator the competence to take a decision on the admissibility of the use of specified devices.</p>



<p>That provision reads:</p>



<p>“<em>In order to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, the critical infrastructure operator (…) may take a decision on the admissibility of the use of the devices referred to in paragraph 1, for the time necessary for the performance of activities by security staff of specialist armed security formations (…)</em>”.</p>



<p>Second, the technical scope of those measures follows from the provisions of the <strong>Aviation Law</strong>, in particular Article 156ze(1), which sets out the possibility of using devices serving to counter unmanned aircraft.</p>



<p>Under that provision, such devices may be used for the purpose of:</p>



<p>“<em>interfering with or taking over control of an unmanned aircraft, interfering with the flight control signal or the navigation signal enabling the flight of that aircraft</em>”.<a id="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p>



<p>In practice, this means that the critical infrastructure operator has obtained a new power of a decision-making character, whereas the physical use of the devices remains tied to the activities of the staff of specialist armed security formations (SUFO). This solution is a compromise between the need for effective protection of strategic facilities and the necessity of limiting the risk of uncontrolled use of devices capable of interfering with communications or navigation systems.</p>



<p>The explanatory memorandum to the bill<a href="#_ftn10" id="_ftnref10">[10]</a> stated that the purpose of the regulation is to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure and to provide operators with tools corresponding to contemporary threats, in particular threats making use of unmanned systems.</p>



<p>The third level of regulation was the modification of the timetable for the application of the provisions of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act.</p>



<p>On 29 June 2026, the Council of the European Union approved an amendment to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (the AI Act).<a href="#_ftn11" id="_ftnref11">[11]</a> This amendment did not change the AI Act’s basic risk-based regulatory model, but postponed the dates on which part of the obligations concerning high-risk systems begin to apply.</p>



<p>The most significant change was the extension of the preparatory period for providers of high-risk AI systems. The regulation was intended to enable undertakings, supervisory authorities and standardisation institutions to prepare the appropriate technical and organisational mechanisms, including conformity standards, risk assessment procedures and quality management systems.</p>



<p>This change is also relevant for the drone sector. Contemporary unmanned systems increasingly use artificial intelligence algorithms for autonomous navigation, object identification, image analysis or operational decision-making. In consequence, particular applications of drones may simultaneously be subject to aviation law regulations, provisions concerning the security of critical infrastructure, and the requirements of the AI Act.</p>



<p>By way of example, Article 113 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, which sets out the timetable for the application of the AI Act’s provisions, was amended as regards the dates of applicability of the rules concerning high-risk systems, postponing the full application of part of the obligations to later dates.<a href="#_ftn12" id="_ftnref12">[12]</a></p>



<p>As a result, in 2026 a multi-level regulatory architecture concerning a single device came into being. At European Union level, the European Commission set the strategic direction of the development of drone security policy through the non-binding Action Plan. At national level, Poland created a mechanism for the protection of critical infrastructure enabling the use of counter-drone measures. At the technological level, the AI Act laid down the principles of the responsible use of artificial intelligence systems employed in autonomous devices.</p>



<p><strong>Three different regimes. Three different regulatory logics. And all of them concern the same device.</strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">1.2 The paradox of acceleration</h2>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-1.png" target="_blank" rel=" noreferrer noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="980" height="551" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-1.png" alt="" class="wp-image-8877" srcset="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-1.png 980w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-1-300x169.png 300w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-1-768x432.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 980px) 100vw, 980px" /></a></figure>



<p>The history of military technology knows few moments in which the development curve breaks as abruptly as in Ukraine after 2022. Commentators<a href="#_ftn13" id="_ftnref13">[13]</a> estimate that the technological leap<a href="#_ftn14" id="_ftnref14">[14]</a> in the field of unmanned aircraft accomplished during two to three years of war would, in the absence of an arms race, have taken 20–30 years.<a href="#_ftn15" id="_ftnref15">[15]</a> As to the period, it must be assessed that the thesis itself is <strong>fundamentally true</strong>, but the formulation “20–30 years” is not a scientific claim easily attributable to a single source. It is rather a <strong>metaphor used by military analysts, representatives of the defence industry and commentators</strong>, who describe a <strong>step-change acceleration of the innovation cycle</strong> under the influence of the war. In the space of only two to three years, drones travelled the road from specialised reconnaissance tools to mass-deployed combat systems, encompassing cheap single-use platforms, unmanned swarms, systems resistant to electronic jamming, and solutions using artificial intelligence. In the view of many military analysts, this conflict has shortened the development cycles of unmanned technologies in a way that, in peacetime conditions, would correspond to a multi-year or even multi-decade process of evolution.<a href="#_ftn16" id="_ftnref16">[16]</a></p>



<p>This paradox of acceleration has its source not in success but in failure.<a href="#_ftn17" id="_ftnref17">[17]</a> The original plan of a lightning resolution – seizing the capital within a week and taking control of the south of the country – collapsed already in the cyber phase, when the operation intended to paralyse the digital administration, banking and state budget did not translate into the country’s military collapse. The result was a positional stalemate in the east – trench warfare reminiscent of the fronts of a hundred years ago.</p>



<p>And it was precisely this stalemate, not manoeuvre, that became the incubator of innovation. Tactical pressure in an environment in which neither side can gain a conventional advantage forced a cascade of technological solutions: from commercial observation drones, through mass-scale FPV drones, to satellite-controlled long-range platforms with elements of autonomy.</p>



<p>It is worth emphasising that this mechanism was to a considerable extent <strong>civilian in its genesis</strong>. The drone revolution did not come out of the laboratories of the great arms concerns, but out of the model-making market, out of commercial consumer electronics and out of open-source software. A manufacturer which in 2021 was selling a platform for power-line inspection was in 2023 delivering the same design with a different payload configuration. The law, which for two decades had been building separate regimes for civil aviation and for armaments, found itself confronted with a product that crosses that boundary without any design modification.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">1.3 Thesis, research question and structure of the argument</h2>



<p>For a lawyer serving entities in the high-technology sector, the paradox of acceleration has a practical dimension. It gives rise to the question that is the axis of this text: <strong>does law in this area merely react to a technology which the conflict has outpaced, or has it itself become an instrument of acceleration – and perhaps, in some segments, an instrument of its extinguishment.</strong></p>



<p>The answer, which we substantiate in the remainder of this text, is: law performs <strong>three different roles simultaneously</strong> in this sector, and which of them is activated is decided not by the technology but by the qualification of the purpose of use. And that qualification is, in the case of dual-use products, inherently unstable.</p>



<p>The structure of the argument is as follows. Part 2 presents the technological taxonomy of drone warfare – without it, legal analysis operates in a vacuum, because each of the regulatory regimes attaches legal consequences to specific technical features (mass, range, presence of sensors, degree of autonomy, type of link). Part 3 maps the legal environment of the European Union and Poland, divided into nine pillars.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-2.png" target="_blank" rel=" noreferrer noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="627" height="353" src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-2.png" alt="" class="wp-image-8879" srcset="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-2.png 627w, https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image-2-300x169.png 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 627px) 100vw, 627px" /></a></figure>



<p>Part 4 analyses seven points of friction at which these pillars collide with one another – it is there that the undertaking’s real legal risk is concentrated. Part 5 formulates the thesis of the dual-track nature of the regime. Part 6 translates the analysis into transactional and compliance practice, together with a compliance calendar up to 2028.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">2 · The Anatomy of Drone Warfare – a Technological Taxonomy</h2>



<p>The point of departure for any legal analysis must be the differentiation of categories. It is a fundamental error – also in the regulatory debate – to treat the “drone” as a single class of devices. A more apt analogy here is to optics and photography: there is no single universal lens for every photograph, because each type of shot – macro, portrait, telephoto, wide-angle landscape – requires a different optical construction, a different focal length and a different compromise between reach and field of view. It is exactly the same with drones and counter-drone systems: there is no single “anti-drone system”; there are systems countering specific categories of platforms, matched to their signature, range and mode of communication. This differentiation is not merely descriptive but legal in character – it determines product qualification, the export regime and the scope of compliance obligations.</p>



<p>This differentiation has directly normative consequences. At the level of product qualification, the mass, construction and intended purpose of the platform determine its place in the EU UAV regime, in particular in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, which treat product classes and the “open”, “specific” and “certified” categories of operations differently; in practice this means that the same aircraft may, as a product, remain in lawful civil circulation while at the same time, with a different mode of use or retrofitting, pass into the area of heightened regulatory risk. At the level of the export regime, the identical differentiation decides whether a component, software, sensor, communications module or navigation system falls within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 as a dual-use product, which may trigger an authorisation requirement, an end-user assessment and a proliferation risk analysis. At the level of compliance obligations, in turn, what matters are not only the physical features of the drone but also its data and autonomy functions: the presence of cameras, sensors or AI modules may in parallel trigger the requirements of the GDPR, cybersecurity, information security and – outside the scope of the military exclusion – the obligations arising from the AI Act. As a result, in the UAV sector it is not enough to ask “what is the product”; the key question becomes in what chain of use, circulation and liability the product operates.</p>



<p>The importance of this differentiation lies in the fact that, in the UAV sector, technical categories translate into different normative consequences in several overlapping legal regimes at once. First, at the level of product and operational qualification, features such as take-off mass, communications architecture, scope of autonomy or type of payload affect the classification of the platform in the light of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, and thus the admissibility of its placing on the market and the mode of its lawful operation. Second, at the level of export control, the same features may determine whether specific components, sensors, navigation modules, software or technical documentation are covered by the regime of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which triggers licensing obligations, end-user assessment and proliferation risk assessment. Third, at the level of functional compliance, what matters is no longer only the material features of the platform itself, but also its data-processing, observation and decision-support functions: the use of optical sensors, thermal-imaging sensors, remote identification systems or image-analysis algorithms may in parallel trigger requirements arising from the GDPR, cybersecurity regulation and – outside the scope of the military exclusion – the obligations laid down in the AI Act. In this sense, the legal qualification of a drone is not a one-off act but a multi-layered process, dependent on construction, function, context of use and the architecture of circulation.<a href="#_ftn18" id="_ftnref18">[18]</a></p>



<p>A separate phenomenon, irreducible to any of the above categories, is the drone swarm. Whereas the existing taxonomy ordered drones according to the features of a single platform – mass, range, mode of communication, degree of autonomy – the swarm is an emergent phenomenon at the level of many platforms operating as one system. Three elements are key here: iteration and coordination between units (drones exchange data on position, target and status in real time, often via a mesh network, with no single point of failure), distributed processing of sensor data (imagery and telemetry from many platforms are aggregated and classified jointly, which increases target-detection effectiveness beyond the sum of individual sensors), and collective control by a single operator or a supervisory algorithm which allocates tasks among the units of the swarm. Ukrainian deployments of this technology – including autonomous swarming systems used since 2025 for mine-laying and target engagement, and large-scale operations combining several dozen to several hundred platforms in a single strike – show that the swarm is no longer an experiment but an operational reality. This has serious legal consequences which remain unresolved to date: whether the swarm should be qualified as a single system subject to a single conformity assessment or as a collection of separate products; who bears responsibility for a decision taken at swarm level when no single platform takes it independently; and how the data protection and radio spectrum management regime is to treat a network whose nodes come into being and disappear in flight.<a href="#_ftn19" id="_ftnref19">[19]</a></p>



<p>This differentiation is not merely terminological or descriptive in character, but produces direct legal effects. The individual technical properties of an unmanned aircraft constitute the triggering conditions for different regulatory regimes of European Union law and national law. In practice, this means that a change in one technical parameter of a drone may lead to a fundamentally different legal qualification of the same device.</p>



<p>The first such parameter is the <strong>Maximum Take-Off Mass (MTOM)</strong>. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 establishes classes of unmanned aircraft systems (C0–C6), whose assignment takes place, among other things, with regard to technical parameters, in particular mass, speed and system equipment. This classification is not purely technical in character – it determines the possibility of conducting operations in the appropriate subcategories of the “open” category provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and affects the manufacturer’s obligations connected with conformity assessment and product class marking.<a href="#_ftn20" id="_ftnref20">[20]</a></p>



<p>The significance of mass is also revealed at the level of the operator’s obligations. Under Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, the operator of an unmanned aircraft system is subject to a registration obligation, inter alia, where it operates an aircraft with a maximum take-off mass of at least <strong>250 g</strong> or – regardless of mass – an aircraft equipped with a sensor capable of capturing personal data, unless the device meets the conditions provided for toys within the meaning of Directive 2009/48/EC. The 250 g mass thus constitutes one of the fundamental legal thresholds in the European drone regulatory system.<a href="#_ftn21" id="_ftnref21">[21]</a></p>



<p>The second parameter of fundamental importance is the <strong>drone’s equipment with sensors enabling the capture of personal data</strong>, above all optical cameras, thermal-imaging cameras, LiDAR scanners or other devices allowing the identification of natural persons. In such a case, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies. Data recorded by a drone may constitute personal data within the meaning of Article 4(1) GDPR, which entails the necessity of ensuring a legal basis for processing in accordance with Article 6 GDPR, complying with the principles set out in Article 5 GDPR and – in the case of operations creating a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons – carrying out a data protection impact assessment in accordance with Article 35 GDPR. These obligations arise regardless of the mass of the aircraft, and therefore also in relation to the smallest drones weighing under 250 g, if they are equipped with devices enabling the capture of personal data.<a href="#_ftn22" id="_ftnref22">[22]</a></p>



<p>This approach is confirmed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its judgment of 11 December 2014 in Case <strong>C-212/13, Ryneš</strong>, the Court held that the recording of images enabling the identification of natural persons constitutes the processing of personal data, even if it takes place with the use of devices monitoring the surroundings of private property. Although the case concerned video surveillance, the conclusions flowing from that judgment apply mutatis mutandis also to unmanned systems equipped with cameras or other observation sensors.<a href="#_ftn23" id="_ftnref23">[23]</a></p>



<p>A further feature determining the legal regime is the <strong>character of the equipment and payload</strong>. Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishes the Union’s system for the control of exports of dual-use items. The qualification of a drone or its components for the list of dual-use items is decided not only by flight parameters but also by the technical capabilities of the device, such as range, autonomy, navigation systems, observation equipment, high-resolution cameras, data transmission systems or specialised sensors. In consequence, two seemingly similar drones may be subject to entirely different export obligations solely on account of differences in their equipment or technical capabilities.<a href="#_ftn24" id="_ftnref24">[24]</a></p>



<p>Even more complex is the legal qualification of systems using <strong>artificial intelligence</strong>. The degree of flight autonomy alone does not automatically determine the applicability of the AI Act. It must first be established whether the given solution constitutes an “AI system” within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. Only at the next stage is it necessary to assess whether the system belongs to the high-risk category in accordance with Article 6 of that regulation and Annexes I and III. This means that two drones with identical flight parameters may be subject to different regulatory obligations solely on account of differences in the software responsible for autonomous navigation, object identification, image analysis or operational decision-making.<a href="#_ftn25" id="_ftnref25">[25]</a></p>



<p>In consequence, the legal qualification of an unmanned aircraft does not follow from a single technical feature, but from the configuration of its constructional, functional and operational properties. The same drone may simultaneously be subject to aviation law regulations, personal data protection provisions, the dual-use item control regime, provisions concerning the protection of critical infrastructure and – in specific cases – Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the AI Act). This signifies a transition from the classic model of sectoral regulation to a model of functional regulation, in which different branches of law simultaneously apply to the same device, protecting different legal goods: aviation safety, privacy, state security, control of trade in technologies and the safety of artificial intelligence systems.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>2.1 · Observation drones – the foundation of situational awareness</strong></h3>



<p>The lowest tier consists of commercial multirotor drones (the Chinese DJI Mavic,<a href="#_ftn26" id="_ftnref26">[26]</a> Ukrainian equivalents of the Zoom class). Their role is to provide <strong>situational awareness</strong> – the category that decides the success of every assault and every defence. A contemporary soldier with an overhead picture operates in an entirely different reality from one who scans the field with his eyes.</p>



<p>In the Ukrainian trade and military-technology discourse,<a href="#_ftn27" id="_ftnref27">[27]</a> the designation ZOOM refers to a specific reconnaissance platform developed by the Ukrainian company Frontline / Frontline Robotics, presented as an alternative to the Chinese DJI Mavic drones. It is a light multirotor observation drone intended for reconnaissance tasks, fire correction and building situational awareness at the tactical level, and therefore for the same operational niche which for a long time was dominantly occupied at the front by Mavic platforms. In this sense, the “Ukrainian equivalent of the Mavic of the ZOOM class” should be understood not as a formal technical category but as the proper name of a domestic platform positioned in the segment of light reconnaissance drones with a substitutive function vis-à-vis DJI. The available sources<a href="#_ftn28" id="_ftnref28">[28]</a> also indicate that ZOOM forms part of a broader Ukrainian trend of building domestic Mavic analogues in order to reduce dependence on foreign civilian commercial systems.</p>



<p>Importantly, despite rapid development these platforms have not disappeared – on both sides of the front, civilian Mavics are still used, whose sole task is to “hang in the air and watch”. This is an observation of primary legal importance: <strong>the most numerous category of platforms used in the conflict consists of mass-produced consumer products, placed on the market under the civil regime, with CE marking, in classes C0–C2.</strong> The same unit which yesterday was subject to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 as an operation in the open category is today carrying out a reconnaissance task outside any EU regime.</p>



<p>The DJI Mavic constitutes a model example of the detachment of the product from the purpose of use. As a commercial product, it was designed and placed on the market for the needs of the civil market: photography, inspection, surveying, recreation and light professional applications. In that order, its legal status is determined by the classic instruments of EU aviation law and product law – in particular the requirements of CE marking, the product classes under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, the operating rules under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, the operator’s obligations, remote identification, geographical zones, registration and – depending on the sensor configuration – data protection requirements. However, the moment that same unit is used on contested territory to build situational awareness, correct fire or conduct military reconnaissance, the logic for which the EU civil aviation regime was built ceases to operate. The product itself as a thing does not change, but its operational function changes, and with it the normative order changes: from the area of product safety and lawful civil operation we pass into the area of military operations, military logistics, the law of armed conflict, export control and state security. It is precisely for this reason that, in the UAV sector, the legal nature of a platform is increasingly determined not by its construction but by the chain of use into which it is incorporated.</p>



<p>A good counterpoint to this transformation is the example of the Ukrainian Mavic equivalents, such as the ZOOM developed by the above-mentioned Frontline Robotics. Where the manufacturer communicates<a href="#_ftn29" id="_ftnref29">[29]</a> that a given complex has been entered in the NATO Codification System (NCS) and has received a NATO Stock Number (NSN), this means not so much the obtaining of civil certification as the product’s entry into the common language of NATO defence logistics: the item is unambiguously identified, classified and prepared to function within the system of supply, storage and military interoperability. The NSN is therefore a catalogue-logistics designation, not a mark of quality or an authorisation for marketing in the sense of consumer law or civil aviation law. The juxtaposition of the Mavic with a platform codified in the NATO system well illustrates the institutional shift: the first product begins its life in the regime of civil commercialisation, while the second is from the outset positioned as an element of the defence architecture and the military supply chain. This difference does not consist solely in technology, but in normative embedding – that is, in whether the product is designed for the civil market or for the order of military logistics and allied interoperability.<a href="#_ftn30" id="_ftnref30">[30]</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">2.2 · FPV drones – a squad weapon and the cost revolution</h3>



<p>The current combat standard in the front-line zone is the FPV (first person view) drone – single-use platforms controlled from a first-person perspective through goggles. This is not, however, a weapon of the individual soldier: the operation of a single drone requires a team of 3–4 persons (pilot, relay operator, sapper, frequently a navigator). The FPV is a squad weapon, like a mortar or a heavy machine gun. One team is able to carry out 25–30 sorties a day, consuming a corresponding number of single-use platforms.<a href="#_ftn31" id="_ftnref31">[31]</a></p>



<p>The scale of this revolution has above all an economic and institutional dimension. It is no accident that industry analyses describe FPV as the “$1,000 revolution”: the essence of the breakthrough lies not solely in the platform itself, but in the relationship between the low unit cost of the means of attack and the high cost of countering it, as well as in the possibility of rapidly scaling production on the basis of a dispersed component market, a simple assembly architecture and short iteration cycles. In this sense, FPV is not merely a new category of drone but a new model of the economics of war – a model in which a relatively cheap, partly standardised and rapidly modifiable platform can generate tactical and operational effects disproportionate to its price. That is precisely why the weight of the analysis shifts from the question of the individual product to the question of the production ecosystem, the capacity for its continuous reproduction, and the institutional conditions that enable the transition from field improvisation to mass production.<a href="#_ftn32" id="_ftnref32">[32]</a></p>



<p>In the case of Ukraine, this capacity is no longer solely the effect of spontaneous industrial mobilisation, but results from the construction of an organised, state-supported defence tech ecosystem, centred on the Brave1 platform.<a href="#_ftn33" id="_ftnref33">[33]</a> Brave1 was launched on 26 April 2023 as a governmental defence tech cluster, co-created by the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council and the Ministry of Strategic Industries,<a href="#_ftn34" id="_ftnref34">[34]</a> with the implementation layer carried out by the Innovation Development Fund. From a legal perspective, this is not a classic commercial-law company nor a single procurement procedure, but rather a public coordination platform combining grant, testing, matchmaking and acceleration functions. Officially, Brave1 describes its role as supporting the development of defence technologies through organisational, informational and financial support for projects, and the platform’s successive initiatives – including grant programmes, a defence innovation marketplace and projects carried out with international partners – show that it operates as an intermediate layer between the technological idea, the prototype, military testing, IP protection and further implementation into procurement or operational use. It is therefore an institutional mechanism for mobilising defence innovation, not a separate, homogeneous statutory regime.</p>



<p>The significance of Brave1 for the FPV market lies in the fact that this platform aggregates dispersed manufacturers and lowers the threshold of entry into the defence sector, shortening the road from design to implementation. Analytical sources indicate that around 1,500 defence tech companies and start-ups are gathered around Brave1, with some more recent analyses speaking of an even greater number of entities functioning within this ecosystem.<a href="#_ftn35" id="_ftnref35">[35]</a> From the point of view of this report, however, more important than the number itself is that Brave1 produces an architecture of scale: new entities can enter the sector via a grant, testing, validation, contact with the military user, intellectual property protection and entry into the procurement circuit, without having to pass immediately through the classic, heavy model of the armaments industry. It is precisely this institutional model that explains why Ukraine was able to move from the early phase of improvisation and purchases from the commercial market to a phase in which drone production began to be treated as a mass state capability.<a href="#_ftn36" id="_ftnref36">[36]</a></p>



<p>The volumes of this production are unprecedented. Industry analyses and statements by representatives of the Ukrainian authorities cite figures of the order of about 800 thousand drones in 2023, about 2 million in 2024, production capacities reaching 4 million annually, and subsequently procurement plans covering about 4.5 million FPV drones in 2025. In parallel, declared targets for 2026 have also appeared in public circulation, according to which Ukraine would aim for a level of 7 million drones annually, presented as a volume many times exceeding American production. Even if the individual figures must be treated with caution and a distinction must be drawn between actual production, production capacity, procurement plan and political-industrial target, the direction itself is unambiguous: Ukraine has transformed drones – especially FPV – from an auxiliary technology into an industrial strategic resource, whose development depends no longer solely on the technical capability of an individual manufacturer, but on state-supported organisational, grant, testing and procurement infrastructure. In this sense, Brave1 operates as a multiplier of production sovereignty: it not only supports a specific project, but builds the conditions in which the entire sector can reproduce itself, scale and become independent of imports of ready-made platforms.<a href="#_ftn37" id="_ftnref37">[37]</a></p>



<p>In the legal and economic layer, it is particularly significant that Brave1 is not limited to the distribution of public funds from the Ukrainian budget. Over time, this platform has also been opened to international grants, partnerships with Western states and institutions, and channels of cooperation with the NATO procurement and interoperability environment. This means that the Ukrainian FPV market is today developing at the intersection of national law, mechanisms of public support for innovation, defence cooperation with foreign partners, and the wartime logic of rapid testing and deployment. From this perspective, the success of Ukrainian unmanned production should not be described solely as an industrial success, but also as a success in the design of institutional instruments which have made it possible to combine thousands of smaller entities into one functional ecosystem capable of delivering effects at the scale of millions of units annually.</p>



<p>The mass character of FPV production and the dispersal of suppliers in Ukraine are not solely a spontaneous effect of wartime mobilisation, but the result of the institutional ordering of the defence tech ecosystem. The importance of Brave1 lies precisely in the fact that this platform does not replace the individual manufacturer or the classic armaments industry, but creates an organisational framework within which hundreds – and, according to the available sources, around one and a half thousand – entities can function as elements of a single innovation-production system. From a legal and economic perspective, Brave1 is therefore not merely a sectoral cluster, but an instrument of the state ordering of defence innovation: it shortens the road from idea to test, from test to grant, from grant to implementation, and in the longer perspective – to an order or operational use. This architecture can be described most cleanly at three levels: institutional, project and operational.</p>



<p class="has-pale-pink-background-color has-background"><strong>1. The institutional level</strong></p>



<p>At the institutional level, Brave1 functions as a governmental initiative / defence tech cluster of Ukraine, launched on 26 April 2023 and co-created by the key state organs responsible for security, defence and technology policy, in particular the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council and the Ministry of Strategic Industries. The official description further indicates that the initiative is implemented by the Innovation Development Fund, which allows Brave1 to be treated as an instrument embedded at the interface of public administration, the security sector and state innovation policy. It does not follow from the publicly available materials that Brave1 is a self-standing entity established by a single separate statute or a single specific normative act; it is more accurate to conceive of it as a state coordination platform whose status results from the combination of the competences of public institutions and the implementation mechanisms of the innovation development fund. It is precisely this institutional embedding that explains why Brave1 was able to become a focal point for a broad ecosystem of drone manufacturers, including FPV platforms, instead of remaining merely a grant programme or a sectoral initiative of limited reach.</p>



<p class="has-pale-pink-background-color has-background"><strong>2. The project level</strong></p>



<p>At the project level, the Brave1 cluster has been linked with the European Union-financed undertaking EU4UA Defence Tech, functioning publicly under the title “Strengthening the Innovation Capacities of the Ukrainian Defence Technological Industrial Base”. It follows from the available sources that this is not a self-standing act of secondary Union law of the kind of a regulation or directive, but an implementation and grant project, officially announced by the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine within the EEAS structure, financed by the European Union and implemented by BRDO in cooperation with Brave1. In this architecture, Brave1 plays the role of the Ukrainian cluster and access point to the defence tech ecosystem, while the project layer gives this ecosystem an additional dimension of internationalisation, grant support and linkage with the policy of strengthening the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base. The formal specification of this layer does not, however, take place through a single “founding act” of statutory or Union rank, but through a set of project and operational documents: the EEAS institutional communication, the BRDO project description and the regulations of the grant programme.</p>



<p>Particularly significant from the point of view of a legal report is that the project layer finds its concrete expression in the draft grant agreement concluded between the Innovation Development Fund and the beneficiary being the developer of a specific technology.<a href="#_ftn38" id="_ftnref38">[38]</a> This means that entry into the Brave1 / EU4UA Defence Tech system does not lead directly to a relationship with a Union institution in the typical model of a European Commission grant, but to a contractual relationship governed by Ukrainian law with a public entity on the Ukrainian side. From this perspective, the project level of Brave1 should be understood as a space in which the dispersed sector of manufacturers – including creators of FPV technology – is drawn into a structured model of public support, but at the price of entering a specific contractual regime. Of particular importance here are the clauses concerning ownership and intellectual property rights: the draft grant agreement provides that ownership rights and rights to IP created with the use of grant funds as a rule remain with the developer, which at first sight may suggest a model friendly to commercialisation and to the retention of private control over the result of the project. At the same time, however, the same draft agreement grants the fund a broad, free-of-charge entitlement to use – at its own discretion – all documents and information obtained in the course of the granting of the grant, insofar as such use remains consistent with existing IP rights. This construction therefore does not lead to a simple takeover of IP by the state, but creates a hybrid model of control in which formal ownership remains with the developer, while the fund secures for itself a strong position of access and use in relation to the documentation and information connected with the project. In legal practice, this means that the key question is no longer only who owns the result, but also how broadly the scope of “documents and information” will be interpreted, what technical material is transferred to the fund, and where the boundary runs between the authorised use of documentation and indirect interference with the developer’s economic exclusivity (in accordance with Article 5(1) and (2) of the grant form: “<em>Ownership rights and property rights to intellectual property created as a result of the use of Grant funds belong to the Developer, unless otherwise specified by the Developer.”; ”The Developer grants the Fund the right to use, free of charge and at its own discretion, all documents and information obtained in the process of providing the Grant, if such use complies with existing intellectual property rights</em>”) (see footnote 38).</p>



<p>This tension is further reinforced by the clause on governing law and disputes, according to which the agreement is to be interpreted under the law of Ukraine, and any disputes are to be resolved first by way of negotiations and then in accordance with the procedure provided for by Ukrainian law and/or before a court. In the functional sense, Brave1 / EU4UA Defence Tech therefore remains an undertaking co-financed and politically legitimised by the European Union, but its contractual core – at least at the level of the relationship with the developer – has a clearly Ukrainian jurisdictional embedding. It is precisely this element that should close the analysis of the project level: Brave1 is not solely a mechanism for stimulating innovation, but also a system in which the Ukrainian state, through the innovation development fund and the contractual template, shapes the rules of access to technology, documentation and the results of R&amp;D work. Thanks to this, the cluster can perform the function of a multiplier of mass and scale of production, but it does so in a formula which combines the retention of private intellectual property with a public safeguarding of informational and operational access. It is precisely this combination – and not the mere number of manufacturers – that explains why the dispersed market of FPV suppliers can be integrated into a single functional ecosystem of state-supported defence capability.<a href="#_ftn39" id="_ftnref39">[39]</a></p>



<p class="has-pale-pink-background-color has-background"><strong>3. The operational level</strong></p>



<p>At the operational level, the basic source document is not a general political communication but the regulations of the grant programme, i.e.&nbsp;the Regulations for the Brave1 EU4UA Defence Tech Grant Program, made available in the Legal Terms section of the programme. It is precisely this document that constitutes the most useful source for practical analysis: it determines the framework of participation, the conditions of application, the function of grant support and the operational rules of the call within the initiative linked with EU4UA Defence Tech. In combination with the EEAS communication and the BRDO project description, this document creates the actual operational basis of the programme: the institutional communication legitimises the project and its financing by the EU, the project description indicates its purpose and place in the architecture of cooperation, while the grant regulations order the manner in which undertakings and technology teams can enter the support system. From the perspective of a legal report, it is precisely this operational layer that is key to understanding how dispersed manufacturers of FPV and other defence technologies have been gathered around a single cluster: not through an abstract political declaration, but through a set of specific procedures, grants, tests, validations and pathways to implementation. As a result, Brave1 operates as an institutional multiplier of production capability – it not only finances innovation but organises its transition into a mass state capability.<a href="#_ftn40" id="_ftnref40">[40]</a></p>



<p>The regulatory consequence of this scale is under-appreciated. Product certification regimes – both aviation and armaments – were built around the assumption of small-series production of goods with a long life cycle and high unit value. A model in which a platform comes into being within a week, is consumed within hours and undergoes continuous design modification in reaction to the adversary’s countermeasures is structurally incompatible with that assumption. No European conformity regime was designed for a product whose iteration cycle is shorter than the conformity assessment cycle.</p>



<p>That is precisely why the Ukrainian mass production of FPV should not be described solely as the result of wartime improvisation or of the cost advantage of a cheap platform over an expensive defensive effector, but also as the result of a consciously built institutional architecture in which Brave1 performs the function of a common node for the state, the military, grant-givers and the dispersed defence tech industry.<a href="#_ftn41" id="_ftnref41">[41]</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>2.3 · Communications, the radio horizon and relays</strong></h3>



<p>The effectiveness of FPV depends on communications to a degree perhaps greater than on the quality of the platform itself, and the absolutely fundamental category here is the <strong>radio horizon</strong>. The radio horizon is not a separate normative concept of EU law or of Polish aviation law, but a technical-operational category describing the limit of effective propagation of a radio signal in communications requiring a line of sight between transmitter and receiver. In practice, this means that the range of control and data transmission depends not only on the power of the devices, but also on antenna height, terrain obstacles, built-up areas, forestation and the shape of the terrain. The legal significance of this category is therefore indirect in character: the concept itself is not regulated as a statutory definition, but the phenomena it describes enter legal analysis through the regime of radio equipment, spectrum management, electronic communications, and the safety and reliability requirements for unmanned operations, especially BVLOS and within U-space.<a href="#_ftn42" id="_ftnref42">[42]</a></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>BVLOS – flight beyond visual line of sight, i.e. beyond the operator’s visual range.</strong><br><strong>In practice, it is precisely this category of operations that most needs stable, trusted and legally permissible relay infrastructure.</strong></li>



<li><strong>U-space – simplifying, this is the digital drone traffic management environment, created so that a larger number of drones can fly safely, predictably and in an automated manner, especially in more difficult operations and denser airspace.</strong></li>
</ul>



<p>The control signal and image transmission in classic FPV systems require as clean a line of sight as possible, which is why their propagation is attenuated not only by buildings, forest walls or dense development, but also by the relief of the terrain itself: depressions, escarpments, embankments, forested ridges, rural development and all obstacles that “break” the connection between the operator and the platform. In the realities of the Russo-Ukrainian war, this means that the advantage does not follow solely from the flight parameters of the drone, but from the ability to raise the communications point above terrain obstacles and to maintain a stable transmission channel despite jamming, masking and target movement. Hence the great importance acquired by relays – signal repeaters mounted on masts, on ground vehicles, and most often on separate drones hovering higher than the combat platform. In the simplest variant, such a relay is a separate item of equipment, a kind of “communications superstructure” added to the system; in more advanced solutions, the relay function becomes part of a larger architecture, in which one drone carries the payload, a second observes, a third provides retransmission, and further nodes take over part of the traffic in a network model. This means that the relay need not be understood solely as a single device purchased separately – increasingly it is a separate technological layer, which may take the form of a radio module, an additional aerial platform, a ground set, or a node in a mesh network. It is precisely here that one of the most interesting trends appears: the transition from a single repeater to a layered architecture, and then to dynamic mesh networks, in which every modem or selected platforms can simultaneously transmit and repeat the signal, creating a self-repairing chain of communications. In such an arrangement, the radio horizon problem is no longer solved by a single device, but by a system of systems, functionally approaching a swarm with a division of roles. This in turn means that <strong>the most valuable IP in this segment may not reside in the airframe at all, but in the signal-routing algorithms</strong>, <strong>node switching, jamming resistance, bandwidth management and the integration of the relay function with the combat or reconnaissance role</strong>. Competitive advantage may here be protected as a patent, software, a trade secret or systemic know-how; in practice, value increasingly shifts from “the drone itself” to the communications and control architecture which allows the platform to operate effectively outside the classic line of sight. In this sense, the fight for advantage in the air simultaneously becomes a fight over who will build a higher-elevated, more resilient and more intelligently managed transmission network than the adversary.</p>



<p>This architecture has legal significance extending beyond the battlefield. <strong>Retransmission</strong> is in essence the construction of an <strong>ad hoc, mobile radio communications network</strong> – and thus an activity which, in the civil regime, is subject to electronic communications law, spectrum management and the requirements of Directive 2014/53/EU on radio equipment. The civil equivalent of this architecture – relay networks for BVLOS operations – is one of the fundamental implementation challenges of the U-space framework.</p>



<p><strong>RED 2014/53/EU – this is the radio equipment regime, i.e.&nbsp;not only “does the drone work”, but whether its communications modules:</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>lawfully use the spectrum,</strong></li>



<li><strong>do not interfere with other systems,</strong></li>



<li><strong>are safe and electromagnetically compatible.</strong></li>
</ul>



<p>The retransmission architecture has legal significance extending far beyond the battlefield, because from the civil perspective it in essence means the construction of an <strong>ad hoc, mobile electronic communications network for unmanned operations</strong>. What in wartime conditions takes the form of an improvised or semi-improvised radio bridge between operator and drone becomes, in the civil environment, a multi-layered issue: <strong>it concerns not only the aircraft itself, but also radio equipment, frequencies, electromagnetic compatibility, data integrity, network resilience and liability for the continuity of the communications service</strong>. For this reason, at least three legal orders enter here in parallel.<a href="#_ftn43" id="_ftnref43">[43]</a> First, the law of electronic communications and spectrum management, because the relay is no longer merely “part of the drone”, but an element of transmission infrastructure affecting the <strong>radio spectrum and requiring conformity with the rules on the use of bands</strong>. Second, Directive 2014/53/EU (RED), i.e.&nbsp;the radio equipment regime, whose essence is to ensure that equipment uses the spectrum efficiently, does not interfere with the operation of other systems and satisfies safety and compatibility requirements. Third, the U-space framework, which is not “a single drone system” but a regulatory model of highly digitalised and partly automated management of a large number of unmanned operations, in particular also BVLOS (beyond visual line of sight) flights. Relay networks for BVLOS operations therefore in practice mean a model in which the continuity of the flight does not depend on a simple, linear operator-drone connection, but on an entire chain of communications services, identification, data transmission and coordination with the digital airspace. That is precisely why one of the main implementation challenges of U-space is not the mere fact that the drone flies beyond visual range, but who is responsible, and on what terms, for the communications layer sustaining such a flight: for the reliability of the channel, the interoperability of the equipment, information security, jamming resistance, cybersecurity and the technical conformity of the entire transmission chain. In civil conditions, the problem which at the front is solved by an improvised relay or a mesh network therefore becomes a regulatory problem of the highest rank: the question is no longer only whether the drone may fly, but whether there exists a lawful and secure communications infrastructure allowing it to fly outside the simple logic of direct contact.<a href="#_ftn44" id="_ftnref44">[44]</a></p>



<p>If, however, the relay and the mesh network<a href="#_ftn45" id="_ftnref45">[45]</a> are an attempt to solve the radio horizon problem within the logic of radio emission, then fibre-optic drones represent an attempt to step outside that logic altogether. Whereas the relay architecture endeavours to elevate, stabilise and disperse the signal, the optical fibre eliminates the need for its emission in radio space, and thereby undermines a considerable part of the existing assumptions of both counter-drone technologies and regulation based on the detectability and jammability of the signal.</p>



<p><strong>Mesh network, Shahed/Geran and the shift from loitering munition to a networked strike system</strong></p>



<p>One of the most interesting and at the same time most disturbing phenomena of the current phase of the drone war is the transition from a simple point-to-point control model to a mesh network architecture, that is a lattice or grid network. Unlike the classic arrangement in which the operator communicates directly with a single platform or via a single relay, the mesh network consists of many nodes capable of simultaneously receiving, forwarding and amplifying the signal. Each such node can be part of a larger transmission system: a ground modem, an intermediate station, an observation platform or the drone itself. In practice, this means that communications do not depend on one channel and one transmission route, but can be dynamically reconfigured depending on which elements of the network remain active, where the platforms are located and what the jamming environment looks like. That is precisely why the mesh network is an architecture more resilient, flexible and difficult to disable than a classic linear connection. It is no longer a “link to the drone”, but a dispersed operational network.</p>



<p>In relation to heavy platforms of the Shahed/Geran type, such an architecture has breakthrough significance, because it blurs the boundary between a loitering munition and a network-controlled or network-supervised drone. Traditionally, loitering munitions are perceived as an essentially single-use means flying along a route programmed in advance or corrected to a limited extent. Meanwhile, equipping heavy drones with mesh modems, retransmission nodes and external relay points means that the system ceases to be merely a “blind carrier” executing a sequence of commands recorded once. It enters a more flexible model: it can maintain communications deeper over the adversary’s territory, benefit from mutual signal amplification, and in some configurations also from more up-to-date mission supervision. It is precisely for this reason that analysts speak of the blurring of the boundary between the classic loitering munition and the one-way attack UAV with elements of networked command. In other words: if the “Shahed” begins to function as part of a communications system, it ceases to be solely a single-use kinetic effect and begins to resemble a networked means of aerial attack, whose effectiveness depends not only on the airframe and warhead, but on the data transmission architecture.</p>



<p>This is very well illustrated by the Belarusian case from the beginning of 2026, when reports appeared in the analytical space of Russia’s use of relay stations and other network nodes supporting the flights of Shaheds operating from that direction, and subsequently of their elimination by the Ukrainian side.<a href="#_ftn46" id="_ftnref46">[46]</a> Even if part of the details of those events remains based on front-line, technical and media sources rather than on full, open official material, the operational sense of such a solution is itself logical and coherent: if the platform is to fly deep, maintain communications and benefit from the effect of mutual retransmission, then the network cannot end at the drone itself. It must have external nodes sustaining the communications architecture, whether in the form of border stations, relay towers, ground amplification points or other supporting elements. The destruction of such nodes does not mean the destruction of a single drone, but a strike at the network layer which makes the entire system more dangerous. In this sense, Ukraine is not merely destroying the carrier of a warhead, but degrading the communications infrastructure of the attack.</p>



<p>Technologically, the most dangerous aspect is that the mesh network changes the logic of defence. In the classic model, it was enough to cut the connection, destroy the platform or jam a single channel. In the grid model, the adversary can attempt to:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>redirect traffic along another route,</strong></li>



<li><strong>use other drones as relays,</strong></li>



<li><strong>dynamically change the structure of communications,</strong></li>



<li><strong>combine strike, reconnaissance and retransmission platforms into a single arrangement.</strong></li>
</ul>



<p><strong>This in turn naturally brings such a system closer to a swarm with a division of roles</strong>. Not all platforms have to attack. Some may perform the role of:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>communications nodes,</li>



<li>observers,</li>



<li>decoys,</li>



<li>retransmission carriers,</li>



<li>elements building the resilience of the network.</li>
</ul>



<p>This means that advantage increasingly depends not on a “better drone” but on a better systemic architecture. It is precisely here that IP of the highest value is born: not in the airframe itself, but in the modems, transmission protocols, routing algorithms, jamming resistance, throughput management, node authorisation and the integration of the relay role with the combat role. Solutions of this kind may be protected as a patent, software, a trade secret or systemic know-how. In practice, market and military value therefore shifts from the individual product to the network architecture, which may be more difficult to copy than the drone itself.</p>



<p>This shift also has very significant legal consequences. First, the mesh network is not directly a legal category of aviation law or EU drone law; it is above all a technical concept. However, its legal significance is indirectly enormous, because it describes the structure of communications on which the operation of unmanned platforms depends. The moment such a network is analysed outside the theatre of hostilities, we immediately enter the area of electronic communications law, spectrum management and the radio equipment regime. For if the effectiveness of the drone depends on a dispersed arrangement of transmitters, modems and relay nodes, then we are no longer dealing solely with an aircraft, but with regulated communications infrastructure. Here, Directive 2014/53/EU (RED) gains significance, because all radio transmission modules – especially when they form a system of mutual relays – must be analysed from the perspective of the efficient use of the spectrum, electromagnetic compatibility and equipment safety. In such a framing, the mesh network is not only a technical feature but a question of whether the radio network being built conforms to the rules on the use of bands and does not generate new risks for other communications systems.</p>



<p>Second, the mesh network has a cybersecurity and information security dimension. Every additional node means not only greater flexibility of the communications architecture, but also a greater attack surface: more points vulnerable to takeover, impersonation of an authorised element of the system, spoofing, jamming or the injection of false data. The injection of false data should here be understood as the introduction into the network of signals, messages or parameters which appear authentic but are intended to mislead the other nodes, cause an erroneous reconfiguration of connections, direct the platforms along another route or distort the picture of the operational situation. The more the system passes from a simple point-to-point connection to a dispersed lattice network, the more crucial becomes not the mere transmission of the signal, but trust in its source, integrity and authenticity. That is precisely why mesh technology shifts the analysis from the level of simple drone control towards the issues of node authorisation, data integrity and the resilience of the communications architecture to manipulation.</p>



<p>The legal dimension of this phenomenon is multi-layered. First, the more the effectiveness of the system depends on a multi-node transmission architecture, the less sufficient it is to treat it solely as an aircraft, and the more necessary it becomes to conceive of it as an element of regulated radiocommunications infrastructure – and thus also through the prism of the radio equipment regime, spectrum use and electromagnetic compatibility, with which the significance of Directive 2014/53/EU (RED) is indirectly connected. Second, the strategic value of the system shifts from the airframe itself to the modems, antennas, amplifiers, jamming-resistance systems and routing software, which reinforces their significance as dual-use components. Third, the mesh architecture creates the conditions for dispersed functional autonomy: it enables the redirection of the flight during the mission, the use of other platforms as relays, the dynamic alteration of the communications structure and the combination of strike, reconnaissance and retransmission platforms into a single arrangement. In the case of heavy Shahed/Geran drones, this leads to the blurring of the boundary between the classic loitering munition and a network-supported means of aerial attack. The reports of the use of external relay stations on the Belarusian direction and of their elimination by the Ukrainian side show well that the object of the fight is now not only the drone itself, but also the communications layer which sustains its operation. In this sense, the drone war simultaneously becomes a war for control over dispersed data transmission infrastructure.</p>



<p>In a dispersed communications system, security no longer depends on a single link, but on the integrity of the entire arrangement of mutual trust between nodes. This makes the legal analysis of such systems naturally shift also towards questions of:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>signal integrity,</li>



<li>device authorisation,</li>



<li>resistance to manipulation,</li>



<li>the security of data transmitted between nodes,</li>



<li>and, in the civil equivalent, also towards regimes functionally approximating the requirements imposed on high-risk digital infrastructure.</li>
</ul>



<p>Third, mesh technology has an obvious significance for dual-use export control. While the airframe itself may be relatively simple, the true value and strategic sensitivity is concentrated in the communications components: modems, amplifiers, antennas, jamming-resistance systems, routing and network management software. It is precisely these elements that most easily move from the civil market to the military one and vice versa. In consequence, the components building mesh networks may be analysed not only as part of the end product, but as self-standing dual-use components, whose export, technical transfer and integration may be subject to a separate licensing and security assessment.</p>



<p>Fourth, the mesh network leads us to the boundary of the issues of AI and functional autonomy. The lattice network itself is not yet artificial intelligence, but when it begins to support:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>automatic selection of the signal route,</li>



<li>adaptive node switching,</li>



<li>coordination of multiple platforms,</li>



<li>sharing of observations and targeting data,</li>



<li>maintenance of the mission despite the loss of part of the system’s elements,</li>
</ul>



<p>then in practice we approach an architecture in which operational decisions no longer flow solely from a direct human command, but from the dispersed operation of the system. This gives rise to the classic questions of responsibility, predictability and the qualification of such a network as an element of a more autonomous means of warfare. In the European context, this tension is particularly interesting, because civil applications of AI and communications are subject to ever greater regulation, while military applications of networked autonomy remain to a large extent outside the scope of the classic civil conformity regimes.</p>



<p>Finally, from the perspective of the law of armed conflict, the mesh network changes the very object of what is regarded as a significant component of combat capability. If the effectiveness of the system depends on a dispersed layer of relays, modems and relay stations, then the target of military significance becomes not only the drone itself, but also the communications infrastructure sustaining its operation. This shifts the analysis from the level of the individual effector to the level of the entire network architecture. One might say that, in such a model, the drone war is becoming to an ever greater degree a war for control over the aerial and border-zone tactical internet.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>2.4 · Fibre-optic drones – the end of the jamming era</strong></h3>



<p>The breakthrough proved to be drones controlled by <strong>optical fibre</strong> – a spool of thin glass fibre unwound in flight. The solution has its costs (the mass of the fibre limits range, payload and manoeuvrability), but it eliminates two problems at once: the radio horizon ceases to matter, and the drone cannot be jammed, because it emits no radio signal. It is an electronically “mute” platform – practically undetectable by RF detectors and resistant to electronic warfare.</p>



<p>Fibre-optic drones appeared en masse in August 2024 in the Kursk area,<a href="#_ftn47" id="_ftnref47">[47]</a> where Russian platforms of this type – with a range of over 30 km and a “crystal-clear” image – paralysed Ukrainian logistics along the sole supply route. As one Ukrainian medic put it, logistics simply collapsed, because fibre-optic drones were monitoring all the routes. By January 2026, fibre-optic variants accounted in some sectors for 30–50% of Russian FPV operations and around 15% of Ukrainian ones. In 2025, countering fibre-optic drones became the central theme of the NATO Innovation Challenge.<a href="#_ftn48" id="_ftnref48">[48]</a></p>



<p>The regulatory significance of this category is difficult to overestimate and remains unnoticed in the public debate. <strong>The entire European acquis on countering unauthorised unmanned operations – both technical and normative – rests on the assumption that the drone emits a radio signal</strong>.<a href="#_ftn49" id="_ftnref49">[49]</a> On this assumption were built the remote identification requirement, RF detection systems, the jamming powers granted to the services and, from June 2026, to critical infrastructure operators. The fibre-optic platform invalidates each of those mechanisms simultaneously. Regulation aimed at a specific relay technology ages faster than the legislative process in which it comes into being.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">2.5 · Electronic warfare and spoofing</h3>



<p>Classic <strong>jamming</strong> consists in generating noise on radio frequencies so that the drone cannot distinguish the operator’s signal from the interference and loses control. For platforms flying to preset coordinates (deep strike), <strong>spoofing</strong> is used instead – the substitution of the satellite navigation signal, as a result of which the drone “thinks” it is somewhere else and corrects its flight in the wrong direction.</p>



<p>This distinction translates directly into the choice of defensive means – but also into legal qualification. <strong>Jamming is an interference with the radio spectrum</strong>, and thus with a good administered by the state and protected by electronic communications provisions; <strong>spoofing is an interference with the integrity of the signal of a satellite navigation system</strong>,<a href="#_ftn50" id="_ftnref50">[50]</a> and thus with infrastructure of a global character, the disruption of which has effects far beyond the target. The side effects of both measures – loss of the GNSS signal by civil aviation, maritime transport, power grids synchronised by satellite time – are a classic example of damage in which establishing the causal link and the responsible entity is exceptionally difficult. We return to this issue in section 4.3.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">2.6 · Heavy platforms – bombers, wings, loitering munitions</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Heavy bombers</strong> (Ukr. Vampire,<a id="_ftnref51" href="#_ftn51">[51]</a> colloquially “Baba Yaga”<a id="_ftnref52" href="#_ftn52">[52]</a>) – multirotors carrying anti-tank mines and performing logistics tasks (transport of ammunition, water, medicines). They require heavier means of engagement – 12.7/14.5 mm machine guns with thermal imaging.</li>



<li><strong>Light wings</strong> (Rus. Molniya<a id="_ftnref53" href="#_ftn53">[53]</a>) – cheap long-range airframes, of low precision but mass-produced; they are sometimes armed with incendiary charges.</li>



<li><strong>Loitering munitions</strong> (Rus. Lancet,<a id="_ftnref54" href="#_ftn54">[54]</a> Ukr. Bulava,<a id="_ftnref55" href="#_ftn55">[55]</a> Pol. Warmate<a id="_ftnref56" href="#_ftn56">[56]</a>) – advanced platforms for the elimination of artillery and anti-aircraft systems; difficult to shoot down owing to low-detectability materials and their flight profile.</li>
</ul>



<p>The category of loitering munitions deserves separate legal attention. It is a construction at the boundary between an unmanned aircraft and a missile: a platform which remains in the task area for an extended time, searching for a target, and then carries out the strike. The blurring of the boundary between “aircraft” and “munition” has consequences in each of the regimes analysed – from classification on the control list of dual-use items, through the intra-EU transfer regime, to the question of the character of human control over the use of force.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-b829efbeca099a974d06d935cfe43b95">2.7 · Deep strike and autonomy – Fire Point as a case study</h3>



<p>The highest tier consists of heavy long-range platforms. The model example is the Ukrainian <strong>FP-1.</strong> The Ukrainian FP-1,<a href="#_ftn57" id="_ftnref57">[57]</a> developed by Fire Point, is a one-way strike drone of light construction,<a href="#_ftn58" id="_ftnref58">[58]</a> including fuselage elements made of plywood, powered by a two-cylinder engine; industry and media sources estimate its unit cost at approximately USD 55,000–58,000, i.e.&nbsp;significantly below the level of comparable systems. In mid-2025, a rapid increase in the scale of production was reported, already counted in hundreds of units weekly and over 100 units daily, and in July 2026 drones attributed to the FP-1 family were linked to the strike on the refinery in Omsk, one of the deepest Ukrainian long-range attacks.<a href="#_ftn59" id="_ftnref59">[59]</a></p>



<p>This case study is instructive for three reasons. First, it shows the <strong>inversion of the classic cost curve</strong> of the defence industry: a construction made of commercially available materials achieves an operational effect comparable to systems of many times higher cost. Second, it demonstrates the <strong>scalability of production outside the traditional armaments chain</strong> – growth from 30 to over 100 units daily within a few months is difficult under the regime of classic military certification. Third, this problem illustrates that range is not solely a technical parameter, but also a regulatory category. This follows from the logic of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which – although it is not a classic international agreement in treaty form, but an informal export control regime based on common guidelines and a control annex – has long covered not only classic missiles but also unmanned aerial systems capable of carrying a payload over considerable distances. The most restrictive layer, i.e.&nbsp;Category I, encompasses complete rocket systems and unmanned aerial systems capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, together with specified subsystems and technologies. This means that a platform with a range exceeding 2,500 km – even if it does not always satisfy every historical parameter of a classic missile system – enters the same type of strategic regulatory sensitivity which for decades has triggered the sharpest logic of proliferation control. In European practice, this logic was subsequently absorbed into the dual-use regime, in which references to the MTCR remain an element of the system of control of exports of technology and means of delivery (in EU law, the logic of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was taken over into the system of control of exports of dual-use items primarily by Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which in recital 3 refers to the multilateral export control regimes, including expressly the MTCR, and then develops this logic operationally in Annex I, containing the EU dual-use control list). In this sense, great range is not merely an engineering feature, but a legally relevant feature, because from a specified threshold it triggers a normative order closer to proliferation control, export control and strategic security than to the ordinary regulation of a civil UAV.<a href="#_ftn60" id="_ftnref60">[60]</a></p>



<p>The boundary between control and autonomy is blurring. Placing a satellite communications terminal on a drone allows it to be controlled from enormous distances; the use of machine vision algorithms enables autonomous terminal guidance onto the target after loss of communications.<a href="#_ftn61" id="_ftnref61">[61]</a> It is precisely this last feature – <strong>terminal autonomy, i.e.&nbsp;the capability to complete the task without a human in the decision loop</strong> – that is the heart of the legal problem to which we now turn.</p>



<p>Conceptual precision, usually lacking in the public debate, is worth preserving here. Autonomy is not a binary feature but a spectrum encompassing at least: (i) flight stabilisation and route keeping, (ii) navigation without a satellite signal using terrain image correlation, (iii) automatic detection and classification of objects, (iv) automatic tracking of a target designated by the operator in the terminal phase, (v) independent selection of a target within a designated area. Legal regimes – both the EU Artificial Intelligence Act and the discussion of autonomous weapon systems within the framework of the CCW Convention – react differently to each of these levels, and the distinction between (iv) and (v) is in practice the most difficult to prove in evidentiary proceedings and at the same time the most legally momentous.<a href="#_ftn62" id="_ftnref62">[62]</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-c24f92bca5ae43f507f4405514293ee8">2.8 · The countermeasure layer – a C-UAS taxonomy</h3>



<p>Symmetrically to the strike layer, the countermeasure layer (_counter-UAS_, C-UAS) has developed, which for the European civil market today has greater economic significance than the strike layer itself. Its taxonomy comprises two segments.</p>



<p><strong>Detection and identification:</strong> radio sensors (monitoring of control and image-transmission bands), low-power radars, acoustic sensors, optoelectronic systems with a thermal channel, and – increasingly – fusion of data from multiple sensors with machine-learning-based classification. It is precisely in this segment that artificial intelligence performs a critical role, and it is precisely this segment that is fully civil, and therefore covered by the EU regime without exclusions.</p>



<p><strong>Neutralisation:</strong> jamming of the control link and image transmission, spoofing of satellite navigation, taking over control of the platform, mechanical means (nets, including those launched from interceptor platforms), kinetic means (from smoothbore weapons to artillery systems with programmable ammunition), directed energy (lasers, high-power pulse) and interceptor drones.</p>



<p>This distinction is legally significant, because <strong>each of the effectors is subject to a different regime</strong>: jamming and spoofing fall under electronic communications law and spectrum management; kinetic means fall under the law on weapons and ammunition and liability for damage caused by falling debris; taking over control is an interference with an ICT system, and thus potentially an act criminalised under criminal law if it does not have an express statutory basis. A separate problem is that effective detection requires data processing – on which see section 3.7.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-fc4ca7a709b60c51cc6529ffa9fbd3e2">2.9 The kill chain and the place of the human in the loop</h3>



<p>For the legal analysis of autonomy, it is indispensable to break the process down into links. Adopting a simplified model of the kill chain: <strong>a)</strong> <strong>detection b) identification and classification c) prioritisation d) engagement decision e) terminal guidance f) effects assessment</strong>. The debate on “meaningful human control” in essence concerns the question in which of these links the human takes the constitutive decision and whether at that moment he has information and time sufficient for that decision to be real rather than formal in character.</p>



<p>In the practice of contemporary drone operations: the first and second links are increasingly automated (image classifiers), the fourth link remains on the human side, and the fifth link is sometimes autonomous out of technical necessity – after loss of the link. Legally, this means that <strong>the “human in the loop” construction rests on a link of which the adversary consistently tries to deprive it</strong>. The argument that loss of communications is a technical circumstance and not a design decision loses its force at the moment when the manufacturer designs the platform on the assumption of operation in a heavily jammed environment.</p>



<p>An analogous structure – with different consequences – occurs on the civil side. Article 14 of the Artificial Intelligence Act requires that a high-risk system be designed so that natural persons can effectively oversee it, including understanding its limitations, correctly interpreting its output and deciding not to use it or to interrupt its operation. This requirement is technically identical to the postulate of meaningful human control – with the difference that on the civil track it is a legal norm backed by a sanction, while on the military track it remains the subject of unfinished international negotiations.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-2017345879af2cf699291d5c1d972a9a">2.10 · The data layer – the drone as a sensory platform</h3>



<p>The last layer, systematically omitted in technical analyses, is the data layer. Each of the platforms described is above all a <strong>sensor generating a stream of data</strong>: visual and thermal imagery, telemetry, position, radio spectrum parameters. The operational value of an unmanned system today lies to a lesser degree in the platform and to a greater degree in the chain of processing of those data – from transmission, through storage and annotation, to use in training image-recognition models.</p>



<p>From this arises a chain which crosses the civil-military boundary in both directions. Collections of recordings from combat operations constitute training material of a value impossible to obtain in laboratory conditions – and they are used to perfect classifiers, which subsequently find their way into civil systems (infrastructure monitoring, border protection, crisis management). In the other direction: models trained on civil collections of aerial imagery constitute the base for target-recognition systems.</p>



<p>This bidirectional flow is – as we demonstrate in section 4.5 – the area in which the EU data protection and artificial intelligence regimes come into contact with the defence exclusions in the manner that is legally most unclear and practically most momentous.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-b40798181a77e5f0106eeefd5df8d31e">2.11 · The innovation spiral as a law of development</h3>



<p>Drone warfare is a spiral process: each innovation provokes a countermeasure, and that forces the next innovation: the observation Mavic; drops; FPV; jamming; the relay; the optical fibre; satellite communications; satellite jamming; AI autonomy; interceptor drones.</p>



<p>For the regulator, this means that <strong>every norm aimed at a specific technology ages at the pace of that spiral</strong>. This is an argument in favour of regulation based on effects and on the level of risk, rather than on a catalogue of technical solutions – and at the same time an explanation of why acts based on risk classification (the Artificial Intelligence Act) have a greater chance of remaining current than acts based on product catalogues (dual-use control lists, classes C0–C6).</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-cyan-blue-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-1035e1196f56a434e54324ff2724ae0c"></h2>



<div class="wp-block-media-text has-media-on-the-right is-stacked-on-mobile"><div class="wp-block-media-text__content">
<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-vivid-red-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-3a45f71ad483e1cd03cf6eadb1a92188">3 · The Legal Environment – Nine Pillars</h3>
</div><figure class="wp-block-media-text__media"><video controls src="https://www.kg-legal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/output-1-1.mp4"></video></figure></div>



<p>The legal environment of the UAV sector is not one act or one branch. It is a lattice of regimes, which it is worth ordering into nine pillars. Below, we furnish each of them both with its legal basis and with a practical “flavour” relevant to the servicing of entities in the sector.</p>



<p>The original version of this taxonomy comprised seven pillars. The extension by two further ones – personal data protection and data governance, and public international law – is not a tidying-up exercise. It follows from the observation made in section 2.10: since the value of the unmanned system has shifted from the platform to the data, the data regime has ceased to be a side issue and has become one of the two or three pillars determining the business model. International law, in turn, is the only regime which covers the space left by the defence exclusions of EU law – and therefore precisely the space in which the revolution described above is playing out.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>3.1 · Pillar I – UAV categories and airspace</strong></h3>



<p>The core of the civil regime is formed by three related acts founded on the basic Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (EASA): <strong>Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945</strong> (product requirements, classes C0–C6, CE marking) and <strong>Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947</strong> (operations in the open, specific and certified categories). The spatial layer is completed by the U-space package: <strong>Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664</strong> together with 2021/665 and 2021/666.</p>



<p>The architecture of this pillar rests on two independent axes of qualification, the confusion of which is the most frequent error in the practice of the industry. The first axis – the <strong>product axis</strong> – concerns what the device is: classes C0–C6 lay down construction requirements, including the obligation to be equipped with a remote identification system and a geo-awareness function for the higher classes. The second axis – the <strong>operational axis</strong> – concerns what is done with it: the open category covers low-risk operations within visual range, the specific category requires an authorisation based on a risk assessment (the SORA methodology) or a declaration of conformity with a standard scenario, and the certified category brings the regime close to classic manned aviation.</p>



<p>The U-space layer, in turn, introduces mandatory services in designated airspaces: network identification, geo-awareness, traffic information and flight authorisation, provided by certified service providers.</p>



<p><strong>The practical dimension is therefore that</strong> the regime is not static. Regulation 2019/947 has applied in its consolidated version since 1 May 2025, and the U-space framework was reinforced by <strong>Regulation (EU) 2023/203</strong>, which added information security requirements – risk assessment, management and incident response. Of key interpretative importance is therefore the revision of the Easy Access Rules for UAS of June 2026, consolidating the AMC/GM to Regulation 2019/947 (ED Decision 2025/018/R). From 1 January 2026, flights in standard scenarios require platforms holding a class C5 or C6 certificate. In a broader perspective, this confirms that in the UAV sector law does not end with the text of the regulation itself, but also functions in the executive, interpretative and operational layer. It is precisely at this level – through the AMC, GM and their consolidation in the Easy Access Rules – that general norms are translated into compliance practice, risk assessment, operational documentation and the everyday application of the law by operators, manufacturers, advisers and supervisory authorities. As a result, an analysis of the legal environment of drones requires account to be taken not only of the formally binding provisions, but also of how they are operationalised in executive and interpretative materials, because it is only there that the real regulatory weight of the sector is revealed. <strong>AMC (Acceptable Means of Compliance) and GM (Guidance Material)</strong> do not have the character of independently binding provisions of the rank of a regulation, but they perform a fundamental interpretative and practical function: they show how entities can demonstrate conformity with the requirements arising from Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and how authorities and operators should understand the individual obligations in operational practice. That is precisely why the Easy Access Rules for Unmanned Aircraft Systems are of such great importance for the UAV sector – they do not create new law, but order, consolidate and operationalise the normative material and its interpretation, becoming in practice the basic working tool for operators, manufacturers, advisers and supervisory authorities.<a href="#_ftn63" id="_ftnref63">[63]</a></p>



<p><strong>A systemic remark</strong>: this entire pillar concerns civil aviation exclusively. Article 2(3)(a) of Regulation 2018/1139 excludes from its scope of application aircraft carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, border control and coastguard operations. The first and most far-reaching defence exclusion therefore appears already at the level of the foundation, and not only in the Artificial Intelligence Act. This means that the boundary between the civil and the defence order is drawn already in the EASA basic regulation itself: it is that regulation which determines that the development, certification and operation of military unmanned systems are not subject to the EU regime of common civil aviation rules, but remain within the domain of the competence of the Member States, their defence policies and the relevant national security regimes. From the perspective of an analysis of the UAV sector, this is of fundamental importance, because it shows that the dual-track nature of the regime does not begin at the stage of AI, autonomy or export control, but already at the level of the most basic question of whether a given aircraft is subject to common European aviation law at all. In practice, this means that identical or nearly identical technology may be covered by the full civil conformity regime if it functions on the commercial market, while at the same time remaining outside that regime if it is incorporated into a military operation or one directly connected with it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.2 · Pillar II – Artificial intelligence and decision-making autonomy</h3>



<p><strong>Regulation (EU) 2024/1689</strong> (the Artificial Intelligence Act, “AI Act”) introduces a risk-based classification: prohibited practices (Article 5), high-risk systems (Article 6 in conjunction with Annexes I and III), systems subject to transparency obligations (Article 50), general-purpose models (Articles 51–55) and the remainder, not covered by substantive obligations.</p>



<p>For the UAV sector, however, what is decisive is not what the act regulates, but <strong>what it does not regulate</strong>. Article 2(3) provides:</p>



<p>“<em>This Regulation does not apply to AI systems where and in so far they are placed on the market, put into service, or used with or without modification <strong><u>exclusively</u></strong> for military, defence or national security purposes</em>.” – Article 2(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689.</p>



<p>The consequence is paradoxical: <strong>a civil drone with AI is subject to the full high-risk regime, while a technologically identical platform used “exclusively” for military purposes remains outside the scope.</strong> The criterion is not the technology, but the purpose of use. Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) therefore remain outside the EU regime; the matter is the subject of international law and NATO doctrines, and the European Parliament has repeatedly warned against the Union’s regulatory backwardness in this area. The European Parliament was one of the earliest institutional actors to take up the subject of autonomous weapon systems and military AI, adopting already in 2018 a resolution on LAWS, and then in 2021 a resolution relating to artificial intelligence in the military and civil context.<a href="#_ftn64" id="_ftnref64">[64]</a></p>



<p>Key, however, is the word <strong>“exclusively”</strong>. Recital 24 of the preamble specifies that if the system is also used for purposes other than military, defence or national security – even temporarily and even by another entity – the exclusion does not apply to that extent. For a dual-use manufacturer, this means that <strong>the exclusion is not a feature of the product, but a feature of the specific placing on the market or putting into service</strong>. The same product series sold simultaneously to a military purchaser and to a critical infrastructure operator is, in the second case, subject to the full regime – and the manufacturer must be able to document this duality, separate the product lines and demonstrate it in the event of an inspection.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">Qualification of a drone system as a high-risk system</h3>



<p>In practice, the classification proceeds along two independent tracks:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Article 6(1) (Annex I)</strong> – an AI system is high-risk if it constitutes a safety component of a product covered by the Union harmonisation legislation listed in Annex I, and that product is subject to third-party conformity assessment. Section B of Annex I expressly lists Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. <strong>This means that control software performing a safety function in a certified unmanned system may be a high-risk system on precisely this basis</strong> – a circumstance still under-appreciated in market practice, because the discussion concentrates almost exclusively on Annex III.</li>



<li><strong>Article 6(2) (Annex III)</strong> – covers, inter alia, the management of critical infrastructure, law enforcement, and migration management and border control. Drone systems used by border services or critical infrastructure operators fall here directly.</li>
</ul>



<p>The consequence of qualification is the set of obligations under Articles 8–15: a risk management system, data and data quality governance (Article 10), technical documentation (Article 11), automatic recording of events (Article 12), transparency and information for the user (Article 13), human oversight (Article 14) and accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity (Article 15) – and, on the procedural side: conformity assessment, the EU declaration, CE marking and registration in the EU database.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">The calendar – amended in June 2026</h3>



<p>Market practice planned compliance for over a year around the date of 2 August 2026. That date has changed. On 19 November 2025, the Commission presented a simplification package (the Digital Omnibus), whose part concerning artificial intelligence – after the unsuccessful trilogue of 28 April 2026 and the political agreement of 6–7 May 2026 – was finally approved by the Council on <strong>29 June 2026</strong> (Parliament: 16 June 2026). The result is a postponement:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>obligations for standalone high-risk systems under Annex III – <strong>2 December 2027</strong>;</li>



<li>obligations for AI embedded in regulated products under Annex I (and thus, inter alia, unmanned systems) – <strong>2 August 2028</strong>;</li>



<li>transparency obligations under Article 50 – <strong>unchanged, 2 August 2026</strong>;</li>



<li>Article 50(2) (marking of generated content) in relation to systems already present on the market, and the new prohibitions – <strong>2 December 2026</strong>.</li>
</ul>



<p>The postponement is conditional in character and is linked to a readiness mechanism: the registration of systems in the EU database and the availability of harmonised standards. The following, by contrast, apply unchanged: the prohibitions under Article 5 (from 2 February 2025), the AI literacy obligation under Article 4 (from 2 February 2025) and the general-purpose model regime (from 2 August 2025).<a href="#_ftn65" id="_ftnref65">[65]</a></p>



<p><strong>In practice,</strong> the postponement is not a relief but a shift. The task which cannot be omitted or accelerated is the inventory of AI systems in the organisation and the assignment of each of them to the appropriate category – work independent of the state of the harmonised standards. In addition, the grandfathering principle applies: systems placed on the market before the date of application are not subject to the obligations until they are substantially modified – which, in a sector with an iteration cycle counted in weeks, is a guarantee of limited value.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><a>3.3 · Pillar III – Dual-use products and export control</a></h3>



<p><strong>Regulation (EU) 2021/821</strong> establishes the Union’s system for the control of exports of dual-use items; it entered into force on 9 September 2021, replacing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, and has applied in its consolidated version since 15 November 2025. On 8 September 2025,<a href="#_ftn66" id="_ftnref66">[66]</a> the Commission updated Annex I (the control list), covering emerging technologies – which directly affects drone components, electronics and AI software.</p>



<p>Four mechanisms of this regime are significant for the unmanned sector:</p>



<p>1. <strong>The control list (Annex I)</strong> – drone components are dispersed across several categories: electronics (cat. 3), sensors and lasers (cat. 6), navigation and avionics (cat. 7) and aerospace and propulsion (cat. 9). Qualification rarely concerns the platform as a whole – most often a single subassembly is decisive.</p>



<p>2. <strong>Catch-all clauses (Article 4)</strong> – the obligation to obtain an authorisation arises also for items not included in the list, if the exporter has been informed or is aware of an intended use connected with weapons of mass destruction, military purposes in a state subject to an embargo, or parts for armaments exported without authorisation. This is the instrument which in practice covers the largest number of drone transactions, because it operates independently of the list.</p>



<p>3. <strong>Control of intangible technology transfer (ITT)</strong> – the regime covers not only things, but also software and technology, including making them available by electronic means. In practice, this means that granting remote access to a code repository, transferring model weights<a href="#_ftn67" id="_ftnref67">[67]</a> or placing technical documentation in a cloud outside the customs territory of the Union may constitute an export requiring an authorisation.</p>



<p>4. <strong>Cyber-surveillance items (Article 5)</strong> – a control mechanism covering items not included in the list, intended for surveillance, where there is a risk of use for human rights violations; it applies directly to advanced observation systems and image analytics.</p>



<p>The complementary layer is formed by: <strong>Directive 2009/43/EC</strong> on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products (simplified within the framework of the Defence Readiness Omnibus), the international regimes (the Wassenaar Arrangement, the MTCR – whose Category I traditionally covers unmanned systems with specified range and payload parameters) and, at national level, the <strong>Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance</strong>.</p>



<p><strong>IMPORTANT for M&amp;A practice:</strong> in the due diligence of an entity in the drone sector, the qualification of components as dual use determines the export authorisation regime, the end-user and re-export prohibition clauses and – in real terms – the feasibility of the cross-border transaction. The disappearance of the commercial/combat boundary (a mass-produced observation drone converted into a combat platform without design changes) makes this qualification ever broader, and the regulatory risk ever more difficult to price. Particular attention is required in the situation where the purchaser is an entity from outside the Union: the mere transfer of technical documentation in the company examination process may require an authorisation before the agreement is even concluded.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.4 Pillar IV – Defence financing and procurement (the driver)</h3>



<p>This is the pillar in which law performs the function of a <strong>driver</strong>. The EU instruments do not react to technology – they create demand, direct the stream of public funds and establish the framework for joint production and procurement:</p>



<p>•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <strong>The European Defence Fund (EDF)</strong><a href="#_ftn68" id="_ftnref68">[68]</a> – co-financing of joint defence research and development projects, lowering the industry’s investment risk.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>EDIRPA</strong> (Regulation (EU) 2023/2418) – support for common defence procurement.<a id="_ftnref69" href="#_ftn69">[69]</a></li>



<li><strong>ASAP</strong><a id="_ftnref70" href="#_ftn70">[70]</a> – the regulation on supporting ammunition production: increasing the production capacities of industry; a logic fully transferable to the mass production of loitering munitions and drones.</li>



<li><strong>SAFE</strong> (Security Action for Europe, 2025)<a id="_ftnref71" href="#_ftn71">[71]</a> – a loan instrument with procurement to be carried out by the end of 2030.</li>



<li><strong>EDIP</strong> – the European Defence Industry Programme, together with the construction of <strong>SEAP</strong> (Structure for European Armament Programme) as a voluntary legal framework for the long-term cooperation of Member States across the entire life cycle of a defence product.<a id="_ftnref72" href="#_ftn72">[72]</a></li>
</ul>



<p>The superstructure of these instruments is the <strong>Defence Readiness Omnibus</strong><a href="#_ftn73" id="_ftnref73">[73]</a> of 17 June 2025 – a legislative and non-legislative package intended to remove administrative barriers to defence investment estimated at EUR 800 billion over a four-year perspective. It includes, inter alia, accelerated authorisation procedures for defence projects with a single point of contact, extension of the maximum duration of framework agreements to ten years, simplification of intra-EU transfers of defence products (where delays reached a year), clarification of the defence exclusions in chemicals legislation (REACH, CLP, biocidal products) and – which is particularly significant for financing – a communication clarifying the application of the sustainable finance framework to the defence sector. In June 2026, the co-legislators reached a preliminary agreement on the procurement part of the package, extending the increased EDF financing to actions carried out within the framework of SEAP and permitting the eligibility of the costs of tests conducted in Ukraine.</p>



<p>A separate, younger layer is formed by the <strong>four flagship projects</strong><a href="#_ftn74" id="_ftnref74">[74]</a> of the Readiness Roadmap 2030: the European Drone Defence Initiative, Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield. EDDI – originally communicated as the “drone wall” – is to create a multi-layered network capable of detecting, tracking and neutralising hostile platforms, while preserving a dual-use dimension allowing civil applications (border protection, disaster response). The assumed timetable: launch in Q1 2026, initial capability by the end of 2026, full functionality by the end of 2027 (Eastern Flank Watch – by the end of 2028). They are complemented by the <strong>Action Plan on drone and counter-drone security</strong> of 11 February 2026 and the <strong>Drone Alliance with Ukraine</strong>, together with the announcement of the allocation of EUR 6 billion from the interest on immobilised Russian assets to support Ukrainian drone production.</p>



<p>The market confirms the direction: over a twelve-month horizon, autonomous drones attracted around USD 6.2 billion in 169 transactions, driving a 139-per-cent increase in defence robotics financing. Analysts at the same time point to the gap between the “battle-tested” Ukrainian ecosystem and the capital actually flowing in – a field in which legal advice and transaction structuring become critical.</p>



<p><strong>The practical dimension:</strong> participation in the driver instruments has a legal price which must be factored in at the stage of structuring the consortium. The EDF and EDIP regimes contain extensive provisions on rights to the results of the project, access to existing knowledge (background) and generated knowledge (foreground), export restrictions on results and requirements of control over the entity (registered office in the Union, absence of third-country control or effective mechanisms for its limitation). For a company with capital from outside the Union, eligibility can be illusory if the ownership structure is not appropriately arranged in advance.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.5 · Pillar V – Satellite communications (IRIS²)</h3>



<p><strong>Regulation (EU) 2023/588</strong> establishes the Union’s secure connectivity programme for 2023–2027 and the <strong>IRIS²</strong> constellation (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite). It is the sovereign European answer to dependence on commercial satellite systems, whose role in the control of long-range drones was revealed by the conflict.<a href="#_ftn75" id="_ftnref75">[75]</a></p>



<p>Law here builds the physical layer on which the future generation of satellite-controlled platforms will rest – a classic infrastructural driver. The significance of this pillar is, however, deeper than technical: the experience of recent years has shown that <strong>a private satellite operator’s decision on coverage or on refusal to provide the service in a given area may have operational effects comparable to a decision of a state</strong>. The construction of a public capability is the answer to a problem which should be called the privatisation of communications sovereignty.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.6 · Pillar VI – Critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and product resilience</h3>



<p>Since the first phase of the conflict was cyber warfare, the pillar of digital and physical resilience has systemic significance. It is formed by three acts of differing logic:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2)</strong><a id="_ftnref76" href="#_ftn76">[76]</a> – raises the common level of cybersecurity, extending the circle of essential and important entities and the obligations of risk management, incident reporting and the responsibility of management bodies. It covers, inter alia, air transport, energy, digital infrastructure and – which is significant for the sector under discussion – the manufacture of products, including electronic devices. NIS2 shifts the weight from “IT security” itself to risk management at the level of the entire organisation, including the responsibility of management, incident reporting obligations and the requirement of operational resilience for entities operating in critical and technologically sensitive sectors.</li>



<li><strong>Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (CER)</strong><a id="_ftnref77" href="#_ftn77">[77]</a> – regulates the resilience of critical entities in the physical and organisational dimension: the identification of critical entities, risk assessment, resilience plans, personnel security vetting. The key significance of CER lies in the fact that it concentrates not on cyberspace, but on the physical and organisational resilience of critical entities, and thus on the capability to maintain continuity of operation despite an attack, sabotage, disruption or infrastructural crisis.</li>



<li><strong>Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act, CRA)</strong><a id="_ftnref78" href="#_ftn78">[78]</a> – the youngest act and, in practice, the most burdensome for manufacturers. It establishes horizontal cybersecurity requirements for <strong>products with digital elements</strong>, and thus for drones, ground controllers, detection systems and software. It imposes obligations of secure design, vulnerability management throughout the support period, provision of a software bill of materials (SBOM) and reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities and serious incidents. The reporting obligations apply from September 2026, and the entirety – from December 2027. The most momentous element of the CRA is that, for the first time, it imposes on manufacturers of products with digital elements a continuous cybersecurity obligation throughout the product’s entire life cycle, encompassing secure design, vulnerability management and response obligations also after the product’s placing on the market.</li>
</ul>



<p>Both directive-form acts (NIS2, CER) require national transposition – which shifts the weight to the Polish level, discussed in Pillar IX.</p>



<p><strong>The practical dimension:</strong> the convergence of the three regimes means that a manufacturer of a drone system for a critical infrastructure operator may simultaneously: (i) be subject to the CRA as a manufacturer of a product with digital elements, (ii) be an important entity within the meaning of NIS2 by virtue of its own manufacturing activity, and (iii) be covered by requirements arising from the obligations of its client under CER and NIS2, passed down contractually within the framework of supply chain risk management. Three regimes, three separate calendars, three separate sets of reporting obligations – while the event that triggers them is one.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.7 · Pillar VII – Personal data and data governance</h3>



<p>This is a pillar systematically omitted in analyses of the defence sector, and at the same time the one which in practice most often blocks civil deployments. This follows from the observation made in section 2.10: the drone is above all a sensor, and a sensor turned towards the surface of the earth in an urbanised environment almost always records personal data.</p>



<p><strong>Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)</strong> applies to the processing of imagery from an unmanned platform on general principles, whereby in practice four issues are decisive:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Scope of application.</strong> Article 2(2)(a) and (b) excludes processing in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law and within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. National security remains the competence of the Member States (Article 4(2) TEU). There thus arises – symmetrically to Article 2(3) of the Artificial Intelligence Act – a second defence exclusion, with differently drawn boundaries.</li>



<li><strong>Legal basis and transparency.</strong> The information obligation under Articles 13–14 is difficult to perform in a real manner in aerial operations; practice relies on area-based information, signage and the publication of flight plans, which the European Data Protection Board analysed in Guidelines 3/2019 on the processing of personal data through video devices.</li>



<li><strong>Data protection impact assessment (Article 35).</strong> Systematic monitoring of public space on a large scale with the use of new technologies falls within the typical criteria of a mandatory impact assessment; in Polish practice, the list of operations requiring a DPIA maintained by the supervisory authority includes monitoring with the use of drones.</li>



<li><strong>Special categories (Article 9).</strong> The processing of facial imagery for the purpose of the unique identification of a natural person constitutes the processing of biometric data; in combination with Article 5 of the Artificial Intelligence Act (the prohibition of real-time remote biometric identification in public space for law enforcement purposes, subject to exceptions), this creates a double barrier for observation systems with facial recognition.</li>
</ul>



<p>For operations conducted by the services, the appropriate regime is <strong>Directive (EU) 2016/680</strong> (the so-called Police Directive), transposed in Poland by the Act of 14 December 2018 on the protection of personal data processed in connection with the prevention and combating of crime.</p>



<p>A separate, younger layer is constituted by the <strong>governance of non-personal data</strong>. <strong>Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (the Data Act)</strong>, applicable from 12 September 2025, covers “connected products” – that is, devices generating data on their use and environment, to which unmanned systems belong directly. It imposes obligations to make data available to the user and to third parties designated by the user, and limits the freedom to shape contracts in this respect. <strong>Regulation (EU) 2022/868 (the Data Governance Act)</strong>, in turn, creates the framework for the re-use of public sector data and data intermediation.</p>



<p>Finally, <strong>Article 10 of the Artificial Intelligence Act</strong> introduces quality requirements for the training, validation and testing data sets of high-risk systems – representativeness, relevance, examination for systematic errors. These requirements overlap with the GDPR regime in a manner which is sometimes a source of practical contradictions: the obligation to examine bias sometimes requires the processing of special-category data, the processing of which the GDPR as a rule prohibits. This issue is the subject of work on the data part of the Digital Omnibus.</p>



<p><strong>Legislative status:</strong> in contrast to the part concerning artificial intelligence, <strong>the part of the simplification package covering the GDPR, the ePrivacy Directive, NIS2, the Data Act and DORA remains at the negotiation stage.</strong> At the end of June 2026, the Cypriot Presidency withdrew the compromise text from the approval procedure in COREPER II in the absence of a qualified majority; the file was taken over by the Irish Presidency. The European Data Protection Board and the European Data Protection Supervisor expressed, in Joint Opinion 2/2026 of 11 February 2026, decided opposition to the proposed narrowing of the definition of personal data. <strong>Until formal adoption, the existing state of the law applies</strong> – the contrary assumption is at this moment the most frequent error in compliance planning (The legislative status remains unclosed: in contrast to the part of the simplification package concerning artificial intelligence, the component covering the GDPR, privacy and electronic communications, NIS2, the Data Act and DORA still remains at the negotiation stage. It is officially known that the EDPB and the EDPS, in Joint Opinion 2/2026 of 11 February 2026, expressed substantial reservations about the proposed changes, including the narrowing of the definition of personal data. Expert sources further indicate that at the end of June 2026 the Cypriot Presidency withdrew the compromise text from the approval procedure in COREPER II in the absence of a qualified majority, which means that until formal adoption the existing state of the law continues to apply.<a href="#_ftn79" id="_ftnref79">[79]</a>).</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.8 · Pillar VIII – Public international law and autonomous weapon systems</h3>



<p>The space left by the defence exclusions of EU law is not a lawless space. It is filled – with varying effectiveness – by three regimes of international law.</p>



<p><strong>International aviation law.</strong> The Chicago Convention of 1944 excludes state aircraft from its scope (Article 3), requires special authorisation for flights of pilotless aircraft over the territory of another state (Article 8) and – in Article 3 bis, added in 1984 – confirms the obligation to refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight. This construction arose in a world in which the distinction “civil/state aircraft” was possible visually and procedurally. Applying it to an object with a wingspan of two metres, without markings, crossing the border unannounced, is a task for which the treaty was not designed.</p>



<p><strong>International humanitarian law.</strong> The principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack apply regardless of whether the decision on the use of force is taken by a human or assisted by an algorithm. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 imposes on the parties the obligation to review new weapons, means and methods of warfare for their compatibility with international law – this provision is today the only universally binding instrument that covers autonomy in armaments, although it does so indirectly.<a href="#_ftn80" id="_ftnref80">[80]</a></p>



<p><strong>The CCW process and the UN forum.</strong> The Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems (GGE on LAWS), operating since 2016 within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, has been working since 2024 on the so-called rolling text, encompassing elements of a potential instrument based on a two-tier approach of prohibitions and regulation. At the September 2025 session, a group of 42 states – one third of the parties to the Convention – declared readiness to move to negotiations on the basis of that text. On 6 November 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted, for the third time in succession, a resolution on autonomous weapon systems, supported by 156 states. The UN Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross jointly called for the conclusion of negotiations on a legally binding instrument <strong>by the end of 2026</strong>. The Seventh CCW Review Conference, planned for November 2026, is the moment at which it will be decided whether a negotiating mandate will come into being – whereby the consensus rule applicable in that forum makes this outcome uncertain.<a href="#_ftn81" id="_ftnref81">[81]</a></p>



<p><strong>The NATO layer</strong> comprises the principles of the responsible use of artificial intelligence in defence adopted in 2021 (lawfulness, accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, bias mitigation) and the revised AI strategy. These are not legally binding norms, but they constitute a point of reference for contractual requirements in allied procurement – and in this sense they affect industry more strongly than many a legal act.<a href="#_ftn82" id="_ftnref82">[82]</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background">3.9 · Pillar IX – The Polish level</h3>



<p>The Polish regime combines directly applicable EU regulations with national statutes and operational provisions. The Regulations (2019/945, 2019/947, 2021/664, 2021/821, 2023/588, 2024/1689, 2024/2847) apply directly; the directives (NIS2, CER) require transposition.</p>



<p><strong>The aviation layer.</strong> The national basis is formed by the <strong>Act of 3 July 2002 – Aviation Law</strong>, substantially amended by the Act of 24 January 2025, which entered into force on 27 February 2025. The amendment adapted national law to the EU regime and introduced, inter alia: a register of operators of unmanned systems (a registration obligation for platforms of at least 250 g <strong>and – regardless of mass – those equipped with sensors capable of collecting personal data</strong>), the statutory empowerment of the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency to designate geographical zones, the extension of the catalogue of services entitled to check pilots, the lowering of the minimum age of a pilot in the open category from 16 to 14 under supervision, and a chapter devoted to the prevention of the unlawful performance of operations with the use of unmanned systems. Notification of the intention to perform an operation takes place through the <strong>DroneTower</strong> application, integrated with the PANSA UTM system and the National Drone Information System (KSID). The legal basis for the neutralisation of a platform remains <strong>Article 156ze of the Aviation Law</strong> (destruction, immobilisation or taking over control of the flight), supplemented by the provisions of the chapter on the prevention of unlawful operations.</p>



<p>Institutionally, this layer is completed by the <strong>Act of 8 December 2006 on the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency</strong> (Journal of Laws of 2025, item 1267), extended by the Agency’s competences in the area of unmanned systems, including the possibility of providing services to operators, supporting the testing of new solutions and creating special-purpose companies. Supervision is exercised by the President of the Civil Aviation Authority.</p>



<p><strong>The resilience and countermeasure layer.</strong> The breakthrough is the <strong>Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2026, item 815)</strong>, implementing the CER Directive. Its significance for the sector under discussion extends far beyond its declared purpose:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Critical infrastructure operators have obtained the right to apply countermeasures against unmanned platforms, including jamming devices.</strong> Until now, a private entity managing a strategic facility could only await the intervention of the services; it can now itself interrupt communications with the intruder. The power entered into force on 26 June 2026.</li>



<li>The catalogue of authorised formations (the Police, the Border Guard, the State Protection Service, the Military Gendarmerie) obtained competences to destroy, immobilise or take over control of <strong>unmanned surface/floating objects and robots and autonomous vehicles moving on land</strong>, where they create a threat to critical infrastructure. The new Chapter 6a of the Act, modelled constructionally on the provisions of the Aviation Law concerning aircraft, extends the counter-drone regime to the maritime and land domains.</li>



<li>The Act further introduces an obligation of security audits, mechanisms for the protection of supply chains, and establishes the Maritime Security Centre.</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>The defence layer.</strong> It is formed by the <strong>Act of 11 March 2022 on the Defence of the Homeland</strong> – the national framework for the acquisition and operation of unmanned and counter-drone systems, together with the procurement regime in the fields of defence and security.</p>



<p><strong>The direction of change.</strong> This area is evolving intensively in the years 2024–2026 and requires ongoing verification of the entries in the Journal of Laws and of legislative drafts. After a period of tightening of administrative sanctions, assessed by the operator community as disproportionate, the Civil Aviation Authority transmitted to the Ministry of Infrastructure on 5 May 2026 a draft amendment of a deregulatory and ordering character, covering the system of penalties, insurance, mandatory notifications, the securing of critical infrastructure and counter-drone systems. Entry into force is announced for the turn of 2026 and 2027. In parallel, work is under way on the full transposition of NIS2 within the framework of the amendment of the Act on the National Cybersecurity System.<a href="#_ftn83" id="_ftnref83">[83]</a></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><a>4 · Seven Points of Friction</a></h2>



<p>The pillars described in Part 3 do not form a coherent system. They come into contact with one another at points where their assumptions are mutually contradictory, and the resolution of the collision does not follow from any of them. It is precisely at these points that the undertaking’s real legal risk is concentrated – and it is they, not the content of the individual acts, that should set the agenda of legal advice.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.1 · The “exclusivity” test – the military exclusion in relation to a dual-use product</h3>



<p>The exclusion in Article 2(3) of the Artificial Intelligence Act operates on the condition of the <strong>exclusivity</strong> of the military, defence or national security purpose. This construction assumes that the purpose can be unambiguously assigned to the placing on the market or the putting into service. In the dual-use sector, this assumption is empirically false: the same machine vision module may be sold to the manufacturer of a power plant perimeter protection system and at the same time integrated into a military platform.</p>



<p>The practical consequences are three. First, <strong>the burden of demonstrating exclusivity rests on the entity that invokes it</strong> – and demonstrating a negative fact (the absence of civil application) requires documented control of the distribution channel and end-user clauses. Second, the exclusion relates to the system, not to the undertaking: a company may simultaneously be a provider of a high-risk system and a provider of an excluded system. Third, <strong>modification of the intended purpose after placing on the market changes the regime</strong> – and in a sector in which the end user routinely modifies the platform, this is a real risk, not a hypothetical one.</p>



<p>The practical recommendation is unambiguous: the separation of product lines at the documentary, contractual and – as far as possible – technical level, before the first mixed contract comes into being. Untangling this situation later is costly, and in the course of a company examination it is sometimes impracticable.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.2 · Human oversight: two regimes, one technical requirement</h3>



<p>Article 14 of the Artificial Intelligence Act and the postulate of meaningful human control in humanitarian law<a href="#_ftn84" id="_ftnref84">[84]</a> describe the same property of a system – the human’s capability to understand, verify and interrupt the operation of the automaton – but have an entirely different normative status. On the civil side, it is a legal obligation with an administrative sanction and a documentation requirement. On the military side – the subject of unfinished negotiations.</p>



<p>From this arises an asymmetry with industrial effects: <strong>a manufacturer that builds one technical platform for both tracks must design to the stricter requirement</strong>, because it cannot foresee in advance in which track a given unit will end up. Consequently, the civil requirement becomes the de facto design standard also for excluded applications – a mechanism worth calling the standard-transfer effect. This is one of the few situations in which the defence exclusion operates to the benefit, rather than to the detriment, of the coherence of the system.</p>



<p>The converse mechanism is, however, equally real: operational pressure to shorten the decision chain in a heavily jammed environment leads to constructions in which human oversight is formally preserved but in fact illusory – the operator approves a decision which he had neither the time nor the data to assess. Demonstrating such a situation in evidentiary proceedings requires access to event logs, which Article 12 of the Artificial Intelligence Act requires only on the civil side.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.3 · Jamming as a legally regulated activity</h3>



<p>The jamming power, granted in Poland to critical infrastructure operators from June 2026, is an example of a norm which solves one problem and opens three further ones.<a href="#_ftn85" id="_ftnref85">[85]</a></p>



<p>Jamming devices are, as a rule, inadmissible for marketing and use: they do not satisfy the essential requirements of Directive 2014/53/EU on radio equipment (harmful interference), and their use violates the spectrum management regime. The grant of a statutory power removes the unlawfulness of the act itself, but <strong>does not settle liability for side effects</strong>. Interference in the bands used by satellite navigation systems affects civil aviation, transport, telecommunications networks and – which is sometimes overlooked – energy infrastructure synchronised by satellite time. Questions therefore arise as to: (i) the compensation liability regime of the facility operator towards third parties, (ii) the delimitation of liability between the operator and the manufacturer of the device, (iii) the documentation obligations allowing the course of the event to be reconstructed.</p>



<p>To this is added a third problem, described in section 2.4: <strong>the legal measure was granted at the moment when the technology against which it is effective is in retreat.</strong> The fibre-optic platform is resistant to jamming by definition. The norm responds to the state of the art of two years ago.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.4 · Kinetic neutralisation and liability for damage</h3>



<p>Shooting down or immobilising a platform does not end the event – it begins the fall of a mass with kinetic energy over terrain which is usually precisely what was to be protected. Polish law provides a basis for neutralisation (Article 156ze of the Aviation Law, the provisions of the chapter on the prevention of unlawful operations, the new powers under the Act of 29 May 2026), but <strong>the regime of liability for damage caused as a result of lawful neutralisation remains dispersed</strong> between the liability of the State Treasury for acts of public authority, the general rules of tortious liability and the special provisions on damage caused by the movement of aircraft.</p>



<p>A separate issue is the qualification of independent neutralisation by an unauthorised entity. The shooting down of a drone by the owner of the property over which it is flying is not the exercise of the right of ownership – it is the destruction of another’s thing and, depending on the circumstances, the creation of a danger. Judicial practice in this area is already taking shape.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.5 · Battlefield data as training material</h3>



<p>This is the most under-defined point of the entire map. Collections of recordings from combat operations – visual and thermal imagery from thousands of sorties – have a training value unattainable in laboratory conditions. They flow, formally and informally, in both directions across the civil-military boundary.</p>



<p>The legal issues arrange themselves in three layers. <strong>Data protection:</strong> material of this kind contains the images of natural persons; processing in the course of hostilities falls within the exclusion of Article 2(2) GDPR, but the use of the same collection by a commercial entity to train a model intended for the civil market no longer does – and determining the moment at which the data “enter” the scope of application of the regulation has no unambiguous normative answer. <strong>Data quality:</strong> Article 10 of the Artificial Intelligence Act requires that the training data sets of high-risk systems be representative and free of systematic errors; a collection originating from one theatre of operations, one season of the year and one type of terrain does not satisfy that requirement, which has a direct bearing on the reliability of classifiers in civil applications. <strong>Export control:</strong> the weights of a model trained on such a collection may constitute controlled technology, and making them available outside the customs territory of the Union – an export requiring authorisation (cf.&nbsp;section 3.3, point 3).</p>



<p>The practical recommendation: in every transaction concerning an entity possessing vision models, the provenance of the training data sets must be established and documented in a manner allowing the lawfulness of the chain to be demonstrated. This is today one of the most frequently omitted – and most difficult to repair after the fact – elements of a company examination.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.6 Intangible technology transfer and the dispersed working model</h3>



<p>The export control regime is not limited to the physical movement of goods across the border. Within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, “export” also includes the transmission of software or technology by electronic means – inter alia electronic mail, telephone or other electronic means – to a destination outside the customs territory of the Union. Making such software or technology available in electronic form to natural or legal persons located outside the customs territory of the Union is also deemed to be an export. In consequence, granting a foreign engineer, consultant or potential investor the ability to download controlled files from a repository may constitute an export, even if the data at all times remain saved on the same server and the access was remote and short-lived.<a href="#_ftn86" id="_ftnref86">[86]</a></p>



<p>This does not, however, mean that every making available of source code outside the Union automatically requires an authorisation. It must first be established whether the software or technical information in question has been included in the list of dual-use items in Annex I to Regulation 2021/821, or whether the conditions for the control of unlisted items are met on account of their intended end use or end user. In the unmanned aircraft sector, this assessment may concern both the design of the drone itself, its subassemblies and equipment, and the dedicated software and the technology necessary for their development, production or use. Potentially significant will be, inter alia, design documentation, aerodynamic models and simulations, control system diagrams, autopilot code, solutions concerning autonomous navigation, sensor integration, encrypted communications or jamming resistance. The classification should, however, refer to the parameters and criteria of the specific control entry, and not solely to the fact that the given technology is connected with drones.</p>



<p>The risk of intangible technology transfer arises above all in three configurations: (i) in a geographically dispersed development team including persons working from third countries; (ii) in the due diligence process, if the advisers or technical experts of a potential purchaser from outside the Union receive access to the repository, the design documentation or the test environment; and (iii) in the use of cloud infrastructure, if the data are transmitted to servers located outside the Union or can be accessed from there. The mere decentralisation of infrastructure, the use of blockchain technology or the storage of data in the cloud do not yet determine the occurrence of a controlled export. What matters above all is the content of the data, their export classification, the location of the recipient and whether the entity from outside the Union has obtained a real possibility of acquainting itself with the controlled technology. In the case of dispersed data storage, an additional problem may be the impossibility of reliably establishing in which states the individual nodes or copies of the data are located.</p>



<p>For this reason, control of access to repositories containing drone technologies should be an element of the internal export compliance programme, and not solely a cybersecurity procedure. Such a system should encompass the classification of repositories and documentation, the establishment of the state from which the user actually obtains access, the verification of end users and of the purpose of use of the technology, the segmentation of projects, the principle of least privilege, restrictions on the downloading and copying of files, and the keeping of access logs. For the protection of data against unauthorised access does not itself replace the answer to a separate regulatory question: whether the access of a person who is authorised, but located outside the Union, constitutes an export requiring an authorisation.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">4.7 Supply chain, components and investment control</h3>



<p>The last point of friction is the tension between strategic autonomy and the structure of the component market. The ecosystem which made possible the cost revolution described in section 2.2 rests to a considerable extent on components of geographically concentrated origin – from cells and motors to integrated circuits and cameras. The policy of reducing dependence collides with the fact that alternative European chains do not exist at a scale corresponding to demand.</p>



<p>Legally, this tension materialises in three instruments: the eligibility mechanisms in the financing programmes (the requirement of component origin and of control over the contractor), <strong>Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on the screening of foreign direct investments</strong> together with the national Act of 24 July 2015 on the control of certain investments,<a href="#_ftn87" id="_ftnref87">[87]</a> and the sanctions regime. For an investor, this means that a transaction in this sector requires a parallel analysis of three consent paths: merger control, investment control and – where the object comprises listed assets – export consents. The transaction timetable must take this into account from day one; the attempt to catch up on these consents after the signing of the preliminary agreement is a typical cause of the failure of the process.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-background"><strong>5 · The Dual-Track Nature of the Regime – an Answer to the Practical Question in the Legal Environment</strong></h2>



<p>The juxtaposition of the nine pillars leads to the conclusion that law simultaneously performs <strong>three different roles</strong> – depending on the track in which we find ourselves – and leaves one area uncovered.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Role of law</strong></td><td><strong>Pillars</strong></td><td><strong>Mechanism</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Consequence of need</td><td>UAV/EASA, U-space level (civil track)</td><td>National law chases technology outpaced by the conflict; it regulates ex post what has already come into being</td></tr><tr><td>Driver</td><td>EDF, EDIRPA, ASAP, SAFE EDIP/SEAP, Defence Readiness Omnibus, IRIS², EDDI</td><td>Law creates demand, finances development, builds infrastructure and removes administrative barriers</td></tr><tr><td>Dampener</td><td>AI Act (civil track), dual use 2021/821, NIS2/CER/CRA, GDPR and the Data Act</td><td>Law limits the risk of mass dissemination, conditioning access to the market</td></tr><tr><td>Regulatory gap</td><td>LAWS / military AI, Art. 2(3) AI Act, art. 2 (2) GDPR, art. 2(3) (a) Reg. 2018/1139)</td><td>The defence exclusions leave development without a brake; international law fills this space only partially</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p><strong>Law is neither exclusively a consequence nor exclusively a driver – it is dual-track.</strong> On the civil track it operates as a consequence of need and as a dampener; on the defence track as a driver. The mechanism separating the two tracks is the military exclusion in Article 2(3) of the Artificial Intelligence Act and the analogous defence exclusions in successive acts – whereby, as we demonstrated in section 3.1, the first of them appears already in the EASA basic regulation, and thus at the level of the foundation of the entire regime, not as a special exception.</p>



<p>The paradox lies in the fact that <strong>the same technology is simultaneously being accelerated on the defence side and dampened on the civil side</strong> – and the dual-use boundary along which this division runs is increasingly indistinct. What is more, in the years 2025–2026 we observe an additional phenomenon, which is worth noting as a fourth mechanism: <strong>simplification as a tool of industrial policy</strong>. Both the Defence Readiness Omnibus and the Digital Omnibus aim to lower regulatory burdens – the first on the defence track, the second on the civil one. The direction is convergent, the justifications different: in the first case defence readiness, in the second competitiveness. The effect is a convergence of the two tracks on the procedural side, while their substantive separateness is preserved.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">6 · Practical Implications for Entities in the Sector</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">6.1 · The qualification map – questions which must be answered in this order</h3>



<p>For a client from the UAV sector, one question is key: <strong>on which side of the boundary – dual use, military/civil – is its product or project located.</strong> This qualification determines the entire legal regime that covers it. In practice, it is worth conducting it sequentially:</p>



<p>1. <strong>Is the product intended exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes?</strong> If so – the basis of that assertion and the mechanisms of control over the distribution channel must be documented. If not, or not fully – the civil regime applies in its entirety.</p>



<p>2. <strong>Does the Artificial Intelligence Act apply, and if so, on which basis?</strong> Annex I (a safety component of a certified product) or Annex III (critical infrastructure, law enforcement, borders)? On this depends not only the scope of the obligations, but also the date of their application (2 December 2027 or 2 August 2028).</p>



<p>3. <strong>Which product class and operational category does the platform concern</strong> under the 2019/945 and 2019/947 regime – and do the operations require an authorisation in the specific category?</p>



<p>4. <strong>Is the product or any of its components subject to export control</strong> on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 and the current control list, including under the regime of the catch-all clauses and intangible technology transfer?</p>



<p>5. <strong>Does the device process personal data</strong> – and if so, has an impact assessment been carried out and is the legal basis of the processing documented? Is the platform a “connected product” within the meaning of the Data Act?</p>



<p>6. <strong>What cybersecurity obligations</strong> (the CRA as manufacturer, NIS2 by virtue of its own activity, CER indirectly through the client) cover the manufacturer and the operator?</p>



<p>7. <strong>Does the project qualify for driver financing</strong> (EDF, EDIRPA, ASAP, SAFE, EDIP/SEAP) – and does the ownership and consortium structure satisfy the eligibility and control requirements?</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><a>6.2 Due diligence of a drone entity</a></h3>



<p>In M&amp;A practice, this means that the examination of the company must cover not only the classic areas (legal title to intellectual property, contracts, obligations), but also <strong>regulatory positioning</strong>. The checklist covers at least:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>the dual-use classification of every component and product, together with the substantiating documentation and the history of authorisations issued;</li>



<li>the status vis-à-vis the Artificial Intelligence Act: an inventory of systems, assignment to categories, assessment of the existence and effectiveness of the exclusion under Article 2(3);</li>



<li>the provenance of the training data sets and the rights to use them – including the chain of title to data originating from third parties or from real operations;</li>



<li>the history of security incidents and compliance with the reporting regimes;</li>



<li>operator registration, operational authorisations, the history of proceedings before the aviation supervisory authority and of administrative sanctions;</li>



<li>exposure to investment control (Regulation 2019/452, the Act of 24 July 2015) and the eligibility requirements in the financing programmes of which the company is a beneficiary;</li>



<li>compliance with the intangible technology transfer regime in the dispersed working model, including a list of the jurisdictions from which access to the repositories was granted;</li>



<li>rights to the results of projects financed from public funds, including export restrictions and access rights allocated to Member States.</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>A procedural remark of significant practical importance:</strong> the mere conduct of the company examination may trigger export obligations if access to the technical documentation is obtained by advisers from third countries. The sequence of steps in the transaction process is therefore not a matter of convenience – it is an element of compliance.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading"><a>6.3 · Compliance calendar 2026–2028</a></h3>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-luminous-vivid-orange-background-color has-background has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Date</strong></td><td><strong>Event</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2 August 2026</td><td>Transparency obligations under Article 50 of the Artificial Intelligence Act (unchanged despite the simplification package)</td></tr><tr><td>September 2026</td><td>Manufacturers’ reporting obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act</td></tr><tr><td>November 2026</td><td>The Seventh CCW Review Conference – decision on the negotiating mandate concerning autonomous weapon systems</td></tr><tr><td>2 December 2026</td><td>Article 50(2) of the AI Act in relation to systems already present on the market; the new prohibitions under Article 5</td></tr><tr><td>end of 2026</td><td>Initial capability of the European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch</td></tr><tr><td>turn of 2026/2027</td><td>Announced entry into force of the Polish deregulatory amendment of the Aviation Law</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp; end of 2027</td><td>&nbsp; Full functionality of EDDI</td></tr><tr><td>2 December 2027</td><td>Obligations for standalone high-risk systems (Annex III of the AI Act)</td></tr><tr><td>December 2027</td><td>Full application of the Cyber Resilience Act</td></tr><tr><td>2 August 2028</td><td>Obligations for AI embedded in regulated products (Annex I – including unmanned systems)</td></tr><tr><td>end of 2028</td><td>Full functionality of Eastern Flank Watch</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p>The dates concerning the part of the simplification package relating to the GDPR, privacy in electronic communications, NIS2 and the Data Act remain unsettled – the file is in negotiations in the Council, and adoption before the end of 2026 is uncertain.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">6.4 What cannot be postponed</h3>



<p>The postponement of the obligations for high-risk systems is sometimes read as consent to suspend work. This is an error with a measurable cost. Three tasks have no temporal alternative:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Inventory and classification.</strong> The most difficult element of compliance with the Artificial Intelligence Act is not the completion of documentation, but the identification of all systems in the organisation and the maintenance of that register as successive versions of the product are introduced. This work does not depend on the state of the harmonised standards.</li>



<li><strong>AI literacy (Article 4).</strong> The obligation to ensure an appropriate level of knowledge of the personnel operating AI systems has applied since 2 February 2025 and has not been postponed.</li>



<li><strong>Data architecture and event logs.</strong> The requirements of Articles 10 and 12 are of a design character – satisfying them after the completion of construction work is many times more costly than taking them into account from the outset.</li>
</ul>



<p>It is precisely here – at the interface of technology and the ever-denser lattice of regimes – that the added value of legal advice specialised in highly regulated sectors lies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">7 Conclusion – the Conflict as Lens and Barometer</h2>



<p>The Ukrainian conflict is a lens in which the future of dual-use technology can be seen, and a barometer of the direction of its regulation. It refutes the popular thesis that law by its nature restrains technological development: on the defence track, the legal layer of public financing has proved to be a vector of abrupt acceleration – and the instruments adopted in the years 2025–2026, from the Defence Readiness Omnibus to the flagship projects of the Readiness Roadmap 2030, are proof of this on a scale hitherto unknown in Europe. At the same time, it shows that as drones become widespread, civil law assumes a dampening function – controlling export, autonomy, data processing and access to airspace.</p>



<p>Three observations seem most significant for the further discussion.</p>



<p><strong>First</strong>, the defence exclusions are not an exception to the rule, but a systemic construction repeated at every level of regulation – from the EASA basic regulation, through the GDPR, to the Artificial Intelligence Act. Each time, however, they have differently drawn boundaries, which means that the same platform may simultaneously be excluded from one regime and covered by another. The ordering of those boundaries is a task which the EU legislator has not yet undertaken.</p>



<p><strong>Second</strong>, with the shift of value from the platform to the data and models, the regulatory weight is shifting from aviation law towards data and artificial intelligence law. A manufacturer that in 2019 needed mainly a certificate needs, in 2026, a documented chain of provenance of the training data sets, a vulnerability management system and jurisdiction-based access control.</p>



<p><strong>Third</strong>, the innovation spiral will not slow down – and with it, the pace of the layering of the law will not slow down either. A norm responding to the state of the art of two years ago, adopted in reaction to an incident of a year ago, entering into force in a year’s time, will at the moment of its application relate to a world that no longer exists. This is an argument not against regulation, but for regulation based on effects and on the level of risk, resistant to a change of technical solution.</p>



<p>For lawyers serving this sector, the conclusion is one: <strong>an effective legal strategy begins with the conscious positioning of the product on the right side of each of the boundaries of the regime</strong> – and there are today nine of those boundaries, not one. The ability to move simultaneously in the technological and regulatory layer ceases to be an advantage and becomes a condition of presence on this market.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Annex A: Glossary of Technical Terms</h2>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-vivid-red-color has-luminous-vivid-amber-background-color has-text-color has-background has-link-color has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Term</strong></td><td><strong>Meaning</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>BSP / UAS / UAV</td><td>Unmanned aircraft; an unmanned aircraft system also includes the control station and the link</td></tr><tr><td>FPV (first person view)</td><td>Control from a first-person perspective, through goggles receiving the image from the on-board camera</td></tr><tr><td>BVLOS</td><td>An operation beyond the operator’s visual line of sight</td></tr><tr><td>ISR</td><td>Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td></tr><tr><td>Relay</td><td>A repeater of the control signal and imagery, allowing terrain obstacles to be bypassed</td></tr><tr><td>Radio horizon</td><td>The maximum range of signal propagation limited by terrain relief and obstacles</td></tr><tr><td>Jamming</td><td>Emission of noise on the control frequencies with the aim of severing the link</td></tr><tr><td>Spoofing</td><td>Substitution of the satellite navigation signal, causing an erroneous determination of position</td></tr><tr><td>WRE / EW</td><td>Electronic warfare</td></tr><tr><td>Loitering munition</td><td>A platform remaining in the task area and carrying out a strike after detecting a target</td></tr><tr><td>Deep strike</td><td>A strike on targets located deep in the adversary’s territory</td></tr><tr><td>Terminal autonomy</td><td>The platform’s capability to complete the task without communications with the operator</td></tr><tr><td>C-UAS</td><td>Counter-unmanned aircraft systems</td></tr><tr><td>SBOM</td><td>A software bill of materials, required by the Cyber Resilience Act</td></tr><tr><td>U-space</td><td>A set of digital services enabling safe UAV operations in designated airspace</td></tr><tr><td>SORA</td><td>The risk assessment methodology for operations in the specific category</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">About the Authors and the Firm</h2>



<p><strong>KG Legal Kiełtyka Gładkowski. Partnership – Attorneys law firm </strong>advises entities from the high-technology sectors and highly regulated industries.</p>



<p><strong>Attorney-at-law (radca prawny) Kazimierz Jakub Gładkowski</strong> specialises in corporate matters.</p>



<p><strong>Attorney-at-law (radca prawny) Małgorzata Kiełtyka</strong>, entitled to appear before all courts, specialises in M&amp;A transactions for entities from the high-technology and highly regulated sectors.</p>



<p><em>This article is of an informational and popular-science nature; it does not constitute legal advice. In individual matters, we recommend contacting the firm.</em></p>



<p><strong>Additional Footnotes and Sources</strong></p>



<p><strong>1.</strong> Violations of Polish airspace on 9/10 September 2025 and earlier incidents (Romania – January 2025; Osiny – August 2025); launch of NATO’s operation Eastern Sentry; compare: T. Withington, “Europe’s Drone Wall – Ready, EDDI, Go!”, <em>European Security &amp; Defence</em>, 13 March 2026, pp.&nbsp;38–41; <a href="https://euro-sd.com/2026/03/articles/exclusive/49854/europes-drone-wall-ready-eddi-go/">https://euro-sd.com/2026/03/articles/exclusive/49854/europes-drone-wall-ready-eddi-go/</a></p>



<p><strong>2.</strong> Expert estimate concerning the pace of development of unmanned technologies in wartime conditions; cf.&nbsp;the analysis systematising drone warfare technology – M. Strzyżewski, “Anti-drone defense &#8211; shotguns, nets, EW, interceptor drones”, Marcin Strzyżewski YouTube channel, 2026 (video material).</p>



<p><strong>3.</strong> The analogy and taxonomy of drone categories and the role of situational awareness; the persistence of commercial observation platforms on the battlefield after: M. Strzyżewski, op. cit.</p>



<p><strong>4.</strong> “FPV Drone Warfare: The $1,000 Revolution Reshaping Modern Combat”, drone-warfare.com, 2026. <a href="https://drone-warfare.com/research/fpv-drone-warfare">https://drone-warfare.com/research/fpv-drone-warfare</a></p>



<p><strong>5.</strong> V. Sutea, “Fiber-optic drones have emerged as critical kit for both Russia and Ukraine”, Atlantic Council – UkraineAlert, 24 February 2026 (the appearance of fibre-optic drones in August 2024 in the Kursk area; range of over 30 km, no susceptibility to jamming); <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fiber-optics-drones-have-emerged-as-critical-kit-for-both-russia-and-ukraine/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fiber-optics-drones-have-emerged-as-critical-kit-for-both-russia-and-ukraine</a></p>



<p><strong>6.</strong> NATO Allied Command Transformation, Innovation Challenge devoted to countering fibre-optic drones, 2025 – cf.&nbsp;Atlantic Council, op. cit.</p>



<p><strong>7.</strong> “Fire Point FP-1”, Wikipedia (as at 21 July 2026); cf.&nbsp;“FP-1 vs Shahed: Ukraine Ramps Up Production…”, United24 Media, 20 August 2025 (unit cost approx. USD 55 thousand; plywood fuselage, two-cylinder engine).</p>



<p><strong>8.</strong> “Russian largest oil refinery hit for first time by Ukrainian drones”, Politico Europe, 6 July 2026; cf.&nbsp;Tom’s Hardware, 17 July 2026 (strike on the Omsk refinery after a flight of over 2,500 km). <a href="https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/drones/ukraines-55000-plywood-drone-flew-2500-km-and-shut-down-russias-largest-oil-refinery">https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/drones/ukraines-55000-plywood-drone-flew-2500-km-and-shut-down-russias-largest-oil-refinery</a></p>



<p><strong>9.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (EASA), including Article 2(3)(a) (exclusion of military, customs, police and related operations); Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 (open / specific / certified categories). Source: EUR-Lex.</p>



<p><strong>10.</strong> Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664 (the U-space framework) together with 2021/665 and 2021/666. Source: EUR-Lex; EASA.</p>



<p><strong>11.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2023/203 (information security requirements in U-space); the consolidated version of 2019/947 applicable from 1 May 2025. Source: EUR-Lex; SKYbrary.</p>



<p><strong>12.</strong> EASA, Easy Access Rules for Unmanned Aircraft Systems – revision of June 2026 (consolidation of the AMC/GM to 2019/947, ED Decision 2025/018/R).</p>



<p><strong>13.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the Artificial Intelligence Act), Article 2(3) and recital 24; Articles 4, 5, 6, 8–15, 50, 51–55; Annexes I and III. Source: EUR-Lex; artificialintelligenceact.eu (Article 2: Scope).</p>



<p><strong>14.</strong> European Parliament, EPRS, “Defence and artificial intelligence”, 2025 (LAWS outside the scope of the AI Act by virtue of Article 2(3); calls for international regulation).</p>



<p><strong>15.</strong> Digital Omnibus on AI: Commission proposal of 19 November 2025; unsuccessful trilogue of 28 April 2026; preliminary political agreement of 6–7 May 2026; confirmation by Member State representatives on 13 May 2026; approval by the Parliament on 16 June 2026 and by the Council on 29 June 2026. New dates: 2 December 2027 (Annex III), 2 August 2028 (Annex I), 2 December 2026 (Article 50(2) in relation to existing systems and the new prohibitions). Cf. analyses: Gibson Dunn, May 2026; Travers Smith, May 2026.</p>



<p><strong>16.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (dual-use export control); entry into force on 9 September 2021; consolidated version from 15 November 2025; Article 4 (catch-all clauses), Article 5 (cyber-surveillance items), the intangible technology transfer regime. Source: EUR-Lex.</p>



<p><strong>17.</strong> European Commission, update of Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of 8 September 2025 (emerging technologies). Cf. Akin, “EU Updates Dual-Use Export Control List”, 16 September 2025.</p>



<p><strong>18.</strong> Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products; the Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance.</p>



<p><strong>19.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 (EDIRPA – common defence procurement). Source: EUR-Lex; European Commission (DG DEFIS).</p>



<p><strong>20.</strong> The SAFE instrument (Security Action for Europe), 2025; procurement to be carried out by the end of 2030. Cf. European Parliament, EPRS, “EU joint defence procurement”, 2026.</p>



<p><strong>21.</strong> Defence Readiness Omnibus, European Commission, 17 June 2025 (accelerated authorisations, framework agreements up to 10 years, simplification of intra-EU transfers, exclusions in REACH/CLP, communication on sustainable finance); preliminary agreement of the co-legislators on the procurement part, June 2026. Source: European Commission (DG DEFIS); Staff Working Document to the proposal of 17 June 2025.</p>



<p><strong>22.</strong> Readiness Roadmap 2030 and the four flagship projects: European Drone Defence Initiative, Eastern Flank Watch, European Air Shield, European Space Shield; timetable: launch Q1 2026, initial capability end of 2026, full functionality of EDDI end of 2027, Eastern Flank Watch end of 2028. Source: European Commission (DG DEFIS); European Parliament, EPRS, “Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Wall”, October 2025.</p>



<p><strong>23.</strong> European Commission, Action Plan on drone and counter-drone security, 11 February 2026 (IP/26/364); Drone Alliance with Ukraine; announcement of the allocation of EUR 6 billion from the interest on immobilised Russian assets.</p>



<p><strong>24.</strong> “Drone deals fueled VC’s 139% surge into defense robotics”, PitchBook, 19 March 2026 (approx. USD 6.2 billion in 169 transactions; a 139% increase).</p>



<p><strong>25.</strong> “Ukraine 2025 defence tech investment topped $57.2M, but the ‘funded market’ is $6.8B, says PitchBook”, Resilience Media, 9 July 2026.</p>



<p><strong>26.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2023/588 (the secure connectivity programme 2023–2027; the IRIS constellation). Source: EUR-Lex; European Commission (DG DEFIS).</p>



<p><strong>27.</strong> Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), repealing Directive 2016/1148. Source: EUR-Lex; European Commission (DG CNECT).</p>



<p><strong>28.</strong> Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (CER – resilience of critical entities). Source: EUR-Lex.</p>



<p><strong>29.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (the Cyber Resilience Act) – reporting obligations from September 2026, full application from December 2027. Source: EUR-Lex.</p>



<p><strong>30.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 2(2)(a) and (b), Articles 5, 6, 9, 13–14, 35; Article 4(2) TEU. European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2019 on the processing of personal data through video devices. Directive (EU) 2016/680 and the Act of 14 December 2018 on the protection of personal data processed in connection with the prevention and combating of crime.</p>



<p><strong>31.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (the Data Act), applicable from 12 September 2025; Regulation (EU) 2022/868 (the Data Governance Act).</p>



<p><strong>32.</strong> The Digital Omnibus – the data part (GDPR, privacy in electronic communications, NIS2, the Data Act, DORA): negotiating status as at July 2026; withdrawal of the Cypriot Presidency’s compromise text from the COREPER II procedure at the end of June 2026. EDPB and EDPS, Joint Opinion 2/2026 of 11 February 2026 (opposition to the narrowing of the definition of personal data); Joint Opinion 1/2026 of 20 January 2026 on the amendments to the Artificial Intelligence Act.</p>



<p><strong>33.</strong> The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944), Articles 3, 3 bis and 8; Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Article 36.</p>



<p><strong>34.</strong> The Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS within the framework of the CCW Convention: rolling text since 2024; joint statement of 42 states, September 2025; resolution of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly of 6 November 2025 (156 states); joint call of the UN Secretary-General and the President of the ICRC for the conclusion of negotiations by the end of 2026; Seventh CCW Review Conference – November 2026. Source: UNODA; Lieber Institute West Point, May 2026.</p>



<p><strong>35.</strong> NATO, principles of the responsible use of artificial intelligence in defence (2021) and the revised AI strategy.</p>



<p><strong>36.</strong> The Act of 8 December 2006 on the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (Journal of Laws of 2025, item 1267), including the Agency’s extended competences in the area of unmanned systems.</p>



<p><strong>37.</strong> The Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2026, item 815) – implementation of the CER Directive; the powers of critical infrastructure operators to use jamming devices (from 26 June 2026); the new Chapter 6a concerning unmanned floating objects; the extension of the powers of the Police, the Border Guard, the State Protection Service and the Military Gendarmerie; security audits; the Maritime Security Centre.</p>



<p><strong>38.</strong> The Act of 11 March 2022 on the Defence of the Homeland.</p>



<p><strong>39.</strong> The draft deregulatory amendment of the Aviation Law, transmitted by the Civil Aviation Authority to the Ministry of Infrastructure on 5 May 2026 (the system of penalties, insurance, notifications, protection of critical infrastructure, counter-drone systems) (at present no publication of the source text – see the footnotes referring to press information sources).</p>



<p><strong>40.</strong> Directive 2014/53/EU on radio equipment (essential requirements, harmful interference).</p>



<p><strong>41.</strong> Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments; the Act of 24 July 2015 on the control of certain investments.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCOeO35PQh8">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCOeO35PQh8</a> Cf. the analytical material of a Polish commentator on the war and new technologies, based on accounts attributed to Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR), where it was indicated that Russia is producing “more Shaheds of the Geran 4 and 5 model, i.e.&nbsp;the jet variants, than Geran 2 drones, i.e.&nbsp;the piston ones – 3,000 jet-powered per month and 2,800 piston-powered.”</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref2" id="_ftn2">[2]</a> Paweł Jeżowski, Rosja 2026: Koniec snu Putina o Imperium [Russia 2026: The End of Putin’s Dream of Empire] – Paweł Jeżowski <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSA9sh44Qj4&amp;t=27s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSA9sh44Qj4&amp;t=27s</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref3" id="_ftn3">[3]</a> European Commission, <em>Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security</em>, COM(2026) 81 final, 11 February 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref4" id="_ftn4">[4]</a> Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 288 – the legal character of regulations, directives and other instruments of EU law.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref5" id="_ftn5">[5]</a> The Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts, Journal of Laws of 2026, item 815.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref6" id="_ftn6">[6]</a> The governmental bill amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts, Sejm print no. 2355, the explanatory memorandum to the bill.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref7" id="_ftn7">[7]</a> The Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts, <strong>Journal of Laws of 2026, item 815</strong>, introducing, inter alia, Article 16c into the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management. Text of the act: <a href="https://eli.gov.pl/eli/DU/2026/815/ogl/pol?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://eli.gov.pl/eli/DU/2026/815/ogl/pol</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref8" id="_ftn8">[8]</a> The Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management, Article 16c, added by the Act of 29 May 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref9" id="_ftn9">[9]</a> The Act of 3 July 2002 – Aviation Law, Article 156ze(1).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref10" id="_ftn10">[10]</a> The governmental bill amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts, <strong>Sejm print no. 2355</strong>, together with the explanatory memorandum, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 10th term: <a href="https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=2355"><u>https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=2355</u></a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref11" id="_ftn11">[11]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (the AI Act), Article 6 and Article 113.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref12" id="_ftn12">[12]</a> The regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as regards the dates of application of the obligations concerning high-risk AI systems.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref13" id="_ftn13">[13]</a> <strong>Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)</strong> The CFR indicates that the war in Ukraine has led to a hitherto unseen pace of innovation in unmanned systems: “the Russia-Ukraine war is driving innovations in autonomous warfare not seen on other battlefields.” Kristen Thompson, <em>How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict</em>, Council on Foreign Relations, 16 January 2024.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref14" id="_ftn14">[14]</a> The <strong>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</strong> describes the conflict as a “living laboratory” for new doctrines of warfare: “both sides are now engaged in a sustained effort to gain advantage through rapid innovation and adaptation, introducing new types of unmanned systems, countermeasures, and operating methods at unprecedented speed.” Andriy Zagorodnyuk, <em>The New Revolution in Military Affairs</em>, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref15" id="_ftn15">[15]</a> <strong>CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies</strong> The CSIS report describes how, after the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine created within about three years an entirely new defence technology ecosystem based on drones, shortening development cycles from multi-year military programmes to months. Kateryna Bondar, <em>Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance: What the United States Can Learn from Ukraine</em>, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 18 July 2025.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref16" id="_ftn16">[16]</a> K. Bondar, <em>Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance: What the United States Can Learn from Ukraine</em>, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2025. The author indicates that the war in Ukraine has radically shortened the cycles of development and deployment of drone technologies: solutions whose development in classic military programmes took many years are now designed, tested and deployed in periods counted in months. Link: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-what-united-states-can-learn-ukraine">https://www.csis.org/analysis/unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-what-united-states-can-learn-ukraine</a> , Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, <em>Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design</em>, Center for a New American Security / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an analysis of the technological adaptation of both sides of the conflict and the role of the rapid iteration of unmanned systems.</p>



<p>Link: <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org">https://carnegieendowment.org</a> International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), <em>The Military Balance 2025</em>, chapters on the Russo-Ukrainian war and the development of unmanned systems. The IISS indicates that the conflict in Ukraine has led to the mass use of drones as a basic element of combat operations and has accelerated the development of technologies for countering unmanned systems. Link: <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/">https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/</a></p>



<p>Samuel Bendett, <em>Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Role of Unmanned Systems and the Future of Warfare</em>, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Bendett’s analyses frequently indicate that the war in Ukraine has become a “laboratory” for the rapid evolution of unmanned systems, in which the innovation cycle has been shortened from years to months.</p>



<p>Link: <a href="https://www.cna.org/">https://www.cna.org/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref17" id="_ftn17">[17]</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vI1W4bYCuNA&amp;t=181s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vI1W4bYCuNA&amp;t=181s</a>; thus General Skrzypczak in the press service: “<em>the 7th day of the offensive operation conducted by the Russians is ending. The Russians have not achieved their main objectives, the objectives of the operation, that is they have not captured and have not managed to carry out the encirclement of Kyiv and have not come out on the Mykolaiv axis towards Odesa in order to encircle it jointly with a naval landing. On the auxiliary axes they achieved limited success; they approached Kharkiv and Mariupol; they took Zaporizhzhia. The problem is that the Russians have lost their momentum; the offensive has been halted essentially along the entire front line; the Russians are preparing, trying to bring up reserves, to reconstitute the forces that are prepared, in order to prepare them for combat, but at this moment they do not have such capabilities.</em>”</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref18" id="_ftn18">[18]</a> In practice, it is precisely at this point that the real value of legal advice for companies from the UAV and dual-use sector begins. For the same product may simultaneously be subject to the rules of aviation law, export law, data protection, cybersecurity, AI compliance and contractual restrictions connected with its further use by the client or integrator. Effective advice therefore does not consist in the analysis of a single provision in isolation from the rest, but in building a coherent risk map: from the classification of the product and the market entry model, through the assessment of compliance obligations and export restrictions, to the structure of contracts, responsibility for implementation and the security of project financing. In the drone sector, the advantage today is gained not only by those who develop better technology, but also by those who are able to order its legal and transactional status earlier in many jurisdictions simultaneously.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref19" id="_ftn19">[19]</a> Lieber Institute at West Point, <em>Whose Decision Was It? Drone Swarms and the Accountability Gap in Ukraine</em>, 25 July 2026.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref20" id="_ftn20">[20]</a> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems, OJ EU L 152 of 11.06.2019, p.&nbsp;1.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref21" id="_ftn21">[21]</a> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft, in particular Article 14 (the operator registration obligation). The character of the operator registration obligation, including for drones equipped with sensors capable of capturing personal data, is also explained by EASA.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref22" id="_ftn22">[22]</a> Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR), in particular Article 4(1), Article 5, Article 6 and Article 35.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref23" id="_ftn23">[23]</a> Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 December 2014, <strong>František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů</strong>, C-212/13, EU:C:2014:2428.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref24" id="_ftn24">[24]</a> Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref25" id="_ftn25">[25]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (the AI Act), in particular Article 3, Article 6 and Annexes I and III.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref26" id="_ftn26">[26]</a> DJI (full name: SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd., also referred to as Shenzhen DJI Sciences and Technologies Ltd.) is a private technology company with its registered office in Shenzhen in the People’s Republic of China, founded in 2006 by Frank Wang. The company specialises in the production of commercial and professional unmanned systems, image stabilisers, cameras, aerial imaging devices and solutions for consumer, industrial and agricultural applications. Its most recognisable product lines include, inter alia, Mavic, Mini, Air, Avata, Matrice, Agras and the Osmo line of handheld devices. In the trade literature and media coverage, DJI is commonly described as the largest manufacturer of consumer drones in the world, whereby, owing to the private character of the company, data on its precise revenues and sales volumes are not fully public; publicly available sources point, however, to the global scale of its activity, employment counted in the thousands, and a dominant position in the segment of civil camera drones; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/game-of-drones-chinese-giant-dji-hit-by-us-tensions-staff-defections-idUSKBN2AZ0PV/">https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/game-of-drones-chinese-giant-dji-hit-by-us-tensions-staff-defections-idUSKBN2AZ0PV/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref27" id="_ftn27">[27]</a> <a href="https://odessa-journal.com/the-ukrainian-company-has-unveiled-the-zoom-drone-as-an-alternative-to-the-chinese-dji-mavic">https://odessa-journal.com/the-ukrainian-company-has-unveiled-the-zoom-drone-as-an-alternative-to-the-chinese-dji-mavic</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref28" id="_ftn28">[28]</a> <a href="https://rubryka.com/ru/2024/10/21/ukrayinska-kompaniya-rozrobyla-dron-rozvidnyk-zoom-u-nishi-dji-mavic/">https://rubryka.com/ru/2024/10/21/ukrayinska-kompaniya-rozrobyla-dron-rozvidnyk-zoom-u-nishi-dji-mavic/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref29" id="_ftn29">[29]</a> <a href="https://www.frontline-robotics.tech/en#product">https://www.frontline-robotics.tech/en#product</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref30" id="_ftn30">[30]</a> The NATO Codification System (NCS) does not derive from a single statute or regulation, but from NATO’s allied standardisation-logistics system, managed by Allied Committee 135 (AC/135). The basic system document is ACodP-1 (NATO Manual on Codification / AC/135 Codification Manual), which sets out the principles, responsibilities and procedures of codification. The system further rests on a series of NATO standardisation agreements (STANAG), in particular STANAG 3150, STANAG 3151, STANAG 4199 and STANAG 4438.</p>



<p><a href="https://www.dla.mil/Working-With-DLA/Federal-and-International-Cataloging/NATO">https://www.dla.mil/Working-With-DLA/Federal-and-International-Cataloging/NATO</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref31" id="_ftn31">[31]</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fpv-drones-in-ukraine-are-changing-modern-warfare/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fpv-drones-in-ukraine-are-changing-modern-warfare/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref32" id="_ftn32">[32]</a> <a href="https://vgi.com.ua/en/the-race-for-drone-independence-ukraines-fpv-component-ecosystem/">https://vgi.com.ua/en/the-race-for-drone-independence-ukraines-fpv-component-ecosystem/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref33" id="_ftn33">[33]</a> <a href="https://brave1.gov.ua/en">https://brave1.gov.ua/en</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref34" id="_ftn34">[34]</a> <a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/v-ukraini-zapustyly-defense-tech-cluster-brave1-iakyi-stymuliuvatyme-rozvytok-viiskovykh-innovatsii-ta-oboronnykh-tekhnolohii">https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/v-ukraini-zapustyly-defense-tech-cluster-brave1-iakyi-stymuliuvatyme-rozvytok-viiskovykh-innovatsii-ta-oboronnykh-tekhnolohii</a></p>



<p><a href="https://egrants.com.ua/en/programs/grant-for-the-development-of-components-for-unmanned-systems">https://egrants.com.ua/en/programs/grant-for-the-development-of-components-for-unmanned-systems</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref35" id="_ftn35">[35]</a> <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-underexploited-potential-of-ukrainian-defence-tech/">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-underexploited-potential-of-ukrainian-defence-tech/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref36" id="_ftn36">[36]</a> <a href="https://digitalstate.gov.ua/news/tech/brave1-market-ukrayina-zapuskaye-marketpleys-viyskovykh-innovatsiy">https://digitalstate.gov.ua/news/tech/brave1-market-ukrayina-zapuskaye-marketpleys-viyskovykh-innovatsiy</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref37" id="_ftn37">[37]</a> <a href="https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation">https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/5/28/as-russia-ukraine-war-continues-so-does-drone-innovation</a></p>



<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sharply-raise-purchases-home-produced-fpv-drones-2025-2025-03-10">https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sharply-raise-purchases-home-produced-fpv-drones-2025-2025-03-10</a></p>



<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ramps-up-arms-production-can-produce-4-million-drones-year-zelenskiy-2024-10-02">https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ramps-up-arms-production-can-produce-4-million-drones-year-zelenskiy-2024-10-02</a></p>



<p><a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/01/26/ukraine-aims-to-build-7-million-drones-in-2026-70-times-more-than-the-us">https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/01/26/ukraine-aims-to-build-7-million-drones-in-2026-70-times-more-than-the-us</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref38" id="_ftn38">[38]</a> <a href="https://cms.egrants.com.ua/assets/4621da83-b816-4967-8328-b9223a6c0d1c">https://cms.egrants.com.ua/assets/4621da83-b816-4967-8328-b9223a6c0d1c</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref39" id="_ftn39">[39]</a> <a href="https://usf.com.ua/en/about-usf">https://usf.com.ua/en/about-usf</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref40" id="_ftn40">[40]</a> <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu4ua-defence-tech-eu-and-ukraine-launch-new-%E2%82%AC33-million-brave1-grant-programme_en">https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu4ua-defence-tech-eu-and-ukraine-launch-new-%E2%82%AC33-million-brave1-grant-programme_en</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref41" id="_ftn41">[41]</a> See Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, <em>Ukraine launches BRAVE1 defence tech cluster to stimulate development of military innovations and defence technologies</em>; cf.&nbsp;also Brave1, <em>About Brave1</em>, where it is indicated that Brave1 is a governmental initiative directed at the development of defence technologies, implemented by the Innovation Development Fund and initiated by the competent state organs and the components of Ukraine’s security and defence sector.</p>



<p><a href="https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/v-ukraini-zapustyly-defense-tech-cluster-brave1-iakyi-stymuliuvatyme-rozvytok-viiskovykh-innovatsii-ta-oboronnykh-tekhnolohii">https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/v-ukraini-zapustyly-defense-tech-cluster-brave1-iakyi-stymuliuvatyme-rozvytok-viiskovykh-innovatsii-ta-oboronnykh-tekhnolohii</a></p>



<p>See EEAS / Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, <em>EU4UA Defence Tech: EU and Ukraine launch new EUR 3.3 million BRAVE1 grant programme</em>, indicating that the project is financed by the European Union and implemented by BRDO in cooperation with Brave1; cf.&nbsp;also BRDO, <em>Strengthening the Innovation Capacities of the Ukrainian Defence Technological Industrial Base</em>, where the title of the implementation project linked with the EU4UA Defence Tech initiative was disclosed.</p>



<p><a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu4ua-defence-tech-eu-and-ukraine-launch-new-%E2%82%AC33-million-brave1-grant-programme_en">https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu4ua-defence-tech-eu-and-ukraine-launch-new-%E2%82%AC33-million-brave1-grant-programme_en</a></p>



<p>See Regulations for the Brave1 EU4UA Defence Tech Grant Program, available in the Legal Terms section of the programme <em>Grant for the development of components for unmanned systems</em> on the eGrants platform; cf.&nbsp;also the Digital State communication, indicating that EU4UA Defence Tech is financed by the European Union and implemented by BRDO in cooperation with Brave1.</p>



<p><a href="https://egrants.com.ua/en/programs/grant-for-the-development-of-components-for-unmanned-systems">https://egrants.com.ua/en/programs/grant-for-the-development-of-components-for-unmanned-systems</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref42" id="_ftn42">[42]</a> The concept of the radio horizon should be treated as a technical, not a normative, term. It does not function as a legal definition in the EASA regime, in U-space or in the classic acts of electronic communications law. Its legal significance is, however, obvious, because it describes a material limitation of communications on which the possibility of conducting unmanned operations beyond the direct line of sight depends, and thus it indirectly affects the assessment of the conformity of radio equipment, the safety of operations, the design of BVLOS architecture and liability for the continuity and reliability of transmission.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref43" id="_ftn43">[43]</a> <a href="https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/rolling-plan-ict-standardisation/u-space-0">https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/rolling-plan-ict-standardisation/u-space-0</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref44" id="_ftn44">[44]</a> <a href="https://militaeraktuell.at/en/ukraine-opens-next-round-in-drone-frequency-war/">https://militaeraktuell.at/en/ukraine-opens-next-round-in-drone-frequency-war/</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref45" id="_ftn45">[45]</a> <strong>Mesh modems turn Shaheds into FPV drones: how enemy technology works:</strong></p>



<p><a href="https://dev.ua/en/news/mesh-modemy-u-shakhedakh-peretvoriuiut-ikh-na-fpv-drony-1762344495">https://dev.ua/en/news/mesh-modemy-u-shakhedakh-peretvoriuiut-ikh-na-fpv-drony-1762344495</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref46" id="_ftn46">[46]</a> <a href="https://dronexl.co/2026/02/28/ukraine-shahed-drone-relay-stations-belarus/">https://dronexl.co/2026/02/28/ukraine-shahed-drone-relay-stations-belarus/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref47" id="_ftn47">[47]</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fiber-optics-drones-have-emerged-as-critical-kit-for-both-russia-and-ukraine/">https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/fiber-optics-drones-have-emerged-as-critical-kit-for-both-russia-and-ukraine/</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/05/23/ukraine-russia-drones-fiberoptic-jamming/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/05/23/ukraine-russia-drones-fiberoptic-jamming/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref48" id="_ftn48">[48]</a> <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/innovation-challenge-fibre-optic-drones/">https://www.act.nato.int/article/innovation-challenge-fibre-optic-drones/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref49" id="_ftn49">[49]</a> European Commission, Joint Research Centre, <em>C-UAS detection, tracking and identification technology</em>.</p>



<p><a href="https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC140692/JRC140692_01.pdf">https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC140692/JRC140692_01.pdf</a></p>



<p>Alex Braszko, Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 12, 2025; Fiber Optic Drones: Posing a Significant C-UAS Challenge &#8211; <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/287737/fiber_optic_drones_posing_a_significant_c_uas_challenge">https://www.army.mil/article/287737/fiber_optic_drones_posing_a_significant_c_uas_challenge</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref50" id="_ftn50">[50]</a> <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/spoofing">https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/spoofing</a>, <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/afs/afs400/afs410/GNSS/GPS_GNSS_Interference_Resource_Guide.pdf">https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/afs/afs400/afs410/GNSS/GPS_GNSS_Interference_Resource_Guide.pdf</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref51" id="_ftn51">[51]</a> <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-defense-exhibitions/2026-archives-news-defense-exhibitions/bedex-2026/ukraine-to-export-combat-proven-vampire-heavy-drone-for-night-strikes-and-mine-laying">https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-defense-exhibitions/2026-archives-news-defense-exhibitions/bedex-2026/ukraine-to-export-combat-proven-vampire-heavy-drone-for-night-strikes-and-mine-laying</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref52" id="_ftn52">[52]</a> <a href="https://united24media.com/latest-news/russia-forms-units-of-agricultural-drones-to-mirror-ukrainian-tactics-7371">https://united24media.com/latest-news/russia-forms-units-of-agricultural-drones-to-mirror-ukrainian-tactics-7371</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref53" id="_ftn53">[53]</a> <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/01/15/8016293/">https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/01/15/8016293/</a> ; <a href="https://united24media.com/defense-tech/a-russian-drone-that-takes-off-every-minute-along-ukraines-front-how-do-you-stop-molniya-19647">https://united24media.com/defense-tech/a-russian-drone-that-takes-off-every-minute-along-ukraines-front-how-do-you-stop-molniya-19647</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref54" id="_ftn54">[54]</a> <a href="https://github.com/cognis-digital/awesome-drone-warfare-osint/blob/main/docs/drones/lancet.md">https://github.com/cognis-digital/awesome-drone-warfare-osint/blob/main/docs/drones/lancet.md</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref55" id="_ftn55">[55]</a> <a href="https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-fields-new-recon-strike-drone/">https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-fields-new-recon-strike-drone/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref56" id="_ftn56">[56]</a> <a href="https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/">https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WB_Electronics_Warmate">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WB_Electronics_Warmate</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref57" id="_ftn57">[57]</a> <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-fields-the-low-cost-fp-1-long-range-drone-nv-discloses-the-uav-specs-50559428.html">https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-fields-the-low-cost-fp-1-long-range-drone-nv-discloses-the-uav-specs-50559428.html</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref58" id="_ftn58">[58]</a> <a href="https://bavovna.ai/uav/fp-1/">https://bavovna.ai/uav/fp-1/</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref59" id="_ftn59">[59]</a> See NV, How Ukraine-made FP-1 drone reshapes long-range strikes; Militarnyi, Ukrainian Fire Point Establishes In-House Production of Engines for Long-Range Drones; Reuters, Ukrainian drones hit Russia’s largest refinery, in one of deepest strikes yet; cf.&nbsp;also UNN and RBC-Ukraine in relation to the attack on Omsk and the scale of FP-1 production <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-fields-the-low-cost-fp-1-long-range-drone-nv-discloses-the-uav-specs-50559428.html"><u>NV</u></a> <a href="https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-fire-point-establishes-in-house-production-of-engines-for-long-range-drones"><u>Militarnyi</u></a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukrainian-drones-hit-russias-largest-refinery-one-deepest-strikes-yet-2026-07-06/"><u>Reuters</u></a> <a href="https://unn.ua/en/amp/siberia-is-also-within-reach-of-ukrainian-precision-president-on-the-fp-1-drone-strike-on-the-omsk-refinery"><u>UNN</u></a> <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-s-fp-1-drones-fly-3-400-km-to-strike-1783345876.html"><u>RBC-Ukraine</u></a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref60" id="_ftn60">[60]</a> See the MTCR Guidelines, the official MTCR website, indicating the division of the control annex into Category I and Category II; cf.&nbsp;also U.S. Department of State, <em>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked Questions</em>, where it is indicated that Category I covers complete rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicle systems capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km; as regards the absorption of this logic into EU law, see Regulation (EU) 2021/821 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports of dual-use items. <a href="https://www.mtcr.info/en/mtcr-guidelines"><u>MTCR</u></a> <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-frequently-asked-questions"><u>U.S. Department of State</u></a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2021:338:FULL&amp;from=EN"><u>EUR-Lex</u></a>; <a href="https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-frequently-asked-questions">https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-frequently-asked-questions</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref61" id="_ftn61">[61]</a> On the significance of long-range communications for modern drone operations, see Atlantic Council, <em>The coming compute war in Ukraine</em>; on terminal guidance / machine vision enabling autonomous terminal-phase homing, see Modern War Institute, <em>Battlefield Drones and the Accelerating Autonomous Arms Race in Ukraine</em> and Defense Express, <em>How Ukrainian FPV Drones With Automated Terminal Guidance Work</em>; <a href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/battlefield-drones-and-the-accelerating-autonomous-arms-race-in-ukraine/">https://mwi.westpoint.edu/battlefield-drones-and-the-accelerating-autonomous-arms-race-in-ukraine/</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref62" id="_ftn62">[62]</a> See Article 2(3) and recital 24 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (the AI Act), which exclude from the regulation’s scope AI systems used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes; cf.&nbsp;also the discussions on autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) conducted within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), in particular the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref63" id="_ftn63">[63]</a> See EASA, <em>Easy Access Rules for Unmanned Aircraft Systems</em>, revision from June 2026, indicating that this revision incorporates the AMC and GM to Regulation (EU) 2019/947 stemming from ED Decision 2025/018/R; cf.&nbsp;also the online version of the publication of 30 June 2026. <a href="https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/easy-access-rules/easy-access-rules-unmanned-aircraft-systems">EASA</a> <a href="https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/easy-access-rules/online-publications/easy-access-rules-unmanned-aircraft-systems">EASA online publication</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref64" id="_ftn64">[64]</a> See European Parliamentary Research Service, <em>Defence and artificial intelligence</em> (2025), indicating that the European Parliament adopted two main resolutions concerning LAWS and military AI – in 2018 and 2021; cf.&nbsp;also EEAS, <em>Autonomous weapons must remain under human control, Mogherini says at European Parliament</em>. <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769580/EPRS_BRI(2025)769580_EN.pdf"><u>EPRS PDF</u></a> <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/autonomous-weapons-must-remain-under-human-control-mogherini-says-european-parliament_en"><u>EEAS</u></a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref65" id="_ftn65">[65]</a> See European Parliament Legislative Train, <em>Digital Omnibus on AI</em>, indicating that the proposal formed part of the package published on 19 November 2025; cf.&nbsp;also EPRS, <em>Digital Omnibus on AI</em>, where it is indicated that the co-legislators reached agreement in the trilogue on 7 May 2026, and the Parliament approved it on 16 June 2026; on the final adoption by the Council, see Consilium, <em>Artificial Intelligence: Council gives final green light to simplify and streamline rules</em>, 29 June 2026; the final act: Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/package-digital-package/file-digital-omnibus-on-ai">Legislative Train</a> <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/782651/EPRS_BRI%282026%29782651_EN.pdf">EPRS PDF</a> <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/29/artificial-intelligence-council-gives-final-green-light-to-simplify-and-streamline-rules">Consilium</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref66" id="_ftn66">[66]</a> Regulation (EU) 2021/821 entered into force on 9 September 2021 as the new basic act of the Union’s system for the control of exports of dual-use items, replacing the earlier Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. The reference to 15 November 2025 does not mean that the act “ends” in 2025, but that from that day the cited consolidated version applies, taking account of the amendments to the text so far. The date of 8 September 2025, in turn, refers to one of the updates of the control lists / annexes. In August 2026, the regulation still remains an act in force.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref67" id="_ftn67">[67]</a> The transfer of model weights means the transfer of the trained parameters of the AI model themselves – that is, the numbers which the model “carries within itself” after training and on the basis of which it operates.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref68" id="_ftn68">[68]</a> See Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund; cf.&nbsp;also the European Defence Fund (2021–2027) on EUR-Lex and the European Commission’s official website concerning the EDF. <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html">EUR-Lex summary</a> <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/funding-and-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/european-defence-fund_en">European Commission</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref69" id="_ftn69">[69]</a> See Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA); cf.&nbsp;also the EUR-Lex summary and the European Commission’s official website concerning EDIRPA. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2418/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/strengthening-the-european-defence-industry-through-common-procurement.html">EUR-Lex summary</a> <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edirpa_en">European Commission</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref70" id="_ftn70">[70]</a> ASAP was established by Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 as an instrument supporting the increase of the production capacities of European industry in the field of ammunition and missiles; the logic of this act – consisting in the public strengthening of the production capabilities of the defence industry – is functionally transferable also to the mass production of loitering munitions and drones. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1525/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a> <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap_en">European Commission</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref71" id="_ftn71">[71]</a> SAFE (Security Action for Europe) was established by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 as a new instrument strengthening European defence capabilities and the defence industry through financial mechanisms and the support of coordinated actions of the Member States; it remains a current element of the EU defence architecture also in 2026. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a> <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/27/safe-council-adopts-new-financial-instrument-to-boost-eu-defence-capabilities/">Consilium</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref72" id="_ftn72">[72]</a> See Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP); cf.&nbsp;also the European Commission’s official website concerning EDIP. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng">EUR-Lex</a> <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-forging-europes-defence_en">European Commission</a>;</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref73" id="_ftn73">[73]</a> This is a broader European Commission package, adopted on 17 June 2025, intended to create a “defence-readiness mindset” and to simplify the regulatory environment for defence investment. The Commission itself describes it as a comprehensive package and a simplification proposal, and the Parliament in the Legislative Train speaks outright of a Communication on the Defence Readiness Omnibus. It is therefore not simply “the same as EDIP”, but rather a deregulatory-simplification package and the political-legislative environment for faster action by the defence sector. <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/defence-readiness-omnibus_en">European Commission</a> <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-new-era-for-european-defence-and-security/file-defence-omnibus">Legislative Train</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref74" id="_ftn74">[74]</a> See European Commission, <em>Readiness Roadmap 2030</em> and <em>White Paper for European Defence &#8211; Readiness 2030</em>, indicating the four flagship projects: Eastern Flank Watch, the European Drone Defence Initiative, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield. <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en">European Commission</a> <a href="https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en">White Paper</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref75" id="_ftn75">[75]</a> Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023–2027. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/588/oj/eng">eur-lex.europa.eu</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref76" id="_ftn76">[76]</a> Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng">eur-lex.europa.eu</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref77" id="_ftn77">[77]</a> Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (CER) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj/eng">eur-lex.europa.eu</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref78" id="_ftn78">[78]</a> Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (the Cyber Resilience Act, CRA) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng">eur-lex.europa.eu</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref79" id="_ftn79">[79]</a> See EDPB/EDPS Joint Opinion 2/2026 of 11 February 2026 on the Digital Omnibus and the EDPB communication of the same day; as to the further negotiating stage and the withdrawal of the text from COREPER II at the end of June 2026, cf.&nbsp;the expert source: Privacy Next, Digital Omnibus Negotiations (GDPR) &#8211; July 2026 Update. <a href="https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/digital-omnibus-edpb-and-edps-support-simplification-and-competitiveness-while-raising-key_en">EDPB</a> <a href="https://www.edpb.europa.eu/documents/legislative-opinion/edpb-edps-joint-opinion-22026-on-the-proposal-for-a-regulation-as_en">Joint Opinion 2/2026</a> <a href="https://www.privacynext.eu/resources/digital-omnibus-negotiations-gdpr-july-2026-update/">Privacy Next</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref80" id="_ftn80">[80]</a> See Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions; cf.&nbsp;also ICRC, <em>A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare</em>. <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-36">ICRC art. 36</a> <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0902-guide-legal-review-new-weapons-means-and-methods-warfare-measures-implement-article">ICRC Guide</a>.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref81" id="_ftn81">[81]</a> See CCW/MSP/2023/7, para. 20, in which the mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) was defined as the further consideration and formulation, “by consensus”, of a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its character; see also CCW/GGE.1/2026/WP.2, paras. 3–5, 76–78. The Seventh CCW Review Conference has been scheduled for 16–20 November 2026 in Geneva (CCW/MSP/2025/8, para. 19(g); see also UN Secretary-General, Letter convening the Seventh Review Conference of the CCW, April 2026).</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref82" id="_ftn82">[82]</a> NATO, <em>Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy</em>, 22 October 2021, paras. 7–10, in particular para. 9, containing the six Principles of Responsible Use for AI in Defence: Lawfulness, Responsibility and Accountability, Explainability and Traceability, Reliability, Governability and Bias Mitigation; NATO, <em>Summary of NATO’s revised Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy</em>, 10 July 2024, paras. 2, 5-10. The revised strategy of 2024 confirms the applicability of the six principles of the responsible use of AI and provides for their further operationalisation, inter alia through standards, assessment and testing procedures (TEV&amp;V) and certification mechanisms.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref83" id="_ftn83">[83]</a> <a href="https://www.swiatdronow.pl/podsumowanie-posiedzenia-podkomisji-stalej-do-spraw-lotnictwa-cywilnego-10-06-2026-r">https://www.swiatdronow.pl/podsumowanie-posiedzenia-podkomisji-stalej-do-spraw-lotnictwa-cywilnego-10-06-2026-r</a>; Record of the proceedings of the Standing Subcommittee on Civil Aviation (no. 10) of 10 June 2026, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, in particular the statement of the Director of the Unmanned Aircraft Department of the Civil Aviation Authority, Paweł Szymański, who indicated that the draft amendment concerning unmanned aircraft systems prepared by the Civil Aviation Authority was transmitted to the Ministry of Infrastructure on 5 May 2026, constituting a response to the postulates of civil society and the problems revealed in the practice of applying the new provisions; the draft was described as being of a deregulatory, clarifying and ordering character, covering, inter alia, a change of the regulations concerning mandatory third-party liability insurance and sanctions. <a href="https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?SessionID=55B1AE69A4EDC2996BDD70EE751F3A4A86C14EE1&amp;documentId=2AEF7DEF0751F54BC1258E22003E5D23&amp;utm">https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?SessionID=55B1AE69A4EDC2996BDD70EE751F3A4A86C14EE1&amp;documentId=2AEF7DEF0751F54BC1258E22003E5D23&amp;utm</a></p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref84" id="_ftn84">[84]</a> The postulate of meaningful human control does not currently constitute a separate, binding norm of international law. It is a concept developed within the framework of the negotiations concerning autonomous weapon systems, whose purpose is to ensure that the human retains real control over the application of force. Its legal justification is connected above all with the obligation to comply with the existing norms of international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and the taking of precautionary measures, and the obligation to review new means and methods of warfare on the basis of Article 36 of Additional Protocol I.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref85" id="_ftn85">[85]</a> Article 6zj(1)–(4) of the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management, in the wording given by the Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Act on Crisis Management and certain other acts, Journal of Laws of 2026, item 815, in conjunction with Article 156ze(1) of the Act of 3 July 2002 – Aviation Law, consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2025, item 1431, as amended.</p>



<p><a href="#_ftnref86" id="_ftn86">[86]</a> Article 2(2)(d) and Article 2(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items, in the current consolidated text; see also Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1700 of 15 September 2021 on internal compliance programmes for controls of research involving dual-use items: <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/821/2025-11-15/eng?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Regulation 2021/821</a> and Recommendation 2021/1700.</p>



<p><a id="_ftn87" href="#_ftnref87">[87]</a> The Act of 24 July 2015 on the control of certain investments (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2026, item 47, as amended).</p>
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<p>Artykuł <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu/info/it-new-technologies-media-and-communication-technology-law/drone-warfare/">Drone Warfare</a> pochodzi z serwisu <a href="https://www.kg-legal.eu">KIELTYKA GLADKOWSKI LEGAL | CROSS BORDER POLISH LAW FIRM RANKED IN THE LEGAL 500 EMEA SINCE 2019</a>.</p>
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